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Introduction 
In December 1902 the most prominent British imperialist of  his era, Rudyard Kipling, publicly condemned 
British cooperation with Germany during the British-German blockade of  Venezuela.  
The Times, 22 December 1902
His poem, ‘The Rowers’, published in the Times chastised the British Government. Kipling invoked the 
language and ideology of  the ‘German Menace’ in order to express his disgust at British association with 
Germany; this thesis will uncover the process by which these ideas came into being, and how they grew to 
become a powerful force in culture and politics. 
The idea of  a German Menace was not simply a product of  concerns about the defence of  the British 
Isles, but rather that it was born out of  the mentality of  imperialism. Between 1896 and 1903 imperial 
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antagonism between Germany and Britain, in various contexts around the globe, inspired the popular 
perception of  the German Menace as a distinctly imperial threat. Where the established historiography 
locates the beginning of  the Anglo-German rivalry within the development of  the naval armaments race 
after 1904, this study traces the British fear of  Germany much earlier and, crucially, much further from the 
shores of  the North Sea. The German Menace emerged from the context of  imperial anxiety and crises in 
the empire, both in formal territories and areas of  informal influence. By 1902 the stereotypes of  German 
covetousness, autocracy and efficiency coalesced to form a powerful force in British society. Furthermore, 
through the study of  this phenomenon, the interplay between political decision-making, popular sentiment 
and the media will be revealed.  
In the pre-war period Germany was imagined as a holistic menace to empire. For much of  the long 
and diverse historiography of  Britain and Germany before the First World War, the story has so often 
centred on dreadnoughts, invasion scares and European diplomacy. The ‘Age of  Empire’, as Jan Rüger has 
termed it, is often treated as distinct from the era of  Great Power politics.1 The imperial and global origins 
of  the German Menace have yet to be examined within the context of  domestic politics and popular debates 
in the imperial metropole. British domestic and imperial anxieties coalesced into a repertoire – akin to what 
John MacKenzie has described as an ‘ideological cluster’ - of  anti-German tropes.2 A widely-recognised 
anxiety about a German Menace developed in popular culture formed out of  apprehensions about German 
foreign policy and imperial aspirations. This impression of  a threat to empire was constituted from themes 
common to other external imperial anxieties; the jealousy, autocracy and alleged conspiracies attributed to 
Britain’s traditional colonial rivals - France and Russia – were transposed onto Germany after 1896. Within 
existing scholarship the imperial dimensions of  this menace have yet to be explored. Concerns about 
Germany should be viewed as part of  a tradition of  imperial anxiety which focussed upon both internal 
insecurity (revolutionary nationalism, criminality, miscegenation, degeneration and national efficiency) as 
well as external dangers (imperial rivalry in Africa and Asia).  
During the pre-war era British media culture was periodically gripped by imperial anxieties of  this 
nature, which were based upon deep-seated concerns about the stability, strength and durability of  the 
British Empire. This was especially the case during international crises when such stereotypes were voiced, 
often angrily, by the majority. But even during periods of  calm, polemicists, fiction authors, politicians and 
journalists promulgated an anti-German message that informed, and was sustained by, nascent anti-German 
sentiments. The Empire was commonly imagined as a single entity; any encroachment upon the periphery 
was by extension an attack upon its centre. By tracing the development of  the popular perception of  a 
German Menace to Britain’s Empire and its concomitant themes, from its emergence during the Kruger 
Telegram Crisis (1896) until the beginnings of  domestically focussed anxiety about Germany after 1903, it 
will be possible to reveal more about the early development of  stereotypes which dominated twentieth-
century perceptions of  Germany in Britain. 
The Kruger Telegram Crisis, along with the subsequent declaration of  a world empire by the German 
Kaiser, Wilhelm II, in January 1896, represents a paradigm shift in British perceptions. This incident, more 
than any other, laid the foundations for the increasing association of  Germany with a threat to empire. A 
major contention of  this thesis will be to suggest that from the popular perspective, the impact of  the 
Kruger Telegram has been vastly underestimated. Rather than quickly dissipating, the popular anger during 
the crisis scarred British perceptions of  Germany for a generation; it precipitated the crystallization of  
disparate themes into a more coherent notion of  the German threat to Britain. During the period between 
January 1896 and the end of  the Baghdad Railway Negotiations in May 1903, the German threat to the 
British Empire became an increasingly powerful force in British popular and political culture. 
                                                     
1 Rüger, J., The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of  Empire (Cambridge, 2007). 
2 Mackenzie, J.M., Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of  British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester, 1984), p. 2. 
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Between 1896 and 1903 the German imperial menace provided an intermittent but powerful focus in 
British writing, across genres. In weekly and monthly reviews, broadsheet newspapers, ‘yellow dailies’, short-
stories, magazines and popular literature the idea of  a German threat to empire was developed and deployed 
for a variety of  purposes. Inspiration was provided by international events, such as the German seizure of  
Kiao Chou in 1897, attempts to establish the Baghdad Railway and expand German empire in the Pacific, 
anglophobia during the South African War, and brutality during Venezuela Blockade. The British press, 
publishers, statesmen and literary authors were provided with what they perceived to be ample evidence to 
nourish nascent British concerns about the seemingly nefarious aims of  German foreign policy. Links will 
be drawn between these global events and media headline-chasing; throughout this thesis I will offer 
evidence to suggest that in this way international imperial issues interacted closely with domestic popular 
culture.  
The period 1890-1914 witnessed the increasing democratisation of  politics through the ‘Medialisierung’ 
(medialisation) of  society.3 Nearly universal adult literacy, disposable incomes and mass consumption of  the 
written-word, increased the importance of  popular sentiment in political decision-making. Historians of  the 
media have provided valuable analyses of  the relationship between politicians and the press during moments 
of  Anglo-German antagonism. Often detailing the relationships between newspaper editors, 
correspondents and cabinet ministers, scholars have focused upon the ‘top down’ mechanisms of  publicity; 
these approaches, however, do not present a full account of  popular sentiments or perceptions, and fail to 
fully address the texture and detail of  popular discourse and imagery.4 By examining the way important 
international events directly impacted the development of  stereotypes, popular imagination and discourse, 
this thesis will challenge the existing literature and provide new insight. Perceived popular sentiment could 
strongly impact upon the decisions of  governments, and vice versa. In the case of  Germany, anxiety about 
a menace to empire developed into an increasingly powerful political force. Often the assumption has been 
that power-brokers – newspaper owners and politicians – manipulated and held sway over mass-opinion. 
However, popular anger rendered attempts to force popular opinion in a particular direction both risky and 
often futile; the press was much more likely to play to the popular gallery, publishing sensational stories 
which rested upon pre-existent anxieties and appetites, aiming to subtly persuade its readership rather than 
to forcibly coerce them.  
There was a great degree of  ambiguity and complexity in pre-war debates about Germans, the Kaiser 
and the Reich. Recent scholarship has shown how Wilhelm II could provoke both warmth and hostility 
from the British public.5 However, over time the perception of  a jealous, secretive, irrational, efficient and 
dangerous Germany gathered prominence in literature and the media. These vocabularies increasingly 
moved into the mainstream of  popular discourse; the imagery of  the German Menace was increasingly 
recognisable, and powerful. I aim to provide a detailed examination of  how clusters of  stereotypes and ideas 
endure over time and gain in authenticity when real-world events seem to prove them correct. Through this 
process of  gathering historical legitimation, such ideas acquire a more generalised acceptance and their own 
form of  authority. Despite some ambiguity, the regularity of  outbursts of  anxiety involving Germany in this 
period helped to sustain fears of  Germany’s intentions, even during periods when other political issues took 
priority. Importantly, previous outbursts granted legitimacy and authenticity to the opinions of  those who 
warned of  the impending German Menace.  
This thesis aims to further understanding of  the ambiguity of  pre-war anti-German sentiment, arguing 
that, though there were periods where anger towards Germany and the Kaiser was less prevalent, during 
the period 1896-1903 there was an increasing sense of  negativity and anxiety directed towards Germany. 
Initiated by the major outburst of  popular anger surrounding the Kruger Telegram in early 1896, by mid-
                                                     
3 Bösch, F., Hg, N.F., & Wallstein, G., Medialisierung Und Demokratie Im 20. Jahrhundert, Bösch, F., & Frei, N. (eds) (Göttingen, 2006). 
4 See for example: Schramm, M., Das Deutschlandbild in Der Britischen Presse, 1912-1919 (Berlin, 2007); Geppert, D., Pressekriege: Öffentlichkeit Und 
Diplomatie in Den Deutsch-Britischen Beziehungen (1896-1912) (Munich, 2007). 
5 Neiberg, M.S., Dance of  the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of  World War I (Cambridge, MA and London, 2011). 
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1903, the characterisation of  Germany as a malevolent threat to the British Empire had become a major 
feature of  the British cultural and political landscape. The importance of  the German Menace will be 
indicated by examining its ability to strongly influence and even change government policy. Additionally, by 
tracing the issue of  anti-German sentiment, this thesis will emphasise the important development of  a broad 
and rapid process of  democratisation in politics and media at the turn of  the twentieth century.  
Historiography 
The historiography of  the Anglo-German relationship between 1896 and 1914 is extensive; this thesis, 
however, aims to provide a unique and novel contribution to established literature. Since the 1980s, 
diplomatic historians, including Paul Kennedy and later Matthew Seligmann, have studied the intricacies and 
complexities of  diplomacy between Britain and Germany. These historians justifiably investigated and 
emphasised the official importance of  imperial competition upon official actors. However, they have not 
engaged sufficiently with the interface between politics and popular culture. Historians of  the press and 
journalism have provided purely press-focussed analyses of  the relationship between British journalists and 
the Kaiser over the period, while historians engaged with race and anti-alienism have remained largely aloof  
from debates about Germany’s foreign policy and image as a rival power.6 We are thus faced with a need to 
unite disparate strands of  historical study to analyse more clearly the relationships between them. The 
routine separation of  cultural, political, economic and social history has led to significant gaps in our 
understanding of  Late Victorian and Edwardian culture and society.  
The methods adopted by historians of  popular literature and empire, such as Yumna Siddiqi, A. Michael 
Matin and Stephen Arata, will be incorporated and a wide range of  sources will be utilised, in order to 
provide depth to the analysis of  the interface between media, politics and the public. This study will also 
draw inspiration from histories of  popular imperialism developed since the 1980s. The works of  John M. 
MacKenzie and Andrew S. Thompson have highlighted the pervasive and diverse impact of  the British 
Empire upon metropolitan culture. Thus, new insight will be offered by engaging with several distinct 
historiographies and incorporating a wider array of  popular sources, analysing British popular imagination 
as a real-time and constantly evolving phenomenon, and emphasising the importance of  empire in late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century British culture.7 
Popular Imperialism 
A key methodological underpinning of  this thesis is drawn from a school of  history which has argued that 
Britain possessed an inherently imperial culture.8 The nature of  imperialism in Britain has been debated 
                                                     
6 Reinermann, L., Der Kaiser in England: Wilhelm II Und Sein Bild in Der Britischen Öffentlichkeit (Paderborn, 2001); Yarrow, S., ‘The Impact of  Hostility 
on Germans in Britain’, in Kushner, T. & Lunn, K. (eds), The Politics of  Marginality: Race, the Radical Right and Minorities in Twentieth Century Britain 
(London, 1990); Panayi, P., ‘German Immigrants in Britain, 1815-1914’, in Panayi, P. (ed.), Germans in Britain Since 1500 (London, 1996); Panayi, 
P., Immigration, Ethnicity and Racism in Britain, 1815-1945 (Manchester, 1994); Reinermann, L., ‘Fleet Street and the Kaiser: British Public Opinion 
and Wilhelm II’, German History, 26:4 (2008), pp. 469–85. 
7 Kennedy, P.M., The Rise of  the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London, 1980); Seligmann, M.S., Rivalry in Southern Africa, 1893-99: The 
Transformation of  German Colonial Policy (London, 1998); Rüger, J., Great Naval Game; Geppert, D., Pressekriege; Siddiqi, Y., Anxieties of  Empire and 
the Fiction of  Intrigue (New York, 2008); Arata, S., Fictions of  Loss in the Victorian Fin de Siecle: Identity and Empire (Cambridge, 1996); Matin, A.M., 
‘Kim, Invasion-Scare Literature, and the Russian Threat to British India’, in Sullivan, Z.T. (ed.), Kim (New York, 2002), pp. 358–74; MacKenzie, 
J.M. (ed.), Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester, 1986); Thompson, A.S., The Empire Strikes Back: The Impact of  Imperialism on Britain From the 
Mid-Nineteenth Century (Harlow, 2005). 
8 Porter, B., The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford, 2004), p. 6; Hall and Rose have provided one of  the most 
complete historiographies of  the study of  British imperial culture in Rose, S.O. & Hall, C. (eds), At Home With The Empire: Metropolitan Culture 
and the Imperial World (Cambridge, 2006). 
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since the high-point of  empire at the beginning of  the twentieth century; great theorists such as Lenin, 
Schumpeter and Hobson all argued that imperialism was a predominantly non-populist phenomenon.9 
British historians, most prominently John MacKenzie and Bernard Porter, have been inspired to investigate 
British ‘popular imperialism’ by these theorists. Until the 1980s, historians generally saw British popular 
imperialism as short-lived. Authors such as Fieldhouse, Koss and Porter argued in the 1970s that a brief  
surge of  jingoism occurred at the end of  the nineteenth century. In their view, the British were briefly 
enamoured with the expansion of  the Empire in the 1880s, but in spite of  this surge in support, it was soon 
in decline. They suggested this decline was generated by key turning points such as the South African War, 
the Edwardian age of  insecurity, or the horrors of  the First World War.10 In MacKenzie’s view, this argument 
was fundamentally flawed because they drew largely upon the views of  the intelligentsia. Intellectuals such 
as Orwell, Wells, Graves and Forster had turned angrily upon empire and jingoism in the wake of  the First 
World War, and attacked the mentality of  imperialism. Such problematic assumptions about British culture 
drove MacKenzie to investigate whether they were indeed true or a myth developed over the twentieth 
century.11 
Beginning with Propaganda and Empire (1984) John MacKenzie searched an array of  popular cultural 
mediums - fiction, newspapers, traditions, music hall, plays, art, oral histories, state propaganda, adverts, 
consumer products, television and youth organisations - for the influence of  imperialism.12 By examining 
this broad range of  material, which provides the backdrop to the culture of  any modern society, 
MacKenzie’s self-ascribed aim was to ‘establish imperialism…as a core ideology in British society between 
the 1880s and the 1950s.’13 This alternative view of  British culture gathered many other historians into what 
may be called a ‘school’ of  popular imperialism.14 Complementing this hypothesis, 1980s accounts from 
historians such as Penny Summerfield have emphasised the importance in this period of  popular patriotism 
                                                     
9 Their approaches to imperialism provide theoretical insight into the supposed impact of  an empire upon its own metropolitan culture. Hobson 
attacked popular imperialism, arguing that it was whipped up by the media in collaboration with wealthy imperialists in order to suit their aims 
and desires; see Hobson, J.A., The Psychology of  Jingoism (London, 1901); Hobson, J.A., Imperialism (New York, 1902). Lenin, drawing inspiration 
from Hobson’s criticisms of  empire, argued that ‘the bribery of  a handful in the top layers’ of  the ‘proletariat’ was responsible for the acceptance 
of  imperialism, in what was generally a product of  the social elite. Schumpeter’s approach was to describe imperialism as a late-nineteenth 
century aberration, and a primitive human response and an aggressive instinct for expansion and domination.’ These three influential thinkers 
gave the impression that imperialism was a predominantly non-populist phenomenon. Lenin, V.I. Imperialism and the Split in Socialism (Moscow, 
1972), pp. 4, 14, as cited in Barroll, M.A., ‘Toward a General Theory of  Imperialism’, Journal of  Anthropological Research, 36:2 (1980), p. 175; 
Schumpeter, J., ‘Zur Soziologie Der Imperialismen’, Archiv Fur Sozialwissenschaft Und Sozialpolitik, 46 (1919), pp. 1–39; Schumpeter, J., Imperialism 
and Social Classes, Sweezy, P. (ed.) (New York, 1951); Kruger, D.H., ‘Hobson, Lenin, and Schumpeter on Imperialism’, Journal of  the History of  
Ideas, 16:2 (1955), pp. 252–9; Cunningham Wood, J., ‘J. A. Hobson and British Imperialism’, American Journal of  Economics and Sociology, 42:4 (1983), 
pp. 483–500; Lenin, V.I., ‘Imperialism and the Split in Socialism’, Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata, 2 (1916); MacKenzie, J.M. (ed.), Imperialism and Popular 
Culture. 
10 Fieldhouse, D., Economics and Empire (London, 1976); Koss, S., ‘Wesleyanism and Empire’, Historical Journal, 18 (1975), pp. 105–18; Porter, B., 
‘The Edwardians and Their Empire’, in Read, D. (ed.), Edwardian England (London, 1982); Price, R., An Imperial War and the British Working Class 
(London, 1972); Pelling, H., Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain (London, 1979); Beloff, M., Imperial Sunset (London, 1969); For a 
full review of  the works preceding MacKenzie see his introduction to Propaganda and Empire; and Imperialism and Popular Culture; There were works 
previous to MacKenzie, as he admits, which sought to emphasise the popularity of  imperialism in British culture e.g. Robbins, K., ‘Sir Edward 
Grey and the British Empire’, Journal of  Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1 (1972), pp. 3–21; Harcourt, F., ‘Disraeli’s Imperialism, 1866-1868: A 
Question of  Timing’, Historical Journal, 23:1 (1980), pp. 87–109; Field, H.J., Toward a Programme of  Imperial Life (Oxford, 1982); Cunningham, H., 
‘Jingoism in 1877-78’, Victorian Studies, 14 (1971), pp. 429–53; Cunningham, H., ‘The Language of  Patriotism’, History Workshop, 12 (1981), pp. 
8–33. 
11 Mackenzie, J.M., Propaganda and Empire, p. 1. 
12 Mackenzie, J.M., ‘In Touch with the Infinite: The BBC and the Empire, 1923-53’, in Mackenzie, J.M. (ed.), Imperialism and Popular Culture 
(Manchester, 1986), pp. 165–91; Mackenzie, J.M., ‘Heroic Myths and Empire’, in Popular Imperialism and the Military, 1850-1950 (Manchester, 1992), 
pp. 109–38; Mackenzie, J.M., ‘Empire and National Identities the Case of  Scotland’, Transactions of  the Royal Historical Society, 8 (1998), pp. 215–
31; Mackenzie, J.M., ‘Empire and Metropolitan Cultures’, in Louis, W.R. & Porter, A.N. (eds), The Oxford History of  the British Empire, 5 Vols. 
(Oxford, 1998-9), Vol. III: The Nineteenth Century (1999), p. 292. 
13 Mackenzie, J.M., Propaganda and Empire, p. 11. 
14 MacKenzie contributed to and inspired a body of  work examining in closer detail the various sources and regions mentioned in Propaganda and 
Empire: See MacKenzie, J.M. (ed.), Imperialism and Popular Culture, for a series of  articles focussing on his argument. See also Mackenzie, J.M. (ed.), 
Popular Imperialism and the Military, 1850-1950 (Manchester, 1992); Richards, J. (ed.), Imperialism and Juvenile Literature (Manchester, 1989); Castle, 
K., Britannia’s Children: Reading Colonialism through Children’s Books (Manchester, 1996); Ward, S., British Culture and the End of  Empire (Manchester, 
2001); Richards, J., Imperialism and Music: Britain 1876-1953 (Manchester, 2001); Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I., ‘Building a British Superman: Physical 
Culture in Interwar Britain’, Journal of  Contemporary History, 41:4 (2006), pp. 595–610; Woodham, J., ‘Images of  Africa and Design at the British 
Empire Exhibitions between the Wars’, Journal of  Design History, 2:1 (1989), pp. 15–33; Mackenzie, J.M., ‘Empire and Metropolitan Cultures’, p. 
292; David Cannadine’s Ornamentalism (2001) clearly drew its title in critique of  Said’s influential study. In it he seeks to emphasise the importance 
of  social class in the British Empire. He saw the empire as being an outward projection of  the British class hierarchy, rather than founded upon 
racial hegemony. Cannadine argued that the British used this class structure to imagine and classify their empire. His argument is placed neatly 
between MacKenzie and Porter, as, like MacKenzie, he emphasises the importance of  empire to British culture, but perceives it as very much a 
‘class-act’, linking him to Porter’s class based analysis. Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (Oxford, 2001), pp. 3–10. 
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and the rise of  a sense of  national pride in the empire.15 The development of  an acute sense of  British 
nationalism in the late-nineteenth century was most clearly indicated by commonly noted and powerfully 
popular ‘jingoism’. This form of  assertive, even aggressive, nationalism epitomised the rise of  popular 
militarism in Britain, as argued by Hugh Cunningham in ‘The Language of  Patriotism’ (1981) and Cecil Eby 
in The Road to Armageddon (1981).16 Furthermore, the seminal work of  Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 
The Invention of  Tradition (1983) argued for the importance of  ‘mass produced’ traditions in the same era in 
the development of  modern nation-states.17 Similarly, the musings of  Edward Said, inspired and 
complemented MacKenzie’s thesis. In Orientalism (1978) Said argued for the construction of  the ‘Oriental 
other’ in the minds of  Europeans, in order to deal with and dominate the empire in the East.18 Culture and 
Imperialism (1994) further suggested that British culture, as well as that of  other imperial nations, was 
inherently connected to empire. Through literary examples by writers such as Dickens, Brontë, Conrad and 
Kipling, he sought to show that British people were impacted upon subtly by empire in their way of  life and 
attitudes, even where these connections did not seem obvious.19 Both Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism 
were important in suggesting the predominance of  the empire in the minds of  the metropolitan population.  
Bernard Porter’s Absent-minded Imperialists (2001) challenged this ‘popular imperialist’ school of  thought; 
his title was inspired by J.R. Seeley’s oft-quoted phrase: ‘We seem to have conquered and peopled half  the 
world in a fit of  absence of  mind.’20 Porter aimed to show that Britain was far from a society ‘steeped’ in 
empire;21 he sought to demonstrate instead that the working classes were ignorant of  empire, the middle 
classes were apathetic, and that in truth the Empire only impacted upon the imperial elite at the top of  the 
social ladder.22 Porter challenged the evidence cited by ‘MacKenzie-ites’, and ‘Saidists’23, arguing that it 
represented isolated, over-emphasised examples, which when viewed in perspective were swamped by the 
other important strands in British culture.24 Porter’s book was intentionally provocative and received a 
polarity of  reviews and responses;25 his arguments have inspired historians across the various disciplines to 
apply more rigorous methodologies, and to question their own assumptions. Fighting the teleological 
impulse is perhaps the biggest challenge for any objective historian, and Porter’s work has added 
immeasurable depth and assiduity to popular histories of  empire. Since Porter the most prominent additions 
to the debate have been offered by Andrew Thompson, whose monograph, The Empire Strikes Back? (2005), 
                                                     
15 Hampton, M., ‘The Press, Patriotism, and Public Discussion: C. P. Scott, the “Manchester Guardian”, and the Boer War, 1899-1902’, Historical 
Journal, 44:1 (2001), pp. 177–97; Summerfield, P., ‘Patriotism and Empire: Music-Hall Entertainment, 1870-1914’, in Imperialism and Popular Culture 
(Manchester, 1986), pp. 17–48; Cunningham, H., ‘Language of  Patriotism’, pp. 8–33. 
16 Eby, C.D., The Road to Armageddon: The Martial Spirit in English Popular Literature, 1870-1914 (Durham, 1987); Hichberger, J.W.M., Images of  the 
Army: The Military in British Art, 1815-1914 (Manchester, 1988); Adams, M.C., The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of  World War I 
(Bloomington, 1990); MacDonald, R.H., The Language of  Empire: Myths and Metaphors of  Popular Imperialism, 1880-1918 (Manchester, 1994); The 
phrase was popularised by an anti-Russian nationalistic song of  the 1870s: During the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) G.H. MacDermott’s famous 
song: “We don’t want to fight but by Jingo if  we do, We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, we’ve got the money too, We’ve fought the Bear 
before, and while we’re Britons true, The Russians shall not have Constantinople.” Hunter, A.W. and R., The Illustrated Victorian Songbook (London, 
1984), pp. 180–184. 
17 Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds), The Invention of  Tradition (Cambridge, 1992); Hobsbawm, E., Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, 
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20 J.R. Seeley has been a further influence upon such historical studies. In his Expansion of  England (1883) he argued that Britain had always been 
‘intimately associated with her Empire.’ Seeley, J.R., The Expansion of  England (London, 1883) as cited in; Rose, S.O., & Hall, C. (eds), At Home 
With The Empire, pp. 8–9; Porter, B., Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. 18. 
21 The idea of  a society ‘steeped’ in imperialism was attacked by Porter in Ibid., passim. 
22 Porter, B., ‘“Empire, What Empire?” Or, Why 80% of  Early- and Mid-Victorians Were Deliberately Kept in Ignorance of  It’, Victorian Studies, 
46:2 (2004), p. 257. 
23 MacKenzie assigned this name to followers of  Edward Said in Mackenzie, J.M., Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts (Manchester, 1995); as 
cited in Porter, B., Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. ix. 
24 Ibid., p. viii. 
25 Epstein, J., ‘Review: The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain by Bernard Porter’, American Historical Review, 112:2 
(2007), pp. 587–8; MacKenzie, J.M., ‘‘Comfort’ and Conviction: A Response to Bernard Porter’, Journal of  Imperial and Commonwealth History, 36:4 
(2008), pp. 659–68; Morris, J., ‘Review: The Absent-Minded Imperialists: What the British Really Thought About Empire by Bernard Porter’, 
The Observer (5 November 2004). Antoinette Burton was strongest in her defence of  the established popular-imperialist doctrine, attacking 
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Victorian Studies, 47:4 (2005), pp. 626–8. 
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emphasised the complex and significant impact of  Empire upon British culture through a detailed analysis 
of  economic indicators. Thompson has continued to put forward a more nuanced understanding of  the 
relationship between Britain and its empire, suggesting the Empire’s ‘impact upon Britain was pervasive, but 
Britain’s embrace of  that empire more tentative.’26 Thompson’s more plural and less prescriptive definition 
of  imperial culture has been influential in the writing of  this thesis. 
Even Porter admitted that during the age of  high imperialism (1880-1914) some form of  popular 
imperialism – and jingoism – gripped the British populace. The debate raged less fiercely about this period, 
but it has nonetheless revealed the value of  analytical scrutiny, even in a period which seemed to be so 
overtly ‘imperial’ we must continue question the nature of  imperialism in all its forms. In the research for 
this thesis I have sought to retain a sense of  careful scepticism; the quantity of  coverage and discussion of  
empire, and the challenges to it in the press, in official sources and in literature and stage suggest that Britain 
was an imperial culture, and that anxieties about imperial decline and rivalry could permeate beyond 
intellectual debate or cabinet meetings. This constructive historiographical debate has provided a 
fundamental inspiration for my own work, both in terms of  my understanding of  the relationship between 
Britain and its Empire, but also in my approach to the archive. MacKenzie and Thompson in particular have 
strongly influenced my approach to this thesis in the way in which I have sought to investigate the imperial 
dimensions of  popular responses to a German challenge to Britain.  
Popular ‘Germanophobia’ 
Recent scholarship has revealed the ubiquity of  both imperial anxieties and xenophobia in Britain during 
the Victorian and Edwardian ages. The British were increasingly concerned about dangerous new political 
and national groupings threatening social order in Britain’s urban centres. Anarchist and Irish Nationalist 
groups similarly posed threats to the metropolitan British civil order, especially from the 1860s until the 
mid-1890s, in the provincial cities and especially in London.27 While Fenian bombings were viewed largely 
as a domestic problem, anarchism was increasingly associated with foreign immigration. Many of  Britain’s 
anarchists were political refugees escaping repression from other states, including France and Russia. The 
fear and anger directed toward anarchists was increasingly conflated with growing anti-alienism in Britain 
around the turn-of-the-century. At the turn of  the twentieth century the large population of  Eastern 
European Jews in London was perceived with increasing hostility,28 as were the similarly sizeable community 
of  Germans and Austrians, and smaller number of  Chinese in London and the provincial towns.29 Thus, a 
wider trend of  xenophobia or anti-alienism developed over the course of  the 1890s and 1900s, most clearly 
expressed in the campaign for and passing of  the Aliens Act of  1905. Historians have discussed the changing 
attitudes towards immigration and the hardening social and political attitudes, combined with press agitation, 
which precipitated the act of  parliament.30 Historiography in the 1970s and 1980s focussed largely on 
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Eastern European Jewish immigration and the resultant animosity in Britain, though other immigrant 
groups did feature to a lesser extent.31  
Following on from the works of  race relations scholars such as John Garrard (1971) and Bernard 
Gainer (1972), during the 1990s and 2000s a substantial body of  works studied the role of  anti-Germanism 
in Britain and the sizeable anti-German riots which occurred during the First World War.32 Panikos Panayi, 
in particular, studied immigrants in Britain, with a particular focus upon the German population in London. 
According to Panayi and others, German immigrants in Britain were often treated with distaste; as waiters 
and bandsmen they attracted the ire of  some members of  Victorian society. However, they were mostly left 
unharmed and allowed to prosper; whatever animosity there was, Panayi argued, ‘the main strand…was 
political’.33 While it is quite correct for sceptics to suggest that there were relatively few occasions when the 
German immigrants living in Britain were subjected to violence or alienation, it would be a mistake to infer 
from this that popular anti-German sentiment was not an influential element in British society; the frequency 
of  expressions of  concern, fear or anger towards Germany undermines this mode of  thought. There was 
a vital disconnect between the domestic anti-alienism, and the global and imperial menace of  Germany 
perceived in popular discourse between 1896 and 1905. The fear of  a wider international challenge from 
Germany as a world power did not necessarily implicate Germans ‘in our midst’ in the same framework. 
Laura Tabili has suggested that there was a direct link between the decline of  popular ‘francophobia’ in 
Britain, and the dissipation of  a French imperial challenge. This argument lends support to the suggestion 
that the growing presence of  an imperial challenge from Germany was a major cause for rising popular 
expressions of  anti-German sentiment, separate from issues of  aliens and immigration.34  
Another branch of  historiography has considered the more abstract and internationalised views of  
Germany before 1914, as distinct from histories based in immigration and race. In 1973, Paul Kennedy’s 
article ‘Idealists and Realists’ described the differing conceptions of  Germany in Britain. The ‘idealist’ group, 
he argued, was formed out of  those who argued for peace and closer ties, and maintained that any threat 
from Germany was an exaggeration or a fallacy; they were often, but not exclusively, from the left side of  
the political debate. For Kennedy these ‘idealists’ swam against the ‘flood-tide of  nationalism’ which 
increasingly gripped society. The ‘realists’, however, were those who either genuinely believed in the danger 
that Germany represented or used the threat of  Germany to procure political goals. Kennedy used the 
example of  tariff  reform, in which anger towards Germany was used to motivate people to vote in favour 
of  protectionism.35 Kennedy also described ‘the Two Germanies’ – one full of  Prussian militarism and 
aggression, the other the home of  music, art and literature, Wanderlust and Goethe. The distinctions he 
made suggest that in spite of  the political dominance of  the Liberals in government in the decade before 
the First World War, there was a contrasting shift rightwards in terms of  nationalism and xenophobia. From 
such works it is possible to suggest that while anti-German sentiment tended to be strongest amongst the 
political right, it was by no means restricted to it. Furthermore, the fact that by this period a majority of  
Britain’s most popular newspapers, especially the popular tabloids, were based on a right-sided and more 
reactionary outlook. Though there were dissenting voices – often Liberal or Socialist – arguing against rising 
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‘Germans in Sheffield 1817-1918’, German Life and Letters, XLV:1 (1992), pp. 82–101; Bertolette, W.F., ‘German Stereotypes In British Magazines 
Prior To World War I’ (MA Thesis, Louisiana State University, 2004); Scully, R., ‘‘A Pettish Little Emperor’: Images of  Kaiser Wilhelm II in 
Punch, 1888–1901’, in Scully, R. & Quartly, M. (eds), Drawing the Line: Using Cartoons as Historical Evidence (Clayton, Victoria (AUS), 2009); 
Macenczak, A., ‘German Enemy Aliens and the Decline of  British Liberalism in World War I’ (PhD Thesis, Louisiana State University, 2010); 
Bertolette, W.F., ‘British Identity and the German Other’ (PhD Thesis, Louisiana State University, 2012); Argyle, G., Germany as Model and Monster: 
Allusions in English Fiction, 1830s-1930s (London, 2002). 
33 Panayi, P., ‘German Immigrants’; Panayi, P., The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World (Oxford, 1991); Panayi, P., Immigration, 
Ethnicity and Racism; Yarrow, S., ‘Impact of  Hostility’. 
34 Tabili, L., ‘A Homogeneous Society? Britain’s Internal ‘Others’ 1800–Present’, in Rose, S.O. & Hall, C. (eds), At Home With The Empire: Metropolitan 
Culture and the Imperial World (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 65–66. 
35 Kennedy, P.M., ‘Idealists and Realists: British Views of  Germany, 1864-1939’, Transactions of  the Royal Historical Society, 25 (1975), p. 146. 
 Introduction 9 
 
anti-German sentiment, they were increasingly swept aside by the ‘flood-tide’ of  the majority. Members of  
the Right both admitted their belief  in a German Menace, and those who argued against it grew isolated.  
Kennedy’s contribution to the debate on perceptions was influential. His conception of  
germanophobes and germanophiles has informed many of  the later contributions to the historiography of  
the image of  Germany before the First World War. A.J.A Morris’s The Scaremongers (1984) studied journalistic 
‘realists’ who propounded, from a very early stage, the fear of  Germany in their articles. Morris focussed 
upon the private papers and reports of  journalists such as Valentine Chirol and Leopold Maxse, who 
attacked Germany and warned the British public that Germany represented a threat to Britain’s future.36 
The German ‘other’ has also been of  particular interest to literary historians as a counter-balance to British 
national identity.37 Gisela Argyle’s Germany as Model and Monster (2002) and Petra Rau’s English Modernism, 
National Identity and the Germans (2009) tackled the changing image of  Germany over the course of  the 
nineteenth century, from the perception of  a country of  high culture – art, literature and music – towards 
the Prussian lash and jackboot depictions of  the twentieth century.38 A historian of  literature and national 
identity, Rau sought to emphasise ‘the necessity of  the German other for the construction of  Englishness’.39 It 
is this counterposing of  the German ‘other’ that has animated so many such accounts over recent years.  
The study of  popular or literary ‘germanophobia’ or the perception of  a German ‘other’ has for some, 
like Jan Rüger, reached the point at which little more can be added.40 The value of  accounts which seek to 
explain only perceptions of  Germany is questionable when we consider that they rarely relate these 
perceptions to wider issues – namely political, social and international factors.41 In light of  these criticisms, 
the aim here is not only to understand the way in which the views of  Germany changed over time, but also 
to investigate how major events and processes interacted with those changes, and how popular discourse 
interacted with political decision-making. In so doing, the intention will be to develop a deeper 
understanding of  the changing role of  Germany as a cause for imperial anxiety. The challenge presented by 
Germany in a global-imperial context mirrors periods of  rumbling anti-German sentiment in popular 
discourse, and the sudden outbursts of  anger which helped disperse this sense of  looming threat into ever 
wider sections of  the community. Rather than fizzling away, these peaks acted to move the on-going 
discourse in more radical directions.  
Recently Krishnan Kumar drew upon the work of  Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism (1995), to suggest 
that the concept of  ‘banal imperialism’ might provide a better understanding of  the endemic presence of  
imperialism in British lives throughout the twentieth century. Kumar suggested that ‘the nation is repeatedly 
and routinely drummed into the consciousness of  people – but at so banal a level as to be virtually 
unnoticed.’ Kumar suggested further that though Porter, Cannadine and Benedict Anderson may have been 
correct that empire was a ‘class act’, this was not to say that it did not form a vital function in the self-image 
of  all of  its citizens. Thus using ‘banal imperialism’ as a concept, rock solid conclusions may not necessarily 
be drawn, but the ‘‘field of  meaning’ within which individuals in Britain were able to understand themselves 
and form some idea of  their collective identities’ might be ascertained.42 Kumar’s use of  the ‘banal’ provides 
a useful analytical tool. How do we successfully analyse latently held thoughts and opinion? When press 
attention was not directed towards an international event involving Germany, what happened to the German 
Menace? The period 1896-1904 witnessed outbursts of  anti-German sentiment, provoked by major 
international events, especially relating to the empire. As Lothar Reinermann argued in ‘Fleet Street and the 
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Kaiser’ (2008),43 the image of  the Kaiser remained ambiguous until August 1914. That Wilhelm II could be 
both hated and loved begs a question about the meaning of  antipathy towards Germany in this period. 
Similarly, prominent historians such as Catriona Pennell and Michael Neiberg have recently argued that the 
First World War arrived largely as a surprise to Britons, and that this therefore meant that popular anti-
German sentiment was not as significant in Britain before August 1914 as previously claimed.44 Though 
their evidence for the surprised reaction to war in 1914 is convincing, there is still room for a ‘thicker’ 
description of  the way anti-German sentiment had developed over the previous years.  
In response to the arguments of  Pennell and Neiberg I would argue that although, as their work shows, 
war was received with surprise in Britain there would have been no question as to which country that war 
was to be fought against. After the initial shock of  war, propagandists and journalists found the images of  
Germany which developed after 1896 easily accessible. Well known ideas of  German brutality – embodied 
in the image of  the ‘Hun’ (latent in British discourse since 1900), absolutism, covetousness and treachery 
were all archetypes developed in the pre-war period. It seems that there were many continuities in the 
development of  pre-war anti-German stereotypes, and the clear expression of  anti-German sentiment 
during the First World War. Popular discourse was influenced strongly by this growing catalogue of  shocks 
and crises associated in this case with Germany, which cemented the stereotypes and ideas developed during 
crises of  popular anxiety. Anxieties and tropes were stored and recalled from past outrages, and during later 
crises were then drawn upon by the mass media to explain events as they occurred. In this way imagined 
fears can gather authenticity even in periods when there have been apparently few mentions of  them. I will 
argue that the events and developments studied in this thesis were fundamental in the crystallization of  the 
German Menace, a commonly acknowledged popular trope from the pre-war period, which was developed 
further once hostilities had begun.  
Invasion Scares and Spy Fever 
In discussing the presence of  Germany in the British popular imagination and politics in turn-of-the-century 
Britain, the narrative of  invasion and future war in literature must feature prominently. Another important 
genre of  this period was the invasion or future-war novel, and its close relative the ‘spy novel’. The 
extraordinary success of  George Chesney’s Battle of  Dorking in 1871 inspired the popular phenomenon of  
‘invasion scares’ in literature.45 Chesney’s story of  invasion revolved around the events of  the Franco-
Prussian War; it was a tale of  crushing defeat of  the British metropole and the decimation of  the Empire 
with Chesney prophesying that Britain would become a vassal state of  the German Empire.46 Dorking laid 
the foundation for several generations of  invasion fiction writers; until the last years of  the nineteenth 
century on the most part the ‘dastardly’ French, ‘the old enemy’, were often portrayed as the greatest 
invasion threat.47 The German Empire gradually assumed the key role as Britain’s arch-enemy in the 
literature of  invasion. Germany became the focus of  many conspiracy theorists and sensationalist fiction 
writers. As early as 1899, German spies had already begun to replace the French and Russians as the enemy 
in these narratives; H. Hill’s The Spies of  the Wight (1899),48 Louis Tracy’s The Invaders (1901) and Walter 
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Wood’s The Enemy In Our Midst (1906) were some of  the most popular accounts.49 During the same period 
authors such as William Le Queux and E.P. Oppenheim led a long line of  authors who depicted the intrigue 
and drama of  the world of  spies and secrets.50 While Oppenheim and Le Queux were notable for their 
popularity, their works were poorly written and speedily published – these were mass market authors of  the 
finest calibre.51  
There have been many scholarly works analysing the ‘invasion scare’ novel; the work of  I.F. Clarke is 
perhaps the most important of  them all. Clarke’s works on future war and invasion spanned several decades. 
Voices Prophesying War (1966) detailed the long history of  invasion stories, looking all the way back to the 
Napoleonic Wars. Clarke first focused upon the role of  the French in invasion scares – a major and 
consistent presence in these narratives from the 1860s until the 1900s. His argument was that these stories 
acted as a mirror for events in foreign and domestic affairs. With each example of  shock or outcry in society 
there followed a consequent flurry of  novels and serials. Clarke placed invasion fiction at the centre of  
popular debate in the pre-war period; for him it was a powerful conduit for mass opinion in an age of  mass 
literacy.52 
Clarke’s later works on the same broad genre, The Tale of  the Next Great War, 1871-1914 (1995) and The 
Great War with Germany 1890-1914 (1997), continued to express his conviction that a direct link could be 
drawn between international or domestic events, and a resultant flurry of  invasion or war fiction. He also 
argued that these works significantly worsened the international relations between Britain and Germany, a 
similar argument to that of  Rose and Geppert more recently.53 Overall, Clarke’s was very much an account 
of  the market, and the responsiveness of  publishers, editors and authors to political, strategic and cultural 
developments and events. His view was that writers seized upon opportunities presented for sales and 
repute; this was the secret to the success of  authors such as Wells, Le Queux, Childers, Tracy and Shiel. 
These popular authors played upon pre-existing or nascent trends in popular imagination in order to 
publicise their stories. There is therefore a distinction to be made between military polemicists who were 
military or naval cranks intent on demanding governmental change, and the more successful popular fiction 
writers from civilian backgrounds who, it could be argued, responded to and channelled public opinion to 
a much greater extent. 
Since Clarke there has been a regular flow of  scholarship on the literature of  future war and invasion.54 
Perhaps most thought provoking amongst them has been the work of  A. Michael Matin. He aimed to join 
literary studies with military and political history, focussing upon the circumstances surrounding the popular 
sensation of  the invasion novel.55 As a literary scholar, Matin has tended to focus in detail upon certain texts 
– especially the work of  Kipling and Conrad, amongst others – where he sought to uncover the hidden 
motives behind the standard reading of  the narrative. In his recent article, ‘The Creativity of  War Planners’ 
(2011), Matin sought to establish a catalogue of  ten techniques which were ‘so recurrent that they comprise 
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virtually constitutive elements of  the form’.56 His view of  these texts, echoed by others, was that in many 
cases they were simplistic texts, either acting as propaganda if  written by ‘war planners’ or raising sales 
through inciting emotion and causing sensation, if  written by the authors of  popular fiction.57 
These invasion scare accounts offer insight into the Edwardian psyche of  fear. It is suggested that these 
historical texts can provide a basis for approaching the invasion narratives of  my period of  interest. As 
Matin and Clarke have suggested, real events and narratives should be related to one-another. Few in the 
historiography have sought to investigate the importance of  imperial rivalry as a formative influence on 
invasion narratives. Especially in the early period (1896-1903) these accounts can be shown to have been 
influenced by imperial concerns. Even later accounts, such as Saki’s When William Came (1913) consider the 
importance of  empire and the fear that the British themselves could be subjugated; once the colonisers, 
now the colonised.  
Diplomatic and Political Histories:  
The Primacy of  Home Defence? 
In the historiography of  the Anglo-German relationship before 1914, the naval armaments race has featured 
prominently.58 In recent historiography Robert Massie’s Dreadnought (1992) is amongst the best known. 
Massie presented a traditionalist study of  both the naval armaments race and the foundations of  distrust 
between Germany and Britain. Massie’s approach was to seek to assess the impact of  great political leaders 
upon the relations between the two countries, and to determine the path to war.59  
However, in recent years historians such as John Sumida and Andrew Lambert have attempted to revise 
traditionalist accounts;60 this new generation of  historians offered alternative explanations for a variety of  
issues, or looked outside of  the traditional diplomatic and government archives to offer a more rounded 
understanding of  the importance of  the naval armaments race. In this vein, The Great Naval Game by Jan 
Rüger (2007) aimed to ‘discover the cultural in politics and the politics in culture’ by prioritising the 
importance of  naval growth in both German and British culture.61 Rüger’s approach was to challenge old 
understandings of  the naval armaments race, and examine the impact of  massive naval growth upon British 
and German culture. He argued that naval affairs became an outlet for patriotism and nationalism; ‘naval 
theatre’ events, such as ship launches and visits, developed ‘strong popular appeal and symbolic power…in 
its ability to publicly reconcile otherwise divergent strands of  identification and nationhood.’ Laura Rowe 
commented that Rüger made important steps in showing that ‘culture, particularly how and why it came to 
be so constructed, cannot and should not be divorced’ from ‘battles, strategy, administration and 
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technology’.62 Although Rüger focussed solely upon the cultural importance of  the naval race,63 he offered 
an example of  how culture and popular opinion are fundamental to understanding of  this period. As a 
methodological approach, Rüger has set a benchmark for approaching a long-established historical narrative 
and improving historical understanding with a more cultural and nuanced approach to history. However, 
Rüger restricted his study to the later ‘Dreadnought Race’, an era of  naval competition, and focussed more 
closely upon events in the English Channel, rather than considering wider imperial dimensions. 
Complementing the work of  Rüger and others, I will study the period before the development of  a full-
blown arms race and consider the vital centrality of  imperial anxiety in informing popular perceptions of  
Germany.  
Dominik Geppert and Andreas Rose recently sought to redress the historiography of  the Naval 
Armaments Race. Their methodology took inspiration from recent researches into world or global history. 
Reflecting recent trends in German scholarship, Geppert and Rose posited that political history and cultural 
history should be brought closer together. In their article, ‘Machtpolitik und Flottenbau vor 1914’ (2011), 
and Rose’s Zwischen Empire und Kontinent: Britische Außenpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (2011), it was argued 
that British foreign policy decisions were influenced powerfully by imperial concerns and by British 
domestic political discourse.64 Controversially, Geppert and Rose argued for the ‘Primat der Innenpolitik’ in 
pre-war Britain; Germany served mainly as a domestic political device which the British government used 
to generate support for the growing cost of  armaments for the defence of  Empire, and as a justification 
for alliances with Britain’s old enemies, France and Russia. Essentially, their view was for the primacy of  
domestic politics, and the preservation of  empire. Rose’s argument, like the controversial accounts of  Niall 
Ferguson, Keith Wilson and others, asserts that it was Russia, not Germany, which was considered the 
greatest concern by British planners before 1914.65 Germany remained only as an ‘economically dynamic, 
militarily powerful, politically restless and diplomatically uncouth’ propaganda tool.  
This thesis reaffirms the presence of  powerful official imperial anxieties, and increasing usage of  the 
Germany ‘bogey’ indicates its popular currency and power as a motivating factor.66 Popular ‘russophobia’ 
pervaded into the twentieth century, although the agreement of  the Anglo-Russian alliance in 1907 quelled 
many fears. However, by 1896 Germany was increasingly challenging Russia’s position as the greatest 
imperial threat in the British popular imagination. Between 1896 and 1904 this German imperial menace 
increasingly overtook concerns about Russia, which after all had been shown to be weak internally and 
externally during the Russo-Japanese War. Even before 1904 many British journalists and authors remarked 
that an agreement with Russia would be far more advantageous than one with Germany. Furthermore, 
whereas Russia was imagined as a colossus, it was never depicted as a threat which was on a par with Britain; 
the perception of  Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy ruled out Russia as a threatening ‘equal’. Germany’s ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ kinship was made the more threatening, as seen in the ‘national efficiency’ discourse, by its proximity. 
Unlike Russia and France, Germany was viewed as a fraternal equal. Germany appeared to be able to 
compete with Britain at her own game; Russia patently could not.  
Matthew Seligmann’s recent works have sought to reinvigorate the relatively stagnant diplomatic 
historiography of  this era. In Rivalry in Southern Africa (1998) Seligmann argued that South Africa was the 
inspiration for a diplomatic change of  course for the Wilhelmstrasse. Seligmann argued that the strong 
response of  the British government against the Kaiser’s interference in the Transvaal in 1896 shifted 
                                                     
62 Rowe, L., ‘Review: The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of  Empire by Jan Rüger’, Journal of  Contemporary History, 44:54 
(2009), pp. 547–8. 
63 Followed subsequently by another study of  the cultural and political dimensions of  this era: Lambert, A., Ruger, J., & Blyth, R.J., The Dreadnought 
and the Edwardian Age (Farnham, 2011). 
64 Geppert, D. & Rose, A., ‘Machtpolitik Und Flottenbau Vor 1914. Zur Neuinterpretation Britischer Außenpolitik Im Zeitalter Des 
Hochimperialismus’, Historische Zeitschrift, 293:2 (September 2011), pp. 401–37; Rose, A., Zwischen Empire Und Kontinent: Britische Außenpolitik Vor 
Dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich, 2011). 
65 Rüger, J., ‘Review: Zwischen Empire Und Kontinent: Britische Außenpolitik Vor Dem Ersten Weltkrieg by Andreas Rose’, Journal of  Modern 
History, 85:1 (2013), p. 159. 
66 Geppert, D. & Rose, A., ‘Machtpolitik Und Flottenbau’, pp. 401–37. 
14 Introduction  
 
  
German imperial policy from a localised project, towards a push for a global empire.67 This bold thesis has 
been well received in historiography and furthermore, Seligmann’s recent publication, The Royal Navy and the 
German Threat (2012) challenged the established understanding of  the Anglo-German naval rivalry – arguing 
against the ‘doctrinal ascendancy of  capital ship offensive warfare’. Seligmann argued that the Royal Navy 
was acutely aware of  the German threat to global trade – in particular there was concern about German 
armed merchant ships disrupting the vital commercial arteries of  the British Empire.68 Though concerned 
with official policy and diplomacy, Seligmann’s approach has been to re-emphasise the importance of  a 
German global threat to British imperial dominance. This official angle fits well with my own conception of  
popular imperial anxiety, and suggests some subtle or latent linkage between official fears and popular 
concerns.69 
Paul Kennedy remains the most influential historian in the field of  Anglo-German diplomatic relations. 
In a seminal text, The Rise of  the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (1980), Kennedy analysed a large period 
of  diplomatic, political and cultural history in his distinctive brand of  diplomatic and political history.70 The 
book studied in fine detail the process by which attitudes in Germany and Britain changed dramatically over 
half  a century. Kennedy devoted time to studying not simply the traditional subjects of  interest: the role of  
Bismarck, the Kaiser and the Navy; he also considered the various roles played in different periods by 
colonial possessions and by diplomatic interaction across the different periods between different heads of  
government, foreign secretaries and ambassadors.71 Kennedy viewed the causation of  Anglo-German 
antagonism as two-tiered. Firstly, he argued that the meteoric rise of  Germany as an economic power-house 
capable of  not only competing with Britain, but even possibly superseding her, was the major driving force.72 
Below this, Kennedy placed the dual roles of  geographical proximity, and ideology, which helped push the 
international relationship from one of  anxious competition, to open warfare. Kennedy took the view that 
had Germany been situated further from Britain, or even had she sought a Drang nach Osten in earnest, rather 
than pushing westwards and into the North Sea, Britain would not have railed as it did against Germany’s 
increasing influence and power. Kennedy argued that it was a clash of  cultures - between ‘liberal’ England 
and ‘reactionary’ Prussia - which defined the ideological battleground, preparing the two countries for the 
inevitable clash in August 1914. He concluded that the first priority for the British government would always 
have been the preservation of  the status quo in Europe and in Home Waters. The Far East, Africa and the 
Western hemisphere would always take second place to any consideration at home.73 
Kennedy’s concern was for geo-politics: the pressures upon those exercising power and the causes of  
major global events. The growing commercial threat posed to Britain by the booming German economy 
was well recognised in British political circles. Kennedy argued that in the realm of  diplomacy, economics 
was a primary factor in engendering official antagonism between the two national structures. Kennedy’s 
argument is persuasive; however, the connection between the commercial competition, its global and imperial 
consequences, and the influence it had upon popular culture requires further investigation. Globalized 
commerce was recognised as central to Britain’s economy at the turn of  the twentieth century; as well as the 
formal empire, ‘informal’ influence in South America and across Asia represented a vital source of  wealth 
and power. For Britain to sustain its position as the prime imperial power it needed to dominate global trade. 
Concerns about commerce and empire overlapped and were commonly conflated in British popular 
discourse. Kennedy’s argument for the primacy of  economic competition does not rule out the importance 
of  empire in a cultural and social sense; global economic competition should be viewed as an issue impacting 
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upon popular imperialism. The example of  national efficiency, as discussed in chapter three, demonstrates 
how economic debates could powerfully influence public discourse and the popular imagination.  
It is accepted that any history of  the official relationship between Britain and Germany in this period 
should not seek to argue that considerations in Europe – naval expansion and home defence – were not 
prime factors. However, in seeking to understand a more nuanced cultural and social view of  the period, 
these ‘power-political’ interpretations must be supplemented by other approaches. Any suggestion that the 
colonies and global interests were unimportant in British (or German) popular culture is fundamentally 
flawed.74 Whilst visiting incidents such as the Kruger Telegram and the Venezuela in some detail, Kennedy 
went on to play down their importance to his greater argument. The role of  the press, and public opinion 
were studied in his work, but they play little part in the overall conclusions of  his research. There remains 
much to be said about the influence of  global changes and German strategic advancement in close proximity 
to the British Empire upon the British public mind in this period.75 
Methodology 
In the historiography of  this subject terminologies have very often been confused or carelessly employed 
with regard either to popular xenophobia or to foreign enemies. In particular the suffix ‘phobia’ has too 
often been employed by historians to denote a generalised discourse. Often, popular phobias have been used 
by scholars as a description of  either anti-alien sentiment, or a national discourse of  fear. Historians have 
talked variously about ‘russophobia’, ‘germanophobia’ and ‘francophobia’ during the nineteenth century.76 
However, the terms are now loaded with historical meanings which risk conflating different, if  linked, 
discourses about immigration and national or imperial anxieties. To talk of  a popular ‘germanophobia’ 
before 1914 risks confusing the issues at the heart of  this thesis with views about Germans living in Britain. 
The period 1896-1903 in particular was characterised by a latent, sporadic and abstract sense of  a German 
Menace; significantly, little evidence exists to suggest any association between German immigrants and the 
generalised and abstracted German threat posed by the nation in the imperial context between 1896 and 
1903. As shown by the anti-German riots during the First World War, extreme events and latent anti-
German sentiment could combine to result in great damage to personal property and abuse. However, no 
event extreme enough to precipitate attacks on the German immigrant population occurred before 1914. 
Furthermore, by 1914 the British had experienced nearly two decades of  anti-German expression in popular 
discourse; this tradition of  anti-German sentiment combined with an extreme wartime situation to cause 
the riots which took place between 1914 and 1918. Thus, in the interest of  clarity, the term ‘germanophobia’ 
will be avoided. Instead I consider the terms ‘anti-German’ and ‘anxiety’ to better represent what I aim to 
describe. Though many contemporaries talked of  ‘phobia’ as opposed to ‘philia’ in terms of  these nations, 
what they actually described was anti-German or pro-French opinion rather than the medicalised obsessive 
and specific fear that the word ‘phobia’ connotes.  
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The term ‘anxiety’ embodies an abstract sense of  unease and concern;77 it encapsulates the ways in 
which threats to Britain were imagined and described in this imperial age. Historians such as Christopher 
Bayly, Kim Wagner and Yumna Siddiqi have described generalised imperial ‘anxiety’, arguing for its 
importance as a cultural and political factor; however, anxieties about specific menaces to the nation or to 
the empire also figured prominently in popular discourse.78 Ranajit Guha’s essay, ‘Not at Home in the 
Empire’ described the nature of  the British imperial experience. Guha argued that the fundamental 
‘absurdity’ of  the British claim to be able to knit together ‘colonial authority’ with ‘metropolitan liberalism’ 
left the British feeling ill-at-ease about empire: 
A sore that refused to heal, it went on festering by being compulsively touched. Symptom of  
an unredeemably bad conscience, it developed the habit of  insinuating itself  into all manner of  
colonial discourse, ranging from homiletics to politics, from the novel to the lyric to the 
common joke. 
Ruling without consent made isolation ‘a structural necessity’ and throughout imperial culture a looming 
sense of  unease pervaded, not from a ‘nameable fear’, but more a general sense of  threat and danger to the 
stability of  imperial rule. Guha’s work has been an important influence, aiding an explanation of  the 
anxieties which pervaded British imperial culture, some of  which will be the focus of  this thesis.79 It will be 
argued that anxieties expressed in the press and literature about Russia or France were most often based on 
a vague sense that they presented a danger to the empire or to Britain’s safety; the likely outcome was 
uncertain, and the nervousness unspecific. After 1896 a similar sense of  generalised unease, imagined and 
investigated in various written and oral forms, developed about Germany - the new global power.  
The term ‘menace’ will be used throughout to describe the developing representation of  the German 
threat to Britain and its specifically imperial nature in the early period. The word encapsulates what Germany 
was increasingly seen to be in the germinal stage: unknown but apparently hostile to Britain, an implied but 
not explicit threat. In the period 1890-1914 a discussion of  imperial anxieties might be expected to focus 
on other menaces to Britain, for example Russia or France. The reality of  such dangers was often far from 
the ideas reflected in the British popular imagination and discourse; the British habitually exaggerated 
internal and external threats beyond the realms of  reality, but these were almost always based on admittedly 
less threatening but altogether real enemies or issues. It is my assertion here that, as popular perceptions of  
a Russo-French Menace declined, Germany loomed large in the popular imagination. In this earlier period 
of  anti-German sentiment (1896-1903) ideas of  a German Menace to Britain were founded upon an 
‘ideological cluster’: a set of  tropes and stereotypes based upon the suspicion of  underhand German 
territorial ambitions, assumed jealousy of  the Empire and the brutality and autocracy of  German society 
and governance. Popular anxiety about Germany seemed to be intermittently vindicated by imperial events 
which appeared to reveal the existence of  a menace to Britain’s Empire; thus the authority of  these ideas 
increased over time.80  
Popular Culture and Politics in the Fin-de-Siècle 
This thesis will examine the interconnections between culture, media and politics for the purpose of  
investigating the development of  stereotypes about Germany in the period 1896-1903. My approach utilises 
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a variety of  newspapers, images and mass-market literature, as well as official archives, in order to provide 
analysis of  cultural transfers which occurred in the public domain. It is important to state the 
methodological influences on my approach to researching this period. Scholarship of  popular imperialism, 
as discussed above, and of  the press and popular literature has diversely influenced this study and provide 
the central methodological groundings. 
A key dilemma for this study is how to engage with and describe ‘popular culture’ in its multiple forms. 
John Tosh argued that the history of  popular culture ‘is about more than the trickle-down from the political 
and intellectual elite’; he suggested that ‘conventional social history’ does not necessarily provide the detail 
necessary; nor is ‘dissemination…an adequate framework’ for its study. Popular cultural history is intangible, 
tantalising and perilous; it speaks to the human condition, but all historians who seek to practise it risk 
controversy and inaccuracy caused by the difficulty of  ascertaining the opinions of  those whom Tosh called, 
‘the people of  the mass.’81 I have drawn together my own conceptions of  the various aspects which combine 
to form popular culture from these approaches to historical study.82 Amongst the most prominent terms I 
will use are ‘popular discourse’ and ‘popular imagination’. It is thus important that I establish what is meant 
by these two interlinking but distinct concepts. Though not describing identical phenomena they do interact 
with one another and help to describe a set of  views, themes, ideas and expressions about a particular issue. 
I employ the term, the ‘popular imagination’ to embody the malleable corpus of  ideas and images pertaining 
to a subject about which society has commonly little or no experience or at best incomplete knowledge. It 
represents the range of  ideas - the full potentiality of  images and themes - which are widely held in society, 
formed out of  fundamental contemporary societal norms of  thought and belief. The term ‘popular 
discourse’ implies the more active debate of  and engagement with certain issues, all drawn from within the 
broader context of  the popular imagination. Popular discourse focusses around a ‘centre’, a mean or focal 
point of  conjecture, argumentation, opinion and debate. Such cultural phenomena, by their very nature, 
shift over time; in this thesis I will emphasise and analyse both gradual shifts over time, and sudden 
paradigm-defining shocks which bring fresh ideas and images to the popular imagination, and introduce 
new elements in the popular discourse. 
Press and Politics in Britain 
In 1896 British metropolitan newspapers and periodicals were nominally motivated by political and party 
stance. Whereas in the mid-nineteenth century the ‘Liberal’ press had dominated the national market, the 
turn of  the twentieth century was heavily dominated by the political right; amongst the older and more 
established broadsheets, the Times, the Observer and the Westminster Gazette were all resolutely nationalist and 
right-sided.83 The true revolution came with the rise of  the ‘daily’ newspaper; London-based dailies such as 
the Telegraph, Pall Mall Gazette and the Morning Post began writing in a new, more sensationalist style, from 
the 1870s.84 A reading of  many dailies of  the 1890s appears in many ways familiar to the reader of  today.85 
The years 1896 to 1914 witnessed the birth of  modern democratised media as illustrated and pictorial papers 
surged to prominence; the Illustrated London News and later the Daily Mirror and Daily Sketch brought 
photojournalism to prominence in Britain.86 There was a rapid change towards exaggeration, sensation, 
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rumours, speculation and ever larger headlines and images.87 Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord Northcliffe, 
established the Daily Mail in 1896 and its sensationalist and scandalous style became emblematic of  the 
direction that the mass press was moving. Northcliffe was the greatest press baron of  his age; from the late 
1880s he built up an empire of  newspapers which came to include the Evening News, Daily Mail, Sunday 
Dispatch, Daily Mirror, the Observer (1905) and the Times (1908). The ‘Northcliffe formula’ was simple and 
recognisable even today; it was marked out by ‘publicity stunts, competitions and innovative journalism’.88 
Northcliffe, along with other tabloid newspaper proprietors of  the time, was part of  a revolution in the 
interaction between the people, the press and politics.89 By 1890 huge numbers of  people were discerning 
consumers of  ‘the news’ through the vast array of  cheaply available national and local morning and evening 
dailies, Sunday papers, and periodical magazines and reviews. Never before had so many Britons had access 
to such a variety of  information and opinion; literacy was not yet universal – one estimate put it at 95% of  
adults by 1893 - but since the Education Act of  1870, men and women in Britain had both the capability 
and a growing desire to read the written word in many different forms.90 
The nature of  the popular press in this period requires a deep analysis which goes past an investigation 
of  ‘representations’. In this study, the layers of  discourse which accumulated from 1896 with regard to 
Germany will be examined. Publicists who took an anti-German stance formed one part of  a wider and 
more complex understanding of  Germany across the press and public sphere. Real events, especially in 
foreign relations and economics, impacted strongly upon the ever-developing perception of  the ‘new’ 
Wilhelmine Germany. The two-way interaction between policy and opinion is extremely difficult to gauge; 
here that relationship will be examined through the lens of  an imperial consciousness, and a perception 
across society of  a growing threat from Germany. In 1980 Paul Kennedy argued that with new mass 
electorates, and huge press apparatuses, appealing to and attempting to direct the sentiments of  this vast 
audience became the business of  all politicians, and of  any group which wished to claim that it had ‘public 
opinion’ behind it.’91 Any ambitious politician or pressure group was forced to recognise the need to engage 
with ‘public opinion’. Kennedy stated that the differences in the relationship between public, press and 
government were very different in Germany compared to Britain. Whereas Germany’s semi-official press 
and government structure allowed ‘the newspaper-influencing apparatus’ to be far more sophisticated and 
influential, in Britain, Kennedy argued vociferously that ‘such blatant press-influencing simply did not exist’. 
Gentlemanly arrangements and ‘club’ agreements might be manipulated, but could only stretch so far. There 
was indeed great room for press criticism of  the government; there were exceptions, but as Kennedy states, 
for historians ‘[t]he most interesting phenomenon [was] that both establishments steadily lost whatever 
control they had of  the arch-patriotic press.’92 
More recently communications and media historians have argued that in Britain and Germany, mass 
media should be viewed as a force for democratisation and popularised politics; agencies of  state power 
during the early twentieth century were forced to change tactics to meet new challenges.93 Frank Bösch and 
Norbert Frei have recently suggested that this process of  medialisation in society resulted in increasing 
                                                     
87 The press played a prominent role in many murder cases (Jack the Ripper), scandals (such as the Maiden Tribute Affair) and court-battles (the 
Dilke Affair). Both Maiden Tribute and the Dilke Affair were the result of  a press campaign headed by W.T. Stead, the great investigative 
journalist of  the 1880s and 1890s. See Jenkins, R., Dilke: A Victorian Tragedy (London, 1996); Gorham, D., ‘The “Maiden Tribute of  Modern 
Babylon” Re-Examined: Child Prostitution and the Idea of  Childhood in Late-Victorian England’, Victorian Studies, 21:3 (1978), pp. 353–79; 
Cohen, W.A., Sex Scandal: The Private Parts of  Victorian Fiction (Durham, NC, 1996). 
88 Williams, K., Read All About It!, p. 125.  
89 For a detailed review of  Northcliffe’s rise to power see Thompson, J.L., Politicians, the Press, and Propaganda (Kent, OH, 1999), pp. 3–19; Williams, 
K., Read All About It!, pp. 125–127. 
90 Williams, R., ‘The Press and Popular Culture: An Historical Perspective’, in Boyce, G., Curran, J., & Wingate, P. (eds), Newspaper History (London, 
1978), p. 42. 
91 Kennedy, P.M., Rise of  the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 361, 362. 
92 Ibid., pp. 361, 365, 366, 368. 
93 Domeier, N., Der Eulenburg-Skandal. Eine Politische Kulturgeschichte Des Kaiserreichs (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 2010); Bösch, F. Hg, N.F. & 
Wallstein, G., Medialisierung Und Demokratie; Schildt, A., ‘Das Jahrhundert Der Massenmedien. Ansichten Zu Einer Künftigen Geschichte Der 
Öffentlichkeit’, Geschichte Und Gesellschaft, 27 (2001), pp. 177–206; Hodenberg, C. von, Konsens Und Krise - Eine Geschichte Derwestdeutschen 
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democratisation of  politics. Even in Germany, Bösch argued that increasing democratisation of  society and 
media changed the way politicians interacted with journalists and fed information to the masses. The 
relatively ‘open’ press in Britain led to even greater democratisation of  politics, towards a more recognisable 
populist model.94 Corey Ross’s Media and the Making of  Modern Germany (2008) offered an influential analysis 
of  popular media in this era. Ross questioned conventions about the role of  the press and media as ‘levelling’ 
influences upon consumers. He argued that the masses were not passive receptors for propaganda; the 
assumption of  the ‘universalising’ nature of  mass media has been overstated. Consumers were discerning 
and harboured a great plurality of  opinion. For Ross, attempts by the state to influence public opinion were 
of  extremely questionable effectiveness. As a result of  such recent media histories, older notions of  the 
press and media as subject to Machiavellian political control and pressure have been debunked.95  
In a study of  the international importance of  mass media, Dominik Geppert investigated, through the 
case study of  Anglo-German relations, the way the modern press interacted with the rest of  society in his 
Pressekriege (2007).96 Like A.J.A. Morris in his Scaremongers (1985), Geppert studied the interrelationships 
between journalists, politicians, military men and publishing interests and how ‘press feuds’ influenced 
Anglo-German foreign policy between 1896 and 1914.97 Geppert argued that the ‘massive extension of  the 
public sphere’ into society revolutionised the way that the press impacted upon international relations; he 
sought particularly to emphasise the growing power of  publishers and proprietors such as Northcliffe. 
Geppert concluded that ‘press wars’ – frenzies of  media attention – impacted directly upon foreign politics. 
Each country viewed the other’s press as being at least partially representative of  the government stance, 
and so a press feud could directly interfere with diplomacy, and even threaten peace.98  
Geppert was largely focussed upon the influence of  the press upon government decision making. Such 
works have laid great emphasis upon the importance of  the owner-proprietor-editor such as Alfred 
Harmsworth or Lord Beaverbrook. Although there is much to be learned from the study of  such great men, 
I would argue that a synthetic view is more appropriate. As Bösch and Frei argued, the press in Britain and 
Germany were increasingly geared towards pleasing and expanding their readership. They could do so only 
by satisfying their interests, rather than directly challenging their beliefs and ‘educating’ them in their 
misjudgement. In the material I have studied it has been apparent that the traditional periodical writers were 
inclined to reveal their frustration that the press was increasingly focussed upon the desires and whims of  
the electorate, rather than around the moral or ‘educated’ stance of  the elite. Geppert has provided an 
important study of  the interaction between the press and the “Official Mind”. I am inclined to take a more 
pluralistic view and focus more upon the detailed narratives and notions developing within British popular 
culture, which were increasingly marketable for the press. Bösch’s study of  ‘Medialisierung’ suggested that 
newspapers were able to be both a force for democratic ‘Offenheit’ (candidness) but also were subject to 
their owner’s prerogative.99 The complex picture built up in recent scholarship suggests that in the 1890s 
and 1900s the press was influenced by power-brokers at their head, but was increasingly focussed upon 
satisfying popular demands. Through the vast number of  regional and national outlets, the media was too 
plural to be subject to the will of  one man alone but there was also the possibility of  subtly influencing and 
shifting debates. Attempts at publicity - influencing opinion and coverage - as Kennedy argued in 1980, 
could often lead to unforeseen consequences once the press and public began to dominate the debate.100 
Though newspapers and journals would happily push a political line, they still needed to be popular 
and representative. Their stories were written to inform, but could only do so within pre-established popular 
paradigms. This led to complex feedback relationships between the press and their readership, and between 
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the press and politicians. It will be argued here that in a variety of  case studies of  British-German events 
over a decade, the mass media whipped up pre-existent trends and responded to popular views. They played 
upon latent themes in the popular imagination, and sought to represent what they claimed to be public 
opinion. Through press outbursts pre-existent ideas could develop into new and powerful popular concepts, 
such as the German Menace. Fundamentally the press – especially the daily press - rarely swam against the 
popular tide, for fear of  a loss of  readership in an increasingly competitive and democratised market.  
Popular Literature in Britain 
In the last years of  the nineteenth century the written word, in its multiplicity of  forms, was more 
widespread than ever before and literacy was virtually universal in Britain.101 We can increasingly talk of  a 
‘mass’ market in Britain for a variety of  narrative forms.102 To reliably analyse literary sources it is necessary 
to explain what constituted popular literature in this period, who consumed it, and how they received and 
reacted to what they read. This is no simple task, and as many historians of  Victorian and Edwardian 
publishing and literature accept, there is great difficulty in determining the links between circulation figures, 
readership, the authorial and publisher influence, and which social groups were most likely to have read 
them. Simply put, there is too little evidence to prove concretely who read what and why; thus our 
assumptions must be tempered with cautious estimations and suggestions.  
i. Literary Forms and Markets 
Fiction was delivered to the consumer in a variety of  formats. Over the nineteenth century the format of  
novels had gradually evolved. By the 1890s a vast portion of  the population were demanding regular fictional 
entertainment.103 Often the same book would be published in a variety of  physical formats at different 
prices to meet various consumer brackets. For the middle class and library-borrowing working classes, the 
six shilling novel had become a staple.104 At the lower end of  the market came the sixpenny novels; such 
‘yellowback’ and paperback novels were produced in large numbers.105 Finally, at the bottom end of  the 
market, the ‘penny dreadfuls’, as they were commonly known, were sold in vast quantities. Little more than 
pamphlets, penny novels were the ‘staple diet of  reading for the masses.’106  
The most important point of  access to fiction for the majority of  readers was the newspaper press. 
Though the middle class was growing in size, the vast majority of  Britons were from poorer backgrounds, 
with lower disposable incomes. Fiction – in the form of  serials or short stories - could be cheaply accessed 
in monthly magazines, Sunday weekly newspapers and journals, and increasingly in daily newspapers. These 
magazines mixed current affairs articles with snappy sensational stories; monthly serials also allowed authors 
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and editors to often react to their audience and current events to add extra dramatic effect.107 Strand Magazine 
and Pearson’s Magazine were amongst the most popular monthlies with circulations in excess of  250,000;108 
weeklies such as Reynolds’s achieved circulations in the hundreds of  thousands, while Lloyd’s Weekly was the 
first newspaper to circulate to one million readers in 1896.109  
Added to the literary fiction, the Victorian-Edwardian era was also littered with huge numbers of  non-
fictional polemics. Often written by journalists and politicians, these accounts could sell widely. Though 
many works offered dull over-detailed discussions of  the economic benefits of  a free trade policy, some 
such texts sold in unprecedented proportions and were designed for a mass market. A text of  particular 
interest for this thesis is Made in Germany (1896) published by E.E. Williams. Published first in serial form 
for the New Review, by 1897 the book was already into its 5th edition.110 Like Made in Germany the majority of  
such non-fiction was non-academic and populist; the authorial voice of  the majority came in the style of  
the ‘new journalism’ – many writers like Robert Blatchford and Arnold White were extremely popular 
journalists in the ‘yellow press’ and elsewhere.111 Whilst many were distributed as serialised opinion pieces 
in the periodicals, successful books, like today, received substantial coverage across the daily and weekly 
press. In this way, a theorist like Williams could inspire popular debate, far surpassing his already impressively 
large book-based readership.  
The great outpouring of  literary narratives into more affordable mass formats also resulted also in a 
change in the types of  stories published. The imperial successes of  Britain overseas led to great popularity 
of  adventure novels and imperial romances – for example the fictions of  H. Rider Haggard. Other authors 
depicted less typical imperial plotlines with works like Joseph Conrad’s Heart of  Darkness (1899) and Lord 
Jim (1900), and Kipling’s Kim (1901).112 The 1880s and 1890s also witnessed the birth of  detective fiction; 
writers such as Wilkie Collins and Arthur Conan Doyle were famed for their tales of  murder and mystery.  
In highlighting the great variety of  themes and genres, and illuminating the variegated qualities of  such 
texts, a picture develops of  an intensely ‘popular’ literary culture. Popular literature hosted a vast plethora 
of  tropes, stereotypes, memes and discourses, and directly impacted upon popular discourse, and was 
influenced in return; while the high canonical literature might have sold at a higher price bracket, newspaper 
and periodical readers of  all classes could access them. This was a socially and culturally interconnected 
society, even if  it was stratified; the working classes were more likely to read cheaper sixpenny and penny 
novels, and serialised fiction, but they would also have been aware of  the latest high fiction too. Similarly, 
the upper and middle classes would have read not only the literary classics, but also railway fiction and serials. 
Though this was a society fundamentally divided by class and wealth, literature was one of  the mediums 
able – at certain conduit points – to transgress the boundaries of  class and wealth. The market and 
background of  an author or publication is vital in order to understand the motives behind the narratives 
put forward, and the way they would be perceived by the readership.  
ii. Methods of  Literary Analysis 
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When thinking of  the Late Victorian and Edwardian period, modern readers are most commonly aware of  
the works of  Hardy, Forster, Zola and Twain, which represented the ‘high art’ of  literature; they have often 
been seen as representing the spirit of  the age in literary form. Though these authors and their fictions were 
influential and representative of  some sectors of  society, the works of  thousands of  authors who produced 
explicitly popular fiction are largely forgotten today. Some mass-produced authors, for example Bram Stoker 
and H.G. Wells, still enjoy significant recognition, while others, William Le Queux and Hume Nisbet among 
them, are rarely recognised today. The vast quantity of  novels produced in this era represents a relatively 
untapped resource for getting to grips with the question at hand. Throughout this thesis I have sought to 
engage with both canonical and popular fiction in different forms in order to extract more detail and depth 
regarding the way that Germany and Germans are represented throughout a rapidly changing era. Many 
mass market texts, published in response to the important developments of  their day, reflected and 
developed popular attitudes towards Germany. Such texts were designed to satisfy and entertain a large and 
fickle readership with serials and cheap sixpenny and six-shilling editions, and thus needed to gain popular 
approval. This required authors to play to the gallery and to draw upon themes most relevant and interesting 
to their readers.  
The challenge of  understanding the ‘decisive connection between art (literature) and history (the social 
real)’ has troubled literary historians and critics for generations.113 Roland Barthes for example was critical 
of  reductive representations of  literature as mere mirrors for historical events. Jan Pieters argued that 
‘literary texts were relegated to a parallel, aesthetic circuit that stood apart from ‘real life’’. It was against 
such approaches to literary history that Stephen Greenblatt argued for a ‘New Historicism’; through the 
1980s this ‘movement’ gathered weight as a literary critical method. Like Clifford Geertz’s anthropological 
‘thick description’, ‘New Historicism’ strives to understand a whole ‘word-culture’ through the many various 
cultural artefacts available to researchers.114 Proponents of  ‘New Historicism’ seek to understand what Paul 
de Man described as ‘the foreign affairs, the external politics of  literature.’115 In so doing they recognised 
that the perceptions of  the historian today are as subjective and restricted to their own epoch as the writer 
was in our historical researches; ‘all literary creativity involves a complex global circulation of  social 
energies’.116 Though this history does not claim the depth of  Greenblatt’s literary focus, this wider and more 
detailed examination of  literary texts in situ provides an important basis for research and analysis.  
As argued earlier, Edward Said expressed the need to connect literary works ‘not only with that pleasure 
and profit but also with the imperial process of  which they were manifestly and unconcealedly a part’.117 
Said’s argued that culture represents a ‘‘battleground’ or ‘theatre’ on which causes expose themselves to the 
light of  day and contend with one another...’; his aim was to expose the presence of  empire in works where 
it had previously assumed to be absent.118 Said’s search for historical evidence in such texts, and his desire 
to ‘read against the grain’ to reveal more about the text are important for this study. Yumna Siddiqi’s Anxieties 
of  Empire (2008) has also been influential to the development of  this thesis. Siddiqi studied the ‘fiction of  
intrigue’ – detective and spy stories – and its interaction with ideological and material imperial culture; a 
disciple of  Said, she sought to analyse the nexus between power and narrative under the British Empire, 
suggesting that the fictions of  Conrad, Buchan et al reveal deep-seated anxieties about the Empire, but also 
sought to dispel those fears and to ‘resolve ideologically’ the concerns that come with policing and governing 
a global empire.119 Siddiqi’s work is significant not only for her understanding of  imperial anxieties 
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developing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also for the analysis of  narrative for the 
purposes of  literary criticism, and in revealing something about a wider historical discourse. Pierre 
Macherey’s ‘symptomatic reading’, ‘a critical attention to textual gaps, silences, and tensions that reveal the 
presence of  ideological matter than has been transformed through the labor (sic.) of  literary production’, 
provides a useful tool for more contextualised and thorough literary analysis. Similarly, Siddiqi’s application 
of  Carlo Ginzburg’s ‘conjectural paradigm’ - ‘the intuitive connection of  clues and traces to produce 
knowledge that is “indirect, presumptive”’ – offers a reasoned rationale for the importance of  applying logic 
and insinuation to less than explicit narratives by understanding the context of  their creation.120 
Other historians have sought to emphasise the value of  the mass produced novel in highlighting the 
subtleties and complexities of  seemingly formulaic and one-dimensional narratives. Stephen Arata (1996) 
discussing the perception of  decline in the Fin de Siècle era, argued that debates about social issues of  the 
day were carried out through the medium of  such texts; Arata was convinced that the literary and historical 
focus upon less accessible literature missed the true value of  these texts.121 Reeva Spector Simon’s Spies and 
Holy Wars (2010) similarly granted prominence to Arata’s ‘mass market texts’; Simon discussed over 800 
British and American crime fiction narratives published over the twentieth century. Produced for a mass 
audience, these texts experienced vast popularity and thus Simon views her texts as a ‘convenient matrix for 
illustrating the interconnection between popular culture and politics’ from the First World War.122  
Theoretically and methodologically, the approaches of  Said, Macherey, Ginzburg and Greenblatt 
provide useful and practical solutions for how to analyse narratives from a set historical period. They all 
sought to avoid one-dimensional, opaque readings of  literary sources, in order to offer richer description, 
indicating how the historian can add value to a simple literary summary or description. Arata and Simon 
have shown that emphasis should be placed upon both the major literary works of  the time, and the works 
which were most popular and widely disseminated. Siddiqi’s approach to literature provides the most 
concrete example of  how the historian can interpret and engage with literary sources. This thesis will not 
focus solely upon fiction and narrative, but such sources provide a vital basis for the analysis of  popular 
culture and society in the period 1890-1914. Literary sources must be read opaquely, in search of  the ‘gaps’ 
in the text; they must also be viewed as influenced by and influencing the discourses of  their time – and the 
epistemes within which they were conceived. Only by understanding these factors can historians reliably 
utilise such sources adequately. There has been considerable literary research into the popular literature of  
this era. Historians such as Petra Rau, Gisela Argyle and A. Michael Matin have investigated some of  the 
key literary works of  the era for the presence of  themes of  ‘germanophobia’ and invasion-scare sentiment. 
These works have doubtless merit, but few have been able to link these histories to the wider society of  the 
period in anything more than a cursory fashion. This thesis seeks to link together these differing 
historiographical approaches and source-bases to provide a fuller description and better understanding of  
the ideas and themes held within them, within a real-world context.  
Summary 
This thesis straddles several bodies of  work. First and foremost it should be considered as part of  the 
historiography of  popular imperialism which was established and developed by scholars such as MacKenzie, 
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Cunningham and Porter. The discourse of  the German Menace was part of  a wider trend of  imperialism 
in Late Victorian and Edwardian Britain.  
Secondly, it has been important to emphasise the importance of  the histories of  the press and media. 
This thesis will rely significantly upon the daily, weekly and periodical press. I will take a pluralistic view of  
the function of  the press, and view the relationship between recipient and producer as based upon popularity 
and marketability. The press – especially popular dailies – operated in a highly competitive market and so 
their ability to inform and persuade was mitigated by the need to excite, entertain and retain their readership. 
Although press magnates and boards had overtly-stated political stances, and at times attempted to push a 
certain line, all of  this was conducted within a pre-established popular paradigm.  
Thirdly, I have been methodologically influenced by historians of  literature; popular literature, closely 
related in this period to the press, represented an essential tier of  popular culture. Literary historians and 
theorists such as Said and Siddiqi have provided a strong theoretical framework for analysing and 
investigating narratives and texts from the period of  study. Popular novels and serials strongly influenced 
the British popular imagination and helped to inspire sensation and provoke public debate. They reflected 
societal norms and indicated the issues which were likely to entertain and inspire the large reading public. 
Like the press, authors might have attempted to persuade their readers, but ultimately were forced to abide 
by certain social norms in order to entertain and satisfy them.  
Chapter one explores the origins of  imperial anxieties in British popular culture. The subsequent rise 
of  the German Menace after 1896 can be explained by examining the context of  colonial insecurity, and 
widespread fears of  external threats to the Empire. Chapter two offers a close study of  a major imperial 
crisis - the Jameson Raid in South Africa and the effects of  Kaiser Wilhelm II’s ‘Kruger Telegram’; arguably 
this incident, more than any other, established Germany as a potential foe in the British popular imagination 
and discourse. Themes given new life during the outburst of  anger had a decisive effect on the development 
of  imperial anxieties about Germany over the following years. Chapter three explores lasting effects of  the 
Kruger Telegram between 1896 and 1902; there is evidence to suggest that the key themes expressed during 
the British reaction to the Kruger Telegram scarred popular culture. In literature and the media, these 
themes may be shown to have coalesced into a much clearer and more powerful unified concept of  a 
German Menace by the end of  the South African War in 1902. Chapter four will analyse the popular 
response to government policy during the period between the start of  the Venezuela Blockade in December 
1902 and the end of  the British negotiations with Germany over the Baghdad Railway in April 1903. These 
two major international and imperially associated crises revealed the true strength of  the German Menace 
as a popular and political force. They provide evidence for the democratisation of  politics in this period, as 
popular sentiment forced significant changes in Government policy over foreign affairs. Although after 1903 
British concerns turned inward, reflecting the increasing awareness of  a German naval challenge, the 
imperial dimensions of  the German Menace retained a grip over popular discourse over the following 
period. Even in the period after the First World War, these issues still featured prominently the British 
popular discourse.  
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Before the German Menace:  
Imperial Anxieties until 1896 
Popular discourse in the British Empire and Metropole, was influenced by acute insecurities about security 
and decline. By the end of  the nineteenth century these fears were gathering intensity as a result of  a wider 
trend of  national self-doubt and increasing fears about the fragility of  the Empire. These internalised 
insecurities were directly transposed onto fears of  an external threat at home and abroad. Britain in this 
period should not be viewed as imagining itself  in dichotomy - as metropole and empire – but as one 
imperial whole. This holistic outlook meant that a threat to imperial possessions could easily translate into 
a threat to the heart of  Empire.  
A set of  tropes developed in British culture associated with external threats. The British Empire was 
viewed as being over-stretched and weakened, allowing potential enemies the opportunity to take portions 
of  the Empire and threaten its very existence. British liberal imperialism was contrasted with the supposed 
absolutism and irrationality of  its enemies; the unpredictability of  other Powers represented a key facet of  
these concerns. The jealousy of  rival powers was assumed - France, Russia and later Germany - leading to 
a belief  that other powers schemed in secret, plotting the downfall of  the Empire. Such assumptions about 
the nature of  Britain’s competitors were readily transferred to new challenges.  
The rise of  the German Menace in the British popular imagination was fundamentally an imperial 
phenomenon; it is important to emphasise that it was part of  a tradition of  imperial anxiety which developed 
in Britain over the later nineteenth century. I will examine the key elements of  imperial anxiety in British 
discourse and imagination to indicate certain conceptions of  threats to the Empire prior to the rise of  the 
German Menace. Firstly, the long term anxieties inspired by the imperial experience, especially in India, will 
be highlighted. The foreign threats which exercised British concerns during the nineteenth century will be 
analysed: the long-established fear of  France, and ideas of  a Russian threat to the British Empire. These 
two focusses for external imperial anxieties will help to explain the foundations from which the German 
Menace developed after 1896.  
Colonial Anxieties and British India  
As the British Empire expanded, many in Britain sought increasingly to justify their position as imperialists 
and to secure and maintain this position. They constantly grappled with the challenge of  running a huge 
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disjointed empire and organising and controlling its millions of  colonial subjects with only a few thousand 
civil servants. Central to this drive for control and stability was the quest for ‘colonial knowledge’; as Bernard 
Cohn and Nicholas Dirks argued, the development of  colonial knowledge (a postcolonial analytical term) 
was the most important facet of  the imperial experience. Thomas Richards similarly stated that a 
‘comprehensive knowledge of  the world was for most of  the century the explicit goal of  all forms of  
learning.’1 It was assumed that perfect knowledge would beget perfect governance and control. The British 
Empire was knowledge, and knowledge was the British Empire.2 This fetish for knowledge and information 
about people, materials and processes represented a vital underpinning of  the whole Empire in the later 
nineteenth century.  
From the 1850s the value of  the Empire became increasingly recognised in popular discourse; anxieties 
inevitably arose about how to protect and retain it. Especially after the Indian Uprising (1857-58) colonial 
officials put much thought and effort went into consolidating control and structure, in order to prevent the 
recurrence of  such crises. Christopher A. Bayly has examined a particular facet of  ‘colonial knowledge’. For 
Bayly, the British in India relied upon ‘information’ to secure and consolidate their rule, especially after the 
transfer of  power from the East India Company to the Crown after 1858. Bayly coined the phrase 
‘information panic’ to describe the failures in the British attempt to accrue universal knowledge of  the 
Empire, and emphasised numerous occasions when such panics ‘periodically convulsed expatriate British 
society in India.’3 Bayly particularly focussed upon the internal panics about perceived threats to Indian 
colonial order: the ‘cult’ of  Thuggee, widow-burning (‘Sati’) or human sacrifice.4  
South Asian historians have taken inspiration from Bayly to emphasise the effect of  such panics and 
rumours in British India. D.K. Lahiri Choudhury’s article ‘Sinews of  Panic’ (2004), described the effect that 
communications technologies had in providing both the tantalising prospect of  greater knowledge and 
information and a mechanism for rumour, dissent and intrigue during the Victorian and Edwardian eras.5 
The desire to know everything and control information became a state obsession; the ‘fetishized telegraph 
technology’ and the ‘imagined state enabled by it were entangled in crisis and information panic at the start 
of  the twentieth century.’6 The state had been offered what seemed to be a miraculous new means for 
control and order, but with falling access costs, subaltern dissidents were offered a powerful means of  
subversion. Such panics, though, were not limited to the British official mind. Gautam Chakravarty (2004), 
Christopher Herbert (2008) and Kim Wagner (2012) have argued that information panics, subaltern violence 
and colonial anxieties informed the British imagination, both in the Empire and at home.  
The Indian Uprising in particular left a lasting scar upon the British imagination. Quoting contemporary 
novelist Hilda Gregg in 1897, Chakravarty, in The Indian Mutiny in the British Popular Imagination, argued for 
the central importance of  the ‘mutiny’ in British culture: ‘[o]f  all the great events of  this century, as they are 
reflected in fiction, the Indian Mutiny has taken the firmest hold on the popular imagination.’7 Similarly, 
Herbert described popular ‘trauma’ caused by images of  rape and murder of  British civilians at the hands 
of  imagined murderous Indian mutineers from 1857 into the twentieth century.8 Though these two accounts 
restrict themselves to a literary focus, the implications of  such important ideological trends for wider British 
society should not be underestimated. They emphasise the potential for empire to profoundly impact upon 
British popular discourse. In his article, ‘Treading Upon Fires’ (2012), Kim Wagner argued that the ‘mutiny 
motif ’ played an important role in turn-of-the-century British domestic culture; specific traumatic events, 
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such as the Uprising of  1857, established a precedent through which all subsequent crises would be 
interpreted; such events provided a blueprint for interpretation as well as for response, which led to an 
exaggeration of  the current threat. Scares during the 1890s and around the anniversary of  the Uprising in 
1907 indicate this most clearly; such panics were typified by recurrent themes such as secret messages, 
religious fanaticism, betrayal and foreign intrigues. Scholarly examples like Choudhury and Wagner suggest 
that British culture by the 1890s was accustomed to imagining the potential weaknesses of  its increasingly 
fragile empire; this imagined weakness meant that any event could ignite press, popular and political anxiety.9 
Throughout the nineteenth century British imperial anxieties were most clearly expressed in the 
narratives of  empire – in novels, but also in newspapers, plays, poems, political debates and government 
records. In British culture depictions of  ‘mutinies’, cults of  stranglers, the rape of  white women, 
cannibalism, and plots against the empire were commonplace. It is possible to suggest that these anxieties 
and imperial scares provided the wider context within which the image of  an imperial German Menace 
could develop. The late Victorian and Edwardian era saw rising concerns about societal degeneration, alien 
groups within Britain, political and economic inefficiency, and national or racial vigour and security. This 
increasing sense of  popular self-doubt is vitally connected to the nation’s anxious fixations. Britain, as I view 
it, was part of  an imperial whole;10 anxieties about colonial rule in India and elsewhere, rather than being a 
separate discourse, were in fact intrinsically connected to the mainstream of  British popular culture. In the 
metropole and colonies, British fears evolved from the possibility of  internal chaos – particularly from 
revolutionary groupings. These fears were closely related to developing external anxieties focussed around 
dangerous competitors such as France and Russia. 
The French Menace 
The threat of  France was a key factor in the development of  a British national identity during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars;11 Britain experienced mass militarization and the hundreds of  
thousands of  citizens united in defence of  the nation led to a widespread sense of  defensive patriotism. 
The last invasion of  Britain, a botched raid upon Fishguard in Pembrokeshire in 1797, also stood as a 
memorialized event. Fears of  a full-scale invasion had been justified at that time with Napoleonic armies 
actively preparing for a full-scale attack on Britain; but after the defeat of  France in 1815 the danger of  
immediate invasion passed into the realm of  popular imagination, where it remained important for the next 
eighty years.12 Despite a lasting period of  peace, the image of  France as a dangerous enemy, established 
during this formative period, left a legacy which survived the decline of  the French menace.13  
Historical study of  Anglo-French imperial antagonism has largely been restricted to histories of  
diplomacy and power politics. For example, Thomas Pakenham’s Scramble for Africa described the detail of  
European competition for African territory, while T.G. Otte (2006) and Martin Dockrill (2002) have recently 
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provided traditional power-political accounts of  Anglo-French relations.14 Relatively few historians have 
considered late nineteenth century British perceptions of  France, or their potential as a focus for imperial 
anxiety. Linda Colley and Gerald Newton have, however, discussed the importance of  France in the 
development of  British national identity. Colley argued that the negative attributes attached to France – 
Catholicism, corruption, absolutism or revolutionism, and an oppressive army dominating society - all 
served as a reminder to the British that it was they, not the French , who had ‘drawn the long straw’.15 
Considering its significance, remarkably few scholars have specifically investigated the Anglo-French 
relationship before the Entente Cordiale in 1904. Robert and Isabel Tombs provided an analysis of  the 
‘longue durée’ of  Anglo-French popular relations in That Sweet Enemy (2008), but no other major account 
has tackled in detail the issue of  British perceptions of  France in the 1890s and early 1900s in an era of  
intense imperial antagonism.16 This chapter will relate popular perceptions of  a French imperial challenge, 
and popular French invasion scares in Britain to the wider context of  imperial anxiety.17  
Through the 1840s and 1850s outbursts of  panic about supposed French invasions erupted sporadically 
in the British press.18 Richard Cobden’s The Three Panics (1862) described how these panics resulted largely 
from rumour and conjecture, stemming from assumptions about the ill-will of  France. France had occupied 
the position of  Britain’s enemy and the primary threat to the Empire for so long that the British popular 
imagination was fixated upon it and the added factor of  the geographic proximity of  France meant that 
many fears revolved around potential invasion. The literary ‘invasion scare’ genre was a major feature of  
Britain’s fixation with the French; as will be discussed below, this genre became a major feature in popular 
Anglo-German antagonism before the First World War.  
Anglo-French Relations, 1870-1904 
From the 1870s the main theatre for Anglo-French political antagonism was outside of  Europe.19 The 
European ‘Scramble for Africa’ and increasing focus upon the Eastern Mediterranean forced Britain and 
France into close competition for territory. Since they were the two powers which most dominated the 
‘Scramble’ they were inevitably led into conflict over these newly acquired territories. Britain and France 
clashed over Egypt when cooperation broke down in 1882 when Britain forcefully intervened with an 
Egyptian civil war. The French Government was unwilling to be involved in military action and Egypt was 
quickly subjugated under a British ‘protectorate’. In the aftermath Britain did not compensate France for its 
loss of  influence, leaving a lasting diplomatic issue.20 The developing Egyptian situation, added to various 
disputes in Southeast Asia and West Africa, led Britain and France into a period of  diplomatic antagonism, 
which acted as a constant reminder to the British public that the old enmity was still present. During the 
late 1880s and early 1890s Anglo-French negotiations were increasingly fraught. Both Britain and France 
sought to connect their own African possessions in order to secure and maximize their respective spheres 
of  influence on the continent; the British from the Cape Colony to Egypt, while the French sought to link 
their possessions in North and West Africa to the Nile in Sudan. British and French interests were closely 
proximal around Nigeria and Sudan in particular, and suspicions between the two nations were recurrently 
heightened by wars for control in their areas of  influence. Bismarck’s Berlin Conference (1884-5) 
represented an attempt to safeguard stability between the major powers, and to prevent potential 
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conflagrations as a result of  aggressive imperialism. Despite a veneer of  agreement, Anglo-French 
competition continued to be a source of  diplomatic and popular tension until the end of  the century.21 
Growing Franco-Russian cooperation, confirmed by the signing of  the Franco-Russian Treaty in 1894, led 
to growing tension and a resultant rise in press coverage.22 The Franco-Russian Alliance intensified fears 
that Britain’s two greatest enemies would combine to crush Britain. Naval scares and fears of  a two-power 
alliance characterised many of  the invasion narratives from 1888 onwards.23 
The on-going competition between France and Britain for the lower Nile came to a head in 1898. The 
French Government refused to recognise Britain’s brutal victory over the Dervishes of  Southern Sudan in 
early 1898 as an establishment of  British influence over the area.24 A French expedition under Major Jean-
Baptiste Marchand marched to Fashoda (south of  Khartoum) on the White Nile and established a fortified 
position; the mission was intended as a direct challenge to British rule. A heavily armed British naval flotilla 
arrived at Fashoda, and the outgunned French troops dug in to wait while the governments in Europe 
negotiated. For both nations the stand-off  was a matter of  prestige, and an attempt to display strength on 
the international stage. During the Fashoda Incident (September-November 1898), British and French 
diplomats sought to decide whether this imperial incident was worth ending generations of  peace for.25 At 
its peak the British press warned of  a possible outbreak of  war, though in reality neither the British nor 
French diplomats were willing to countenance war.  
As an issue of  national pride and a display of  resilience to both the domestic press and the rest of  the 
world, the British government was keen to emphasise its determination to hold on to its new possession. 
With on-going imperial rivalry, a desire to re-establish prestige and the existing fears of  imperial subversion, 
many in Britain were pleased with the bellicose line set by the government in response to the actions of  the 
French.26 The French Government was unwilling to back down, but hoped for a token concession from 
Britain to escape the crisis peacefully and without any admission of  defeat; Foreign Minister Theophile 
Delcassé admitted that a war begun over ‘a country inhabited by monkeys and by black men worse than 
monkeys’ would not have been popular in France.27 When Russia withdrew its support France was 
humiliated, forced into retreat, and was stubbornly offered no ‘face-saving concession’ by Lord Salisbury.28 
As diplomatic historian T.G. Otte has argued, Fashoda marked a clear dividing line in the Anglo-French 
diplomatic relationship, acting as a ‘purgative necessary’ to allow Britain and France to move on from past 
disagreements. With French imperial ambitions muted by the realisation of  their weakness in the face of  
British naval strength, they were much more willing to come to terms over Egypt. This paved the way for a 
wider imperial concessionary settlement by 1904.29 
France in the British Imagination, 1871-1904 
These imperial and diplomatic developments strongly influenced the British popular imagination. In 
particular, Anglo-French imperial antagonism in the 1870s and 1880s inspired a wave of  invasion literature, 
initiating a long-lasting trend. In 1871, George Chesney’s short story, The Battle of  Dorking fuelled British 
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fears of  invasion by a foreign power and captivated a British readership.30 Chesney’s story of  invasion and 
defeat was a reaction to the extreme shock of  Prussia’s victory over France in 1871 in the Franco-Prussian 
War: the dreaded French Army had been defeated by a new power. Dorking depicted the total emasculation 
of  Britain and the decimation of  the Empire and despite its defeatist narrative the story was a resounding 
success, becoming popular enough for Prime Minister Gladstone to denounce ‘the poisonous effect’ of  the 
book in 1871.31 The book continued to influence thinking throughout the 1870s, with much debate about 
the potential for the events of  the book to come to fruition.32  
The historians I.F. Clarke and Michael Matin have argued that Chesney wrote Dorking as an argument 
for political change, seeking improvements for Britain’s army and navy.33 Published in an insecure period, 
and exploiting British fears of  other powers jealous of  Britain’s imperial success, the Battle of  Dorking fuelled 
pre-existing British concerns about invasion and had a lasting influence upon popular culture well into the 
twentieth century.34 In spite of  the political motivations in the writing of  many such narratives, their wider 
popularity was remarkable. Though Chesney’s famous tale focussed on the newly powerful Prussia (soon to 
become the German Empire) this was a one-off  exception in the time; henceforth France was portrayed as 
the enemy in invasion narratives until the late 1890s.35 The issue of  invasion, echoing these literary works, 
was continually raised in debates in the Houses of  Parliament and the press throughout the 1880s and 1890s. 
Advocates for volunteer territorial forces, a greater standing army and naval reform frequently invoked the 
threat of  invasion as a tool to further their cause, in spite of  the state of  peace, both between France and 
Britain, and across Europe.36 British Governments throughout this period of  peace were repeatedly called 
upon to placate doubts about Home Defence.37  
Though highly popular in newspapers, treatises and fiction, the threat of  invasion was never a real 
possibility during this period. France was no more likely to suddenly invade Britain than Britain was to 
invade France, yet the literary genre produced over 100 different narratives from 1871-1914. On-going 
antagonism between the two powers provided enough fuel to inspire popular sensation in the press and in 
popular literature. Particularly during the 1880s and 1890s imperial antagonism between France and Britain 
inspired a host of  invasion narratives. Novels such as The Invasion of  England (1882), The Great War of  189- 
(1892), and William Le Queux’s The Great War of  1897 (1894) portrayed France as the aggressor against 
Britain and its empire. Often assisted by Russia, the French were depicted as easily able to mount an invasion 
of  Britain, which was seen to be overstretched and weakened by the necessity of  defending its global 
empire.38 The genre transcended the limitations of  politics and developed into a mass-market phenomenon. 
Civilian writers such as William Le Queux and Erskine Childers made fortunes with their populist accounts. 
Their narratives went further than just the recognition of  the need for military reform; they fed a masochistic 
desire to experience depictions of  their own demise - a recurrent theme of  this genre was the fall from great 
power.39 This suggests a latent concern about the future of  imperial Britain, and played upon a wider sense 
of  societal disorder and decline during the Fin de Siècle era. Direct links were commonly made between 
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imperial tension outside of  Europe and in the Mediterranean, and threats to Britain. With little actual 
military tension in Western Europe, the Empire presented itself  as a source and location for conflict and 
weakness. The increasing number and variety of  these narratives over the later 1880s and 1890s suggests a 
growing sense of  the plausibility of  the defeat of  the British Empire by foreign powers.  
The peaceful conclusion of  the Fashoda Incident in late 1898 symbolically marked a watershed in 
British perceptions of  France; Fashoda represented the end rather than the beginning of  press antagonism 
and popular fear directed towards a European neighbour. The encounter, as Michael Brown has argued, 
represented a clear strategic and diplomatic victory for the British over the French.40 Whereas the German 
challenge appeared to be steadily growing, the French peril had been revealed to be hollow, and as a 
consequence the image of  the French ‘menace’ was decreasing in plausibility. The emasculation of  French 
imperialism at Fashoda meant that while it was clear the French had coveted British territories in Africa, 
they did not have the strength or the will to challenge Britain. There was also a distinct difference in the 
language and tone of  the press even at the height of  tensions. Contrasting with the Kruger Telegram Crisis 
two years earlier, the North-Eastern Daily Gazette stated that ‘neither side desires war…it may be regarded as 
certain that the two Governments and the two peoples both earnestly wish for peace’.41 Winston Churchill 
wrote in December 1898 for an American audience: ‘[t]here is no Power in Europe which the average 
Englishman regards with less animosity than France.’ Though many of  the nation’s newspapers called for a 
strong retort, there remained a substantial current of  peaceable and filial feeling expressed towards France.42  
After 1898 the French were regarded with decreasing anxiety in newspapers and periodicals. With the 
recognition politically that France had tried and failed to challenge the Empire, thoughts began to turn 
towards a rapprochement. During the Kruger Telegram Crisis of  1896, discussed below, the sudden 
realisation of  a German Menace had led to suggestions of  Anglo-French rapprochement, ‘with whom we 
[Britain] have many more points of  contact, and considerably more genuine sympathy’.43 Reynolds’s Newspaper 
announced: ‘there has been a corresponding growth in the popularity of  the French nation, while the party 
which has always favoured friendship with France has been greatly strengthened.’44 Shortly after Fashoda 
the Financial Times remarked how ‘ridiculous’ the whole incident was, and described Marchand as ‘the gallant 
Major’.45 Although during the South African War, France, as well as many other European nations 
experienced a strong burst of  anti-British and pro-Boer sentiment, there was a marked difference in the way 
that France was imagined in comparison with Germany and Russia. While French ‘anglophobia’ was often 
as hateful and vociferous as any other, contemporaries chose to blame Germany above all others: ‘Germany 
has been from the beginning the great workshop in which the lies against Great Britain have been 
manufactured, with the most ingenious industry and on the most extensive scale.’46 As Robert and Isabel 
Tombs have recently argued, though Britons were ‘ready to imagine themselves’ as enemies, views of  France 
seemed to lack ‘bitterness and real hatred…resentment in some circles was balanced by admiration in 
others.’47  
Nevertheless, the French, often assisted by Russia, maintained a common, if  diminishing, presence in 
invasion novels from 1898 to 1904; there was a distinct disconnect between invasion narratives and popular 
discourse. This can partly be explained by the long tradition of  the imagined French threat, which went 
back to the beginning of  the nineteenth century. Many invasion narratives served the purpose of  
highlighting national inadequacies, and, often searching for an enemy, these largely uninventive writers were 
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drawn to deploy the traditional enemy.48 In contrast, the more flexible and profit-driven civilian writers were 
increasingly drawn to the potency of  the new potential threat of  Germany after 1896.49 Although imperial 
anxieties were often formed out of  press sensationalism and popular paranoia – exaggerating real world 
events into much wider and more dramatic conspiracies - the reality of  imperial events could strongly 
influence the popular imagination. The rapid decline of  the French and Russian literary villain after 1904 
suggests the ease with which the British public were convinced that the threat was ended.50  
 
After the end of  the South African War in 1902 Arnold White argued in the Daily Express that Britain 
should ‘make France a Friend’ in order to curb Germany’s aggression. A year later the Fortnightly Review 
referred to the ‘unquestionable and warm desire of  the whole nation’ for a ‘final reconciliation with 
France.’51 By 1904 the British public gladly welcomed the signature of  a lasting alliance agreement between 
the two age old enemies at the same time as the German Menace rose to prominence.52 As will be discussed 
below, during the two biggest Anglo-German crises between 1896 and 1904 – the Kruger Telegram and 
Venezuela Blockade - British publications across the political spectrum increasingly proposed the possibility 
of  a readjustment of  views towards France. These pragmatic reactions assumed that the threat of  Germany 
required counter-balance, and France was increasingly imagined less as the old insidious and hated enemy 
but more as a country in many ways akin to Britain.  
The Russian Menace 
Russia was Britain’s prime imperial rival during much of  the nineteenth century. For Britain, Russia 
threatened India in the Near East –the Ottoman Empire and Persia - through dominance of  the Eastern 
Mediterranean trade route, and in the North West of  the British Raj. Russian expansion into Central Asia 
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over the course of  the nineteenth century led British colonial officials, journalists, polemicists and authors 
alike to express concern about Russia’s threat to India. In 1853 Anglo-Russian imperial competition over 
the Eastern Mediterranean had resulted in a bloody three year conflict in the Caucasus in what became 
known as the Crimean War. In British political and military circles, Russian aims and intentions were a 
constant source of  debate and discussion, while in popular discourse, the anxiety about Russia was 
commonly expressed, and occupied a central position in the popular imagination.  
Over the nineteenth century in Britain a tradition of  distrust and concern about Russia developed. 
Since the Crimean War (1853-56) Russia and Britain officially maintained a lasting peace, but the interests 
of  the two empires repeatedly clashed in Central Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean, Ottoman Turkey and 
Persia.53 British naval dominance of  the Mediterranean and Russian military dominance on land meant that 
the two powers were constantly aware of  the potential for conflagration.54 J.H. Gleason’s Genesis of  
Russophobia in Great Britain (1950) argued that the empire was at the heart of  ‘Russophobia’, but that the 
‘antipathy’ towards Russia developed most when the threat was ‘potential’ rather than ‘actual’.55 
Historiographical focus upon the politics and actions of  the Great Game has meant that there have been 
relatively few examples of  studies of  the popular discourse about Russia during the 1880s and 1890s.56  
The Russian Menace was articulated in a variety of  ways in popular culture. The idea of  the ‘Great 
Game’ – the intrigues of  Russian and British spies in Central Asia - was popularised most prominently in 
Rudyard Kipling’s Kim (1901). However, Kipling’s tale of  the Raj represented a longer tradition of  the 
Russian theme in British imperial literature. Through the 1870s and 1880s numerous political theses and 
‘polemical histories’ sought to reveal the threat of  Russia or predict how a war on the Afghan border with 
India might affect Britain. These works were written by military men or colonial officials and depicted 
various threats to India; they often demanded an active response from the imperial authorities.57 These non-
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fictional works were also accompanied by press debate and periodic panics. This was particularly true in 
1878 when British opinion railed at the Russian threat to Constantinople during the Russo-Turkish War 
(1877-78) when G.H. MacDermott’s famous song gave birth to the idea of  British ‘jingoism’.58 
In 1877 and 1878 Jingo-meetings were held across Britain where men met to share their patriotism and 
to demand intervention in the Russo-Turkish War. Hugh Cunningham viewed these events as key to the 
foundation of  the patriotic imperialism of  the 1880s and beyond. The term ‘jingoism’ entered common 
usage to describe the belligerent nationalism which became prevalent in Britain in the decades before the 
First World War.59 Similarly, during the Penjdeh Incident in 1885 a Russian attack on an Afghan force in 
north-eastern Afghanistan led to a short-lived popular panic arising out of  the concern that Russia might 
threaten the Raj – the most valued imperial possession.60 In many ways akin to Fashoda, the Penjdeh 
Incident was a diplomatic stand-off, which eventually resulted in an agreement between Russia and Britain 
and the establishment of  the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission. The popular ire was commonly 
provoked by diplomatic incidents revolving around British imperial possessions. The two great imperial 
fears of  Russia were firstly, that a massive Russian army might invade India; and secondly, that the Russian 
presence in Central Asia might inspire some kind of  second mutiny within India. J.R. Seeley, in The Expansion 
of  England (1883) argued that a Russian invasion alone could never succeed, but ‘what if  a mutiny and a 
Russian invasion came together?’61 These two concerns became regular features of  a developing fictional 
and popular trend in the 1890s and 1900s. 
With the rise of  cheaply accessible popular literature and the yellow press, more people in Britain were 
able to access debates about foreign threats. The old polemical arguments about the Russian threat were 
increasingly translated into heroic or anti-heroic imperial narratives. In 1879 during the Second Anglo-
Afghan War “A. Dekhnewallah” (pseud.) published the popular novel, The Great Russian Invasion of  India in 
which a Russian invasion of  India, preceded by the insidious ‘work of  saboteurs’ is eventually thwarted by 
a wily British General.62 In Kipling’s novel, Kim (1901), the eponymous protagonist is wrapped up in the 
Great Game; Kim helps to inform British authorities of  Russian agents in the Himalayas. In so doing he 
symbolically helps to maintain peace in the Empire. Kipling’s contemporary, John Buchan, wrote about the 
North West Frontier in The Half-Hearted (1900). His characters warned explicitly and repeatedly of  a Russian 
invasion of  India. Kipling only employed a Russo-French menace to India as the background to a novel 
which critiqued the complexities of  Raj society, racial perceptions and a comparison between East and West. 
Buchan’s narrative dealt more explicitly with an immediate and dangerous Russian threat. The Half-Hearted 
describes clearly the anxieties of  the age, employing the device of  the foreign threat to Empire, and the 
internal problems inherent in imperial British society: 
On the contrary, I honestly think that there is danger, but from a different direction. Britain is 
getting sick, and when she is sick enough, some people who are less sick will overwhelm its. My 
own opinion is that Russia will be the people.63  
Though the idea of  a Russian threat to Britain had long been accepted, and the key tropes long-established 
in political and press discourse, it was not until the 1890s that such fears could become increasingly popular. 
The rise of  popular media of  communication – cheap printed-word formats – meant that the ‘great game’ 
narrative could become a popular sensation where before it had been predominantly the realm of  political 
and military men. It is no coincidence that Buchan, Kipling and other writers were publishing cheaply 
available and entertaining narratives about Russian invasions of  India, at the same time as Childers, Le 
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Queux, and Oppenheim were describing German attacks in the empire at home. Buchan who later described 
German intrigues in India in Greenmantle (1916) was fixed, for the time, on the Russian threat, while Kipling 
wrote poems, polemics and narratives warning of  both Germany and Russia. Over his career William Le 
Queux wrote about Russo-French and German invasions in equal measure; this context of  popularised, 
democratised narratives of  anxiety is vital to understand the contemporaneous development of  an equally 
looming German Menace. 
By the 1890s the Russian threat to India was well-known and popularised, but diplomatic relations 
remained relatively settled in Europe. In China, a new arena for European imperialism placed Russia, France, 
Britain and Germany in close contact with one another. Similar to the ‘Scramble for Africa’ a few years 
before, the troubled Chinese Empire was seen by many European thinkers and politicians as the next great 
imperial battle-ground.64 Until 1907 Russia remained both a popular concern and diplomatically 
troublesome. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) Britain was allied to Japan, the enemy of  Russia, even 
providing military intelligence as John Chapman has revealed.65 During the Persian Revolutionary crisis of  
1907, Britain and Russia were drawn together into an agreement in order prevent further disorder. The 
Persian Crisis prompted the signing of  the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, following which the two 
nations were able to put aside their differences officially; ending British and Russian antagonism, and leading 
to an agreement over spheres of  influence in Persia. From 1907 until 1914 Russia and Britain cooperated 
militarily and diplomatically, ending a century of  antagonism.66  
External Imperial Anxieties 
In the long-established tradition of  imperial anxiety - expressed in India as the threat of  internal disorder, 
and also the French and Russian threats to empire – it is possible to suggest key modes of  expression. I 
would argue that when imagining threats to empire, themes of  imperial overstretch, absolutist and covetous 
enemies were inherent in British popular discourse. In popular perceptions, after 1896 Russia’s presence in 
newspaper debates, paranoid articles or literary narratives was in decline.67 Though the British were 
accustomed to fearing Russia, the German Menace soon became the primary concern. It is important to 
state that throughout this thesis, the perception of  Russia as a threat to empire is not denied. Rather, the 
British imagination had learned to ‘fear’ from popular Russian and French ‘menaces’, and panics about 
imperial order, and gradually these ‘bogies’ were transposed into German ones. The Russian Menace, in 
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particular, and the German Menace shared great similarities both in the ways they were expressed, and in 
the types of  trope and expression with which they were characterised.  
Imperial overstretch 
The rise of  patriotic discourse and popular imperialism were accompanied by near constant reminders in 
the press, literature, music or poetry that Britain was the ‘New Jerusalem’ - the preeminent nation in the 
world. This sense of  importance was used to justify Britain’s global dominance. However, the apparent 
‘absent-mindedness’ of  British imperialism had the consequence that British discourse also focussed upon 
the difficulty with which an empire of  such size could be governed, and the realisation of  inherent weakness 
in the imperial system.68 The combination of  the immense size and power of  the empire, as well as the 
apparent fragility of  the whole endeavour meant that Britons could at once imagine themselves as all-
powerful and weak. The dual discourses of  power and weakness were not mutually exclusive, but account 
for combined growth of  an aggressive nationalism and imperial anxieties. Before the turn of  the twentieth 
century, Russia and France served both as targets for aggressive imperialism, and as sources of  deep-seated 
insecurity.  
Such internal anxieties were drawn from the colonial experience combined with the ‘external’ imperial 
threat – which for most of  the nineteenth century was Russia. As Michael Matin, Heather Streets and Ann 
Parry have argued, European powers were important in shifting imperial focus from internal control, to 
external exposure.69 Russia was imagined as a threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and 
India. Britain feared Russia in particular along the trade route to India, and along the most extreme frontiers 
of  the Raj. Fiction-writers and polemicists in equal proportion warned of  a threat to the empire posed 
largely by Russia in Asia, and France and Germany in Africa, the Americas and the Pacific. Early fictional 
narratives, such as Arminius Vambéry’s The Coming Struggle for India (1885), and more common military 
polemics imagined the exposure of  India to invasion from Afghanistan. In spite of  the almost complete 
lack of  plausibility, this idea did grow in popularity amongst Conservative military reformers.70  
These accounts argued that as a consequence of  an over-exposed empire, Britain was unable to defend 
itself  at home or abroad against an enemy who had the element of  surprise, and powerful arms at their 
disposal. Over the 1880s and 1890s concerns were repeatedly raised in popular and political discourse about 
Britain’s languishing armed forces and naval strength. Generals such as Lord Roberts and Kitchener, and 
politicians such as Lord Rosebery, aimed to encourage military reform through the press throughout the 
period.71 Invasion scares throughout the period were closely related to issues of  naval strength and set 
against the backdrop of  a sustained naval arms race between the British and Franco-Russian navies. The 
aim of  maintaining a ‘two-power standard’ expressed by Lord Salisbury’s Naval Defence Act of  1889, and 
a later surge of  investment in 1894, only served to provoke armaments drives in Russian and French 
shipyards, and failed to stretch Britain’s naval advantage.72 Navy and Army reform was repeatedly demanded 
from the Right throughout this era; this helps to explain the number of  political treatises about invasion of  
India or Britain.73 The repeated expression of  such political arguments impacted upon popular discourse; 
newspapers and novelists consistently expressed concerns about national complacency, an atrophied army 
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and a navy spread too thinly across the empire. Imperial Britain was anxious about the extent to which the 
thinly spread armed forces were able to defend their newly enlarged global dominion and the European 
metropole.  
This sense of  exposure can be seen in the numerous tales of  invasion or future war which depicted 
invasions of  Britain and the dismemberment of  the Empire. The Battle of  Dorking (1871) described imperial 
troubles with the USA as the context for the weakening of  Britain for a Prussian invasion.74 Imperial 
incidents often caused the outbreak of  international war in many invasion or future war narratives. In M.P. 
Shiel’s Yellow Danger (1898), an early and influential ‘yellow peril’ narrative, a European war breaks out with 
Britain set against Germany, France and Russia, developing out of  a dispute over China.75 Louis Tracy’s The 
Final War (1896) pitted the same alliance against Britain, the European powers plotting to defeat Britain in 
order to feast on its imperial possessions. The single most successful work in the genre, Le Queux’s The 
Invasion of  1910 (1906), depicted the invasion of  Britain in war which came as a result of  a dispute with 
Germany in Samoa; the imagined imperial threat and the invasion scare narrative were deeply imbricated. 
British culture was intrinsically imperial, and anxieties about European powers derived directly from the 
sense that its forces were spread too thinly, leaving either the metropole or the empire too exposed. External 
anxieties about foreign powers reflected deep concerns about the weakness of  the British army, the 
unpreparedness of  the British navy, and the inability of  Britain to defend its empire against increasingly well 
prepared enemies.  
Invasion scares and imperial threats were part of  the wider anxiety about the inability of  Britain to 
sustain the empire and metropole. Russia was imagined as the greatest imperial threat to India, Britain’s most 
valuable possession. Until 1898, France seemed to be the greatest threat to Britain at home, as imperial 
commitments weakened already underfunded national defences. However, as I will argue, Germany’s 
increasing global activity led the same concerns to be levelled towards them in British popular culture. The 
idea of  an overstretched and undersupplied imperial infrastructure was juxtaposed with Germany’s 
economic virility and efficiency. Unlike France and Russia, in the racialised popular discourse of  turn-of-
the-century Britain, Germany not only menaced the weakened British Empire; it also did so with efficiency, 
dynamism and thoroughness. France and Russia were perceived as giant and disorganised states which 
seemingly lacked ‘Anglo-Saxon’ racial vigour necessary to truly challenge, but Germany seemed able and 
willing to take on Britain at its own game. Germany thus began to appear to represent a far greater threat 
than either France or Russia had ever been.  
Absolutism and Impulsiveness 
For most of  the nineteenth century Britain experienced bursts of  anxiety as a result of  a perceived menace 
from France. Some elements of  the perception of  French remained case specific, especially with images of  
Catholic irrationality or assumed moral and financial corruption. However, other anti-French evocations 
were curiously influential upon later imaginings of  a German threat. The image of  an absolutist power was 
contrasted, as Linda Colley and others have argued, with ideas of  British liberalism. France seemed to 
represent a dangerous and frightening proof  of  Britain’s own blessed position.76 Since the Napoleonic Wars, 
Britain had imagined itself  to be diametrically opposed to the forces of  absolutism. The Raj, for example, 
was justified by claiming to bring order and the rule of  law to the Indian Sub-Continent, fitting with the 
British self-image of  liberal imperialism. By the end of  the nineteenth century, the idea of  bringing 
                                                     
74 Ibid., pp. 318, 321, 323-324; Streets, H., Martial Races, pp. 87-116. 
75 Shiel, M.P., The Yellow Danger (London, 1898); Queux, W. Le, Invasion of  1910. 
76 Colley, L., Britons; Newman, G., Rise of  English Nationalism; Parry, J.P., ‘The Impact of  Napoleon III on British Politics, 1851-188’, Transactions of  
the Royal Historical Society, 11 (2001), pp. 147–75; Porter, B., ‘“Bureau and Barrack”: Early Victorian Attitudes Towards the Continent’, Victorian 
Studies, 27:4 (1984), pp. 407–33. 
38 Chapter 1  
 
  
civilization and reform to the colonies was a central tenet of  British identity and a justification for the 
subjugation of  others.77  
The image of  France and Russia as absolutist states contrasted strongly with this British sense of  
identity. The fear of  revolutionary disorder dominated British political thinking, and though minor 
revolutionary or activist movements did develop amongst the working and middle classes, they remained 
marginal, suggesting over a long period that an inherent conservatism pervaded amongst the majority. 
France had always been viewed as corrupt, repeatedly dominated by absolutist military leaders and 
revolutionary irrationality. The Russian Tsar was often depicted as ‘the jailor of  nations’ - a cruel and 
heartless oppressor of  free thought and expression.78 The Russian Empire was little understood, and viewed 
as unpredictable. The threat of  Russia, as R.A. Johnson argued, derived directly from its unpredictability; 
the whims, grudges and fancies of  the absolutist state helps to explain how British popular discourse could 
so regularly imagine threats from France and Russia throughout the later nineteenth century.79  
In discourses of  imperial anxiety, then, images of  an absolutist power – whether Russia, France, or later 
Germany – were used to imagine enemies who followed the will of  the power-hungry elite at the top of  
society. Wars of  conquest and invasions of  civilized nations were made more plausible by this imagined or 
real absolutism.80 Narratives of  invasion depicted oppression and the loss of  freedom in Britain as a 
consequence of  absolutist occupiers; Britain’s continued prosperity, freedom and liberalism was directly 
challenged by forces imagined to be its antithesis. With the rise of  Germany as a threat to Britain after 1896, 
these older images of  absolutist enemies were intensified. The Kaiser was represented as ruling with an iron 
fist, while Germany’s imperial activities were often imagined to be results of  the Kaiser’s passions, or the 
machinations of  his undemocratic government. He was often depicted as a ‘war lord’, and at times when 
Anglo-German relations were at their most fraught, the Kaiser’s personal rule was attacked viciously in the 
British press. In popular literature, Wilhelm was regularly portrayed as an absolute monarch – sometimes 
positively, but often extremely negatively.81 This image of  absolutist Germany fitted into pre-existing 
imperial anxieties. The rise of  yet another absolutist power, with little regard for free-speech or other 
nations, was easily swallowed by the anxious British popular imagination.  
Covetousness and Jealousy 
On a Sunday morning in January 1885 at St. Margaret’s church in Westminster, Archdeacon Frederic Farrar 
delivered a sermon full of  fire and brimstone warning of  the perils of  ‘faithlessness’ to the nation.82 In it he 
described the ‘National Horizon’: 
Dark clouds loom now upon the horizon.…Trade depressed, thousands overburdened, some 
of  our greatest colonies dissatisfied, our navy weak, our army weak, and constantly exercised 
in expeditions barren, difficult, and expensive. France jealous, suspicious, and hostile; Germany 
irritating and unfriendly; Russia persisting in stealthy encroachment or in sullen menace. 
Complications far less vague than these have in past days often burst out into terrible war. We 
may hope that by the wisdom of  our rulers, guided by the providence of  God, such calamities 
will be averted; and yet who knows whether another 50 years may not see England as utterly 
humiliated as France has been utterly humiliated...83 
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Farrar summed up the way nineteenth century Britons imagined their rivals before 1896. For him France, 
Russia, and to a lesser extent Germany, represented the greatest concerns of  the age; they were imagined as 
jealous, unfriendly, stealthy and sullen. He warned that without faith and godly governance, Britain might 
end up like France had in 1871 – humiliated and bereft of  power.84 
The rise of  ‘new imperialism’ and the increasingly nationalistic popular imperialism in Britain had 
resulted in a re-evaluation of  what the Empire meant to Britain. As the end of  the nineteenth century drew 
closer, Britain’s great position of  strength had been significantly reduced. Britain possessed a vast empire, 
dominated most of  the most valuable territories across the globe, and increasingly the people of  Britain 
were learning to appreciate the value of  this. The dispersal of  British people in the Dominions and settler 
colonies in Africa had added to a patriotic desire to defend territories, and had led to an increasingly 
defensive mentality. The consequent assumption was that other great powers would inevitably look upon 
Britain’s imperial possessions with lust and envy. The idea of  the Russian threat to India was based on the 
assumption that Britain had a jewel worth stealing. It was assumed unquestioningly that other great powers 
possessed an unquenchable thirst for further imperial acquisitions. Furthermore, it was common for 
newspapers and authors to ridicule the colonial empires of  other nations – France and Germany in particular 
were commonly described as having failed in the great scramble for colonies. This failure was used to explain 
why they would wish to steal the territories of  others. Arminius Vambéry, author of  anti-Russian polemics 
and fiction, wrote for the right-wing National Review in 1898, describing, ‘[t]he sickly jealousy and the ill-
conceived envy with which several of  our Great Powers have for a long time regarded England’s prosperity 
of  trade and mighty influence over the far distant regions of  the globe...’ The popularity of  literature of  
invasion and imperial subversion throughout this period helped propagate the assumption of  foreign 
jealousy and covetousness.85  
Never more was the supposed jealousy of  rival nations made more explicit than during bouts of  
‘continental anglophobia’ occurring throughout the age of  ‘new imperialism’. In 1894 the Economist, the 
small but influential free-trade and market-liberal journal, explained ‘Continental Jealousy’ in conciliatory 
fashion: ‘We British are all over the world, and in many nations’ way.’ For the Economist this jealousy was 
unpleasant, but understandable due to Britain’s great success. This trope of  British success and foreign 
jealousy runs through many of  the popular sources from this period. This was a key way of  rationalising 
Britain’s own success, but also denotes a sense of  anxiety about the dark intentions of  other nations. In 
popular literary depictions of  invasions of  India or Britain, and in the nascent spy fiction genre – this theme 
arose regularly. H.G. Wells tapped into this theme in his War of  the Worlds (1898): 
No one would have believed in the last years of  the nineteenth century that this world was 
being watched keenly and closely by intelligences greater than man’s and yet as mortal as his 
own; that as men busied themselves about their various concerns they were scrutinised and 
studied.…With infinite complacency men went to and fro over this globe about their little 
affairs, serene in their assurance of  their empire over matter...86  
Instead of  ‘world’ and ‘globe’, read ‘empire’ and this evocative opening reveals the anxieties in imperial 
culture. Wells, an advocate of  national efficiency, was keenly aware of  the scrutiny of  other nations, and the 
complacency of  Britain.87 While the British absent-mindedly muddled through the governance of  empire 
and nation, other ‘intelligences’ observed, scrutinised and planned. This trope of  the covetous and unknown 
enemy was well-developed before the rise of  the German Menace. The British public were attuned to 
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hearing about national deficiencies and complacencies, the envy of  other nations, and the secretive planning 
for their national downfall. 
After 1896 the rise of  a new danger added another layer to these anxieties; it will be argued that the 
same themes which had previously epitomised the combined Franco-Russian threat – imperial overstretch, 
irrational absolutism, and seething jealousy – were transferred onto the image of  Germany. Eventually the 
German challenge eclipsed the others in popular culture. The European-focussed threat has been 
emphasised in the many histories of  antagonism, popular ‘germanophobia’ and literature of  future war. 
However the German imperial menace has been little understood, and under-emphasised. Germany would, 
over the period 1896-1914, occupy the position of  both an imperial menace and an invasion threat. The 
fact that Germany encompassed both an imperial and a domestic danger (metropole and periphery) helps 
to explain the strength of  the idea of  a German Menace in popular culture before and even during the First 
World War.  
The Context of  Imperial Anxiety 
J.R. Seeley, The Expansion of  England (London, 1883) 
In The Expansion of  England (1883) J.R. Seeley described the rationale for British imperial anxieties before 
the Rise of  the German Menace; the Empire, highly valued and weakly defended, was depicted as teetering 
on a knife’s edge.88 Russia, the threat in the East, could not succeed alone, but a mutiny and an invasion 
might prove enough to lose the Raj. An invasion in Europe might lead to the loss of  the Empire. Michael 
Matin has argued that the imperial threat and the invasion threat were the two main fears for Britain during 
Seeley’s era. These two fears related to a broader sense of  overall anxiety about the security of  the Empire. 
Rather than viewing a metropolitan discourse, or an extra-European imperial one, the British Empire was 
viewed as an interconnected entity. An attack in one place would draw in already overstretched resources 
and endanger another. George Chesney, famed for his invasion tale, The Battle of  Dorking, was also a writer 
of  Indian ‘mutiny novels’, such as The Dilemma in 1872. Through the works of  one influential novelist, the 
link between home defence and the defence of  Empire is made explicit; he highlighted the weaknesses 
across the Empire, both at home and abroad. Chesney’s fictions enjoyed great popularity, suggesting that he 
reflected trends in society, as well as attempting to shape them. The British were imperially minded; it is 
important to recognise that this was a holistic imperial minded-ness that included the British Isles.  
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Seeley controversially described Anglo-French hostility as ‘a matter of  ancient history’. The French 
threat even in 1883 was partially dismissed with the recognition of  the decline of  French ‘aggressive power’. 
Seeley’s view of  the Empire in 1883 helps to explain how the rise of  a new challenger, with efficiency and 
military prowess to rival any power, could grip Britain so strongly. After 1896, popular discourse was 
increasingly engrossed by the realisation that a new and vigorous European enemy had arrived. This enemy, 
Germany, seemed able and determined to threaten the British Empire as a whole. It was incorporated into 
this anxious world-view without much difficulty. As argued below, when the sufficient shock was delivered 
in 1896, the British were primed to react, and to begin quickly to imagine what this new menace would 
mean. 
This discussion of  imperial anxieties aims to explain the context within which the idea of  a German 
imperial menace developed. In the case of  internal anxieties authors such as D.K. Lahiri Choudhury and 
Kim Wagner have emphasised the importance of  imagined threats, rumours and conspiracies to the British 
official and popular mentality during the late Victorian and Edwardian period. More often than not, the 
‘information panics’ these South Asian historians describe were based largely upon threats which were 
exaggerated beyond reality, often to an extreme extent. There was frequently a foundation in real events, 
such as the Indian Uprising, or the real existence of  highway robbers for the imagined Cult of  Thuggee. 
However, the British popular imagination during this period was easily panicked, and prone to 
sensationalism and exaggeration, especially as a result of  the rapidly developing popular fiction and press. 
Thus there was often a great difference between the real threat and the imagined one. 
During the later nineteenth century France was conceived of  both as a domestic invasion threat, and 
an imperial antagonist. Through the 1880s antagonism with France in the Mediterranean and Africa was 
often translated into a threat to the metropole through invasion fiction. This link, as suggested by Matin, is 
an important one; through the example of  France we see how close European rival and imperial competitor 
could be conceived as a threat. The image of  Russia, the greatest imagined threat to the Empire for the 
whole nineteenth century from the official point of  view, grew as a popular anxiety in the 1870s and 1880s. 
Popular depictions of  a Russian threat to India became more common and newspapers openly debated 
Russia’s dangerous ambitions. The Franco-Russian alliance of  1894 solidified the working relationship 
between the two powers officially. From 1888-1896, and to a lesser extent until 1904, this combined Franco-
Russian menace acted as a locus for imperial and domestic fears. Invasion fiction often depicted the two 
working in tandem to defeat the British at home and in India. This trope of  emasculation at the hands of  a 
foreign power retained a strong hold over the popular imagination from 1871-1914.  
Britain was regularly portrayed as being over-stretched in literary and journalistic accounts. The 
challenges of  governing a global empire left the dominions and colonies unprotected, and also risked the 
security of  the British Isles. This view of  the empire as a single entity was influential in developing a popular 
sense of  exposure. This was present both in debates about the internal stability of  imperial possessions, and 
in warnings of  exposure to foreign attack. This theme underlay all other British concerns and developed in 
force over the last decades of  the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. British popular discourse 
attributed France and Russia with the negative traits of  autocracy, irrational and aggressive decision-making, 
and an intense jealousy of  British success. The Tsar in particular was imagined as a cruel and ruthless leader, 
and the French as holding pernicious grudges against Britain. As will later be argued in this thesis, the 
characterisation of  the German Menace inherited many of  the themes developed over the nineteenth 
century to imagine Russia and France. The Kaiser – the ‘War Lord’ – was impulsive and unpredictable; as 
German imperial ambitions revealed an aggressive and covetous enemy. German popular anti-British 
sentiment was increasingly emphasised as an indication of  their jealousy of  Britain’s own place in the sun.  
These attributes – imperial overstretch, absolutism and covetousness - had previously made it possible 
to imagine a Russian army suddenly swarming over the mountains into the Raj, or a French invasion fleet 
catching Britain over-exposed and unawares. Between 1896 and 1904 British literary discourse increasingly 
characterised Germany harbouring grudges, seeking to swipe imperial possessions from Britain’s deserving 
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grasp, or menacing the Channel. The novel addition to these habitual anxieties was the commercial prowess 
and industrial efficiency of  Germany. Not only had Germany subsumed both the French ability to invade, 
and the Russian ability to menace the empire, but also unlike them, Germany had enough Anglo-Saxon 
blood to make it count.89  
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The Kruger Telegram Crisis 
On 30 December 1895, Dr Leander Starr Jameson, a key figurehead of  the British South Africa Company 
(chaired by Cecil Rhodes), led a small private army into the Transvaal Republic. A force of  600 private 
soldiers, armed with Maxim machine guns, large supplies of  weapons and ammunition, galloped into the 
Boer Republic towards the mining town of  Johannesburg.1 The success of  Jameson’s attempted coup rested 
upon an expected uprising of  the British Uitlander of  Johannesburg, who, the plotters alleged, were being 
denied basic rights by the Boer Government.2 After four days the blundering expedition was outnumbered 
and overwhelmed by better-armed Boer forces on the outskirts of  Johannesburg; the surviving troops were 
disarmed and expelled, while Jameson and his commanding officers were imprisoned.3 News of  the raid 
was received with shock in Britain on 1 January 1896. Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister, immediately sought to distance the British Government from events, issuing a full condemnation 
of  Jameson and his forces. Along with some newspapers, the Government quickly sought to blame Jameson 
for this ‘amazing outrage’ committed by British imperial officials.4 However, there remained sections of  the 
British press who were unwilling to condemn Jameson for what was perceived by some as a noble attempt 
to assist British nationals. The Financial Times and Pall Mall Gazette both referred to the ‘ill-judged’ nature of  
this ‘foolhardy’ invasion but refused to go so far as to condemn the motives.5 
On 3 January 1896 a seemingly innocuous telegram arrived in the office of  President Paul Kruger of  the 
South African Republic (or Transvaal): 
I express to you my sincere congratulations that, supported by your people, and without 
appealing for the help of  friendly powers, you have succeeded by your own energetic 
enthusiasm against armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of  the peace, and 
have thus been enabled to restore peace and safeguard the independence of  the country against 
attacks from outside.                              William  
Signed by the German Emperor, Wilhelm II, the telegram sparked an unprecedented storm of  patriotism 
across Britain and its Empire, and an outburst of  indignation which lasted throughout January 1896.6 The 
crisis eventually passed, but was remarkable for its effects over the following decades. Viewed through a 
wider lens, the consequences of  the crisis were far greater for the British popular imagination. The Kruger 
Telegram and its aftermath had a lasting legacy, which contributed to the formation of  the German Menace 
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in British popular perceptions. This short-lived but extremely pronounced popular crisis, was focussed upon 
a threat to the Empire as opposed to the metropole. It defined British views of  Germany in the following 
decade and established the key themes in representations of  Germany in popular discourse: aggressive 
German absolutism, covetousness, and the need to match the challenge.  
Given the contemporary notoriety of  the Kruger Telegram, relatively little recent historical research 
has been devoted to it. In germanophone historiography, diplomatic historians such as Harald Rosenbach 
have studied the role of  the Jameson Raid and Kruger Telegram in the development of  Anglo-German 
relations. In Anglophone scholarship, Paul Kennedy’s Rise of  Anglo-German Antagonism (1980) remains 
foremost in this field.7 Few scholarly accounts have analysed the popular reaction to the Kruger Telegram, 
or its impact, in depth. Commonly the press outburst is briefly noted, before moving on to a discussion of  
its results in Great Power politics.8 Dominik Geppert’s recent Pressekriege (2007), which investigated the 
press-political dimensions of  the crisis, stands as one of  few recent approaches which detail aspects of  the 
outburst.9 Geppert studied the Kruger Telegram as a ‘media event’, investigating the press management of  
the German and British governments and the political consequences. Though Geppert’s study revealed 
much about the behaviour of  British and German governments towards the press during the rise of  Anglo-
German antagonism, his approach ran counter to historians of  the media such as Bösch and Ross who have 
argued for the democratising influence of  the growth of  mass media. Further, Geppert focussed upon the 
intersection between official decision making and popular discourse from the perspective of  those in power. 
Historians of  race, anti-alienism and popular perceptions have also often overlooked or undervalued the 
Kruger Telegram, preferring to focus on later events as the catalyst for the changing views of  Germany.10 
Lothar Reinermann, in his discussion of  the relationship between the British press and the Kaiser, recently 
suggested that the damage done by the Kruger Telegram ‘did not last’ and that the Kaiser and Germany 
were soon to be redeemed by their neutral stance during the South African War.11 Although the British 
relationship with Wilhelm II remained ambiguous after 1896 – marked by shows of  fraternity, anger and 
ridicule - the image of  Germany as a whole never recovered.12 There is a risk that short term ambiguity may 
lead to an underestimation of  the longevity of  the event in popular memory.13 
Reviewing recent approaches, there is a need to provide deeper insight into the themes and ideas arising 
out of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis. This event had a defining impact upon the way Britain viewed Germany 
and itself  over the next decade. Furthermore, the longer-term history of  its impact has received very little 
attention, and so it is suggested that new perspectives may be drawn from the legacy of  the Kruger 
Telegram. This chapter will study, in greater depth, the nature and manner of  the popular response. In 
pursuing this path I aim to provide a novel and useful analysis of  an understudied facet of  British popular 
imperial history. 
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The International Background to the Crisis 
As argued in chapter one, since the late 1880s debates about naval and military investment had preoccupied 
successive British governments; by 1895 the British popular discourse was gripped by imperial anxieties. 
Prior to late 1895 Britain’s most commonly acknowledged adversaries were France and Russia. British 
popular cultural was increasingly sensitive to external threats and prone to jingoistic nationalism. The crisis 
in South Africa was framed by three important international developments: the ‘Eastern Question’, the 
Anglo-American Venezuela Crisis and colonial intrigue in Africa.  
During 1895 the major imperial powers had sought to negotiate and pressurize the Ottoman Sultan, 
Abdul Hamid II, to prevent abuses of  Armenian Christians under his rule. The fear of  Russian expansion 
in the area, plus acute awareness of  French and British imperialism in North Africa meant that any foreign 
interference with Turkey had to be conducted carefully. All three powers hoped to prevent abuses under the 
Sultan and to bring about a stabilisation of  the Ottoman provinces.14 The British press raised concerns 
about the atrocities being committed by the Turkish authorities, and through November and December 
1895 the crisis appeared to be coming to a head. However, Salisbury’s government received criticism for his 
indecision and the European powers failed to prevent further atrocities towards the Christian Armenians, 
allowing the crisis to go on into 1896. The Armenian Crisis was an on-going source of  tension for British 
diplomats throughout this period and the press in Britain regularly returned to the issue as evidence of  
Britain’s isolation and international state of  crisis, as well as out of  a Christian desire to help other Christians 
in need.15 
Added to this sense of  growing crisis in Europe, Britain was embroiled in another difficult imperial 
situation with the United States, where public opinion had become increasingly outraged by British gun-
boat diplomacy in the Caribbean (especially in Nicaragua in 1895). Concerns were raised that Britain might 
act in contravention to the American doctrine of  non-interference (the Monroe Doctrine). As a result of  
political pressure the American Government intervened in an Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute. On 17 
December 1895 US President Cleveland delivered an address to Congress in which he vigorously reaffirmed 
the Monroe Doctrine, and recommended that the findings of  an American boundary commission in 
settlement of  the Venezuelan dispute be enforced ‘by every means’.16 The message, accompanied by furious 
American press abuse of  Britain, indicated the clear intent of  America to interfere in British imperial matters 
forcefully, and it delivered a shock to Britain. British newspapers expressed great concern and anger at 
American interference, but there was a marked difference between the reaction to Cleveland’s speech and 
the response less than a month later to Wilhelm’s Telegram.17  
The two incidents were similar in form but the results were very different; it is likely that unfolding 
events in South Africa forced Britain to concede quickly to American demands in Venezuela.18 The 
Washington Post, an American anti-British paper, commented that the press uproar over the Kruger Telegram 
was made more intriguing when contrasted with the relative calm with which the British press responded to 
the Venezuelan Crisis.19 During the Kruger Telegram Crisis, the British press commonly commented upon 
the sense of  relief  that the Venezuela dispute had been settled in early January 1896. The Venezuelan Crisis 
of  December 1895 marked a positive turning point for Anglophone relations and representations, while the 
Kruger Telegram Crisis had the opposite effect. 
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Africa too was a focus for imperial antagonism between several European powers. As well as on-going 
negotiations with France, over the early 1890s Britain and Germany were increasingly embroiled in ‘colonial 
quarrels’ in Africa and the Pacific.20 These largely minor incidents had not provoked much interest publicly, 
but did suggest to British officials that Germany was increasingly active as a colonial power. British and 
German interests clashed in Samoa and the Congo between 1893 and 1895, though in each case, the two 
powers were able to settle disputes and reach peaceable solutions. During 1895 British diplomats such as 
Edward Malet (Ambassador in Berlin) had noted an increasingly fractious private relationship developing 
between British and German colonial policy makers.21 Britain was increasingly active in her colonial policy, 
refusing to back down over issues across the new empire, and the same inflexibility had gripped German 
foreign policy.22  
During 1895 as awareness of  conflicting interests grew, relations gradually deteriorated from the 
previously cooperative one enjoyed since the 1880s (evidenced by agreements such as the Helgoland-
Zanzibar Agreement, 1890).23 Behind the scenes the relationship between Lord Salisbury and Kaiser 
Wilhelm had also worsened. At Cowes on the Isle of  Wight, an interview between the Kaiser and Salisbury 
had resulted in tension – Wilhelm treated Salisbury with disrespect, then Salisbury did not attend a scheduled 
meeting the following day. Such incidents, though little known to the press at the time, laid the foundation 
for events in 1896.24 As Paul Kennedy argued, the Pan-German movement and nationalist German 
intellectuals were calling increasingly for ‘expansionist Weltpolitik’ either with England or ‘against her’, and 
these influential lobbying groups fuelled Wilhelm and his Government’s global ambitions.25 Matthew 
Seligmann has argued that German strategic planners saw South Africa as a potential target for imperial 
expansion. The actions in 1895-96 were intended as a power-grab, which ultimately failed, and forced 
Germany to refigure its imperial goals, leading to the development of  a more concerted globally-focussed 
policy as a result.26  
Both Kennedy and Seligmann agree that since 1893 diplomatic tensions had been raised, but public 
awareness and sensitivity to these matters lagged behind.27 British popular opinion was not yet ready to fully 
engage with this new imperial antagonism, as indicated by the ‘milder tone’ of  the British press during the 
Congo dispute in 1894. The German High Command were pushing for imperial acquisitions at the cost of  
the British Empire. British diplomats and ministers were gradually becoming aware of  potential antagonism, 
but the British public remained largely ignorant of  such developments, and were unprepared for Wilhelm’s 
declaration of  intent in January 1896. This goes some way to explaining the suddenness of  the outburst, 
and the shock in German circles at the strength of  popular opinion in Britain as a result.  
Anglo-Boer Tensions and the Transvaal 
At the end of  1895 a crisis was brewing in South Africa, one of  Britain’s most coveted imperial interests.28 
Since the British annexation of  the Boer Transvaal Republic in 1877 there had been antagonism between 
the British and Boers. In 1880 the Transvaal Republic rejected British imperial rule resulting in a bloody 
conflict in which the British were forced to sign an embarrassing truce, after they experienced great difficulty 
against unconventional Boer tactics. The London Convention, signed on 27 February 1884, defined the 
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rights of  Transvaal Republic as an independent state, but under overall British suzerainty.29 Until December 
1895 difficulties between the Transvaal and the British Cape Colony rarely ceased. Drawn in by the huge 
mineral wealth of  the Transvaal, over the 1880s and 1890s British immigrants, known in Afrikaans as 
Uitlander, grew in numbers and importance. In 1888 one British commentator described thousands of  
British immigrants to the Transvaal ‘swarming within its borders’.30 Conflict between Transvaaler interests 
and this growing immigrant population attracted global interest.31 In British circles increasing attention was 
drawn to the refusal of  long-serving President Paul Kruger to grant equal rights to the Uitlander while there 
was deep concern amongst the Boer population that the small ‘Afrikander’ republic would be overwhelmed 
by a flood of  British immigration and expansionism.32  
The situation in the Boer Republics was fractious. Britain and Germany, were inexorably drawn into 
diplomatic entanglement, lured by great mining wealth in the Transvaal. Through the early 1890s the British 
and German Empires surreptitiously battled for the vital seaborne access route to the Transvaal gold fields, 
Portuguese Delagoa Bay.33 Despite imperial competition, however, Britain and Germany were largely able 
to maintain cordial foreign relations.34 British-Boer relations continued to worsen; since the 1870s the South 
African Republic had sought to establish a railway link with a ‘British-free’ port, in order to secure trade on 
its own terms. In 1891 President Kruger had turned to the British for a loan, through financial desperation, 
and in return had been forced to grant the British rights to link the Transvaal gold fields to the Cape by rail. 
In 1894 the ‘Delagoa Bay Line’ was completed, and Kruger announced that ‘the Cape’s rail monopoly was 
over’. As a result the Boers and the British South African Company began to conduct a railway and customs 
war known as the ‘Drifts Crisis’ (28 August - 7 December 1896). Cecil Rhodes (Prime Minister of  the Cape 
Colony, 1890-1896) reacted in typically robust manner; under his instruction the British South Africa 
Company began to undermine the trade rules of  the Transvaal, and Kruger’s government retaliated by vastly 
increasing the rates charged upon railway traffic using the British line in its territory. The Company 
responded by organising an alternative 51 mile oxen-driven wagon route from the border to the towns of  
the Transvaal.35 The oxen crossed the River Vaal at two ‘drifts’ (fords) (Viljoen’s Drift & Zand Drift near 
present day Lochvaal, Guateng, SA), and Kruger, in response to the sizeable British trade, ordered these 
drifts to be closed to foreign trade.36 The crisis lasted 72 days until eventually Kruger backed down. The 
Drifts Crisis concluded only a month and a half  prior to the Jameson Raid, and, as Kenneth Wilburn argued, 
Rhodes and his confidants had intended to implement their plan for a ‘sub-imperial’ combined insurrection 
of  Uitlander and a relief  force from Jameson, in order to remove Kruger as a barrier to trade and wealth.37 
By backing down, Kruger had pre-empted this plot. Nevertheless, the crisis was seen by Rhodes as a 
vindication of  the need to remove the obstacle to trade and resource exploitation of  the South African 
Republic; Wilburn argued this was the main cause for the orchestration of  the Jameson Raid.38 
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When news of  Jameson’s failure was received in Britain on 1 January the Salisbury and the Colonial Secretary, 
Joseph Chamberlain, immediately sought to distance themselves from events, issuing a full condemnation 
of  Jameson and his forces. Along with some newspapers, the Government quickly placed blame upon 
Jameson for this ‘amazing outrage’ committed by British Empire nationals.39 The traditionally liberal and 
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anti-imperialist Manchester Guardian sought to put beyond doubt the illegality and moral wrongness of  the 
invasion: 
To levy war like garotters, without warning, ultimatum, or diplomatic statement of  complaint, 
is almost the grossest outrage which one nation can commit against another, and when it is 
committed by subordinate officials of  their own motion the offence against their own 
Government is rendered doubly flagrant by the heinousness of  the imputations to which they 
expose their countrymen.40 
However, there remained sections of  the British press who were unwilling to blame Jameson for what was 
perceived as a noble attempt to assist British nationals. The City-of  London’s Financial Times and the 
Conservative sensationalist Pall Mall Gazette both referred to the ‘ill-judged’ nature of  this ‘foolhardy’ 
invasion, but both refused to go so far as to condemn the motives. Many right-sided periodicals and 
newspapers refused to accept the fundamental immorality of  this land-grab.41 Jameson had ordered 
telegraph wires cut between the Transvaal and Cape Colony, in order to prevent any government orders for 
withdrawal reaching his forces, and detailed correspondence did not arrive in London until 6 January, leading 
to great confusion.42 
By the time full details of  the raid arrived in London, events had taken a further turn for the worse; the 
Kaiser’s telegram was dispatched to Kruger in South Africa, and relayed to Britain. The British Government 
condemnation on 1 January was followed by two days where no significant statement was issued. The clique 
of  German officers and princes surrounding Kaiser Wilhelm were incensed by what they saw as a typical 
example of  British belligerence in a German sphere of  interest. Privately, Wilhelm was furious with Britain, 
and, though his advisors attempted to avert a major public relations disaster, as well as potential armed 
conflict, they eventually agreed to the release of  a public telegram of  congratulation to President Kruger.43 
Press releases about the telegram were offered to semi-official newspapers, including the Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung and National Zeitung.44 The message superficially did little more than congratulate Kruger 
for his successful repulsion of  a hostile armed raid, but the reaction of  the British press and the British 
political establishment could not have been stronger. In particular, Wilhelm’s reference to the ‘independence’ 
of  the Transvaal rankled in Britain, where it was widely accepted to be a British-ruled territory. The semi-
official Kölnische Zeitung announced on 4 January that Germany had been prepared to mount a minor armed 
intervention in order to protect German interests and German civilians. Official German press releases 
soon revealed that a small force of  German troops had been prepared to land at Delagoa Bay, in Portuguese 
East Africa (Mozambique), with the sole and peaceful intention of  marching across land to the Transvaal, 
in order to safeguard German interests, i.e. officials and property. This potentially disastrous blunder was 
narrowly averted by news of  the failure of  the Jameson’s Raid, but the potential German action became the 
subject of  exaggeration and rumours in the British press, and further provoked strong British reaction.45 
Accountability for the telegram was debated until the death of  the Kaiser in 1941, but diplomatic 
historians have agreed that responsibility was shared between the Kaiser and his Government, although 
during and after the crisis Wilhelm was generally assumed to be the chief  architect of  the telegram.46 At the 
time the German government claimed that its intention was only to encourage and support a kindred nation 
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in their claim for independence. Others, including Wilhelm’s biographers, and post-WW1 accounts, argued 
that the act was typical of  the Kaiser’s spontaneous and impulsive style of  rule, and that the telegram was 
an instinctive reaction to the Jameson Raid, aside from German imperial policy.47 During the press outburst, 
few were willing to accept that Wilhelm and his government had acted purely out of  instinctive altruism to 
help the poor Boer people. Matthew Seligmann recently argued: ‘A government with such definite territorial 
ambitions as that of  Germany does not battle to obtain a say in the future political structure of  a region 
merely for selfless ends’. In line with some older accounts, he suggested that the telegram was a considered 
attempt to test British resolve, and to pursue a policy of  increasing informal involvement in South Africa.48 
In truth, there was no German plan to invade the Transvaal or to engage in armed conflict, but there was 
clear intent to develop Germany’s influence in Boer affairs, and to challenge British imperialism.49 The 
question of  responsibility will continue to inspire historical debate, as it did in the years immediately 
afterwards. During the popular crisis what mattered was the way Wilhelm was perceived to have led an 
assault on the British Empire, and Germany was increasingly perceived as a menace to the Empire as a 
result.50  
News was limited and confusion ruled in Britain until 6 January in the absence of  any clear information 
on the Raid. When full details of  the Raid itself  arrived, news of  the Kaiser’s telegram had already gripped 
the nation for two days. Diplomatically, Salisbury and his Government recognized the need for a strong 
response to Germany, not only to prevent further escalation, but also as a matter of  imperial pride. On 31 
December, Germany had privately demanded that Britain recognise the independence of  the Transvaal and 
it was feared that any sign of  British weakness would provoke further attempts to chip away at the already 
stretched strategic resources of  the Empire.51 On 8 January Lord Salisbury moved to respond to the outburst 
of  popular anger. The Government announced that a ‘Flying Squadron’ of  two battleships and four cruisers 
would be formed ‘ready to go anywhere’; three cruisers were later sent to Delagoa Bay to shadow Germany’s 
three cruisers nearby.52 Much of  the official comment on the crisis was offered retrospectively, or filtered 
through the press, with Parliament not sitting throughout January. In the end the diplomatic crisis was short-
lived; the robust British diplomatic response led the Kaiser’s Government to recognise their chance of  
gaining a valuable imperial area of  influence had passed and they swiftly backed down. 
The British Reaction to the Kaiser’s Telegram 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis was the surge in defensive patriotism 
and popular anti-German sentiment expressed at all levels of  society. Dominion and American newspaper 
correspondents commented commonly upon the British anger and the ‘tremendous outburst’ of  
indignation. They described large-scale public meetings in the cities of  Britain where ‘the name of  the 
German Emperor has been received with loud hissing and other striking signs of  opprobrium.’53 Letters to 
the editor of  the Conservative ‘paper of  record’, the Times, on 6 January indicate the widespread nature of  
the phenomenon; Harold Finch-Hatton called it:  
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…one of  the most universally mischievous documents that have ever been framed…in letter 
and in spirit a deliberate and premeditated insult to the Queen and the British nation of  so 
gross and wanton a nature as to call for an immediate and decisive reply.  
Another contributor questioned, ‘[d]oes not the blood of  every Englishman boil at reading the message 
from the chief  of  a friendly nation and a grandson of  our Queen…[?].54 On the same day the Manchester 
Guardian’s London Correspondent commented: 
‘In clubs, in railway carriages, in the streets, the situation created by the message of  the German 
Emperor to President Kruger and by the bellicose and threatening tone of  the German press 
is discussed with varying degrees of  knowledge, but everywhere with a feeling of  resentment 
which it is impossible to mistake.55  
Throughout the crisis the Guardian retained a sense of  calm, discouraged patriotic anger and implored the 
public to control its emotions; a staunchly left-sided newspaper, it was unlikely to exaggerate such jingoistic 
behaviour. It often sought to discourage nationalistic urges and regularly preached a non-interventionist 
foreign policy. During the Kruger Telegram Crisis, however, even the Guardian was forced to admit that the 
British public had some justification for displeasure, suggesting that across society, people all political 
persuasions felt the need to announce their support for the imperial cause. The popular liberal daily, Reynolds’s 
Newspaper, joined the Guardian in describing the wide-scale popular response; it argued that there could be 
‘no doubt of  the extreme unpopularity of  the German Emperor in London’. In London’s club land 
proposals were made to remove Wilhelm from honorary members’ lists; Reynolds’s also described ‘hissing’ at 
a mass gathering in Birmingham and Germans were jeered in a play in Blackpool. It went on to argue that 
across the Empire the feeling was the same: even in Melbourne, Australia, ‘a strong anti-German feeling’ 
had developed.56 
Across Britain sermons were delivered in churches and chapels, about the political situation. The 
Bishop of  London selected a quote from St. Mark xiii.7: ‘And when ye shall hear of  wars and rumours of  
wars, be ye not troubled: for such things must needs be; but the end shall not be yet.’ The Morning Post, a 
Conservative daily, commented that ‘the future seems to be full of  dangers and full of  trials’ and implored 
Britain to continue to fulfil its ‘national responsibilities’ to the Empire.57 Reflecting on the crisis at the end 
of  January while campaigning for the Montrose by-election, Liberal Politician John Morley (later a fervent 
‘Pro-Boer’ campaigner) condemned the action of  Germany, but exclaimed: 
I do not think any right-minded man can view without disgust the sort of  language - indecent 
and undignified - which those in some quarters of  society in London and elsewhere have 
thought fit to use about the German Emperor. I hope that is now over. 
Morley’s dissenting voice indicates the level of  anger the telegram engendered, but also shows that at least 
some in Britain wished that the outrage had been expressed in a less bellicose manner. His condemnation 
of  such behaviour suggests that it was a widespread and prevalent phenomenon. As a Liberal he was likely 
to condemn such an aggressive stance in both popular opinion and government, but Morley still felt the 
need to describe his own distaste at Wilhelm ‘war lord in jack boots.’58  
Allegations were made in both the German and British press that the eruption of  anger towards 
Germany had resulted in damage to personal property and ‘disturbances’ in the streets of  the East End 
gained popular notoriety. The Times stated that conditions were still unfavourable ‘to the initiation of  any 
German enterprise in London’.59 Although in reality there were few, if  any, occurrences of  this nature, the 
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plausibility of  such an occurrence reveals the state of  opinion.60 The middle-class Liberal Daily News,61 
reported that after sending his telegram to President Kruger ‘the Emperor William received from England, 
many hundreds of  insulting and anonymous letters, calling him gross and rude names.’ The Pall Mall Gazette, 
saw the lighter side, referring to the letters as ‘very naughty’,62 while the Daily News took the matter more 
seriously, arguing that examples such as these letters, and speeches by inflammatory politicians, ‘might flatter 
the ear of  the masses’ but risked endangering peace.63 Humorous though such hate-mail may seem, it 
illustrates both the extent to which ordinary people had taken the telegram to heart and the scale of  public 
anger. 
During January 1896 fervent patriotism was evident throughout the hugely popular music halls of  
London and across Britain.64 Music hall’s cross-class appeal and outreach made it a vital indicator of  cultural 
trends and popular sentiment.65 During this period, music halls were often the main location for 
demonstrations of  popular patriotism. MacDermott’s song, for example, which coined the term ‘jingo’ in 
its modern form, began as a popular music hall number. Music halls were frequently hosts to expressions 
of  imperial anxiety and consequent bellicosity.66 Even before the Kruger Telegram the British public was 
fascinated by events in South Africa; Lloyd’s Weekly described ‘an extraordinary scene’ which occurred on 2 
January, before news of  the telegram arrived, at the New Olympic Theatre. A man was reported to have 
shouted above the noise of  the performance ‘To hell with the Boers’, which was received by an ‘electrical’ 
eruption of  ‘pent-up excitement’ which ‘found vent in hearty cheers, raised again and again.’ The audience 
also heartily cheered Dr Jameson.67  
In response to the Kaiser’s telegram the music hall scene witnessed an upsurge in defensive patriotism 
and anti-German sentiment. The words of  the sensationally popular music hall song of  the time, ‘Hands 
Off!’68, written in response to the telegram, reveal the variety of  sentiments the telegram inspired. The 
‘league of  greed and hate’ against Britain emphasised both the sense of  standing alone, common in the 
newspapers, and the theme of  international jealousy which formed a key aspect of  on-going imperial anxiety. 
The idea of  the British Empire as a coveted entity formed the basis for many of  the imperial anxieties 
invoked in response to the telegram. It was increasingly accepted that the Kaiser, his government, and the 
German people at large, not only desired their own empire, but that this new colonial empire would have 
to come at the expense of  Britain. The song was resonant with the increasingly prevalent ultra-defensive 
popular imperialism of  the period: ‘back to back’ and the ‘danger at your gate’ epitomise the embattled self-
image of  patriotic songs of  this ilk, much as “Rule Britannia” expressed the sentiment that England ‘never 
will be slaves’. Furthermore, through such recognisable terminology played upon jingoistic patriotism; the 
song called for aggressive resistance to any form of  interference with Britain or her colonial possessions.69 
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The Feilding Star (NZ), 11 May 1896. 
A description of  a performance of  the song, ‘Hands Off ’, at Daly’s Theatre can reveal something of  
the popular success of  this song:  
The singing of  this song created the most intense enthusiasm among the audience. They 
cheered again and again, and more especially at the mention of  Dr Jameson’s name. At the back 
of  the pit someone waved a Union Jack. In the chorus the yeomen, who take part in the scene, 
draw their swords, adding greatly to the effect of  a stirring and patriotic demonstration in this 
hour of  our attempted humiliation. 
The same commentator went on to describe ‘Cheer Boys, Cheer’ as ‘without doubt the patriotic play of  the 
moment’; it was ‘[t]eeming with references to Jameson, the Chartered Company and Kruger, which was seen 
as ‘the cause of  Jingo demonstrations.’70 In the early days of  the outburst Dr Jameson and the Chartered 
Company were synonymous with defence of  the empire, in spite of  their ostensibly aggressive act. At the 
Alhambra Theatre in Leicester Square the running order was pushed back to allow for a reading of  Poet 
Laureate Alfred Austin’s first poem in his new role entitled ‘Jameson’s Ride’; the reading was reported as 
receiving ‘great applause’.71 Austin’s poem had initially been published in the Times and though it was 
immensely popular, literary critics attacked the poem and its unloved author.72  
Another patriotic show was performed at the Tivoli Theatre where the actor Leo Stormont dressed as 
a British admiral singing ‘What is our own we’ll hold’ and ‘Rule, Britannia’ nightly. According to Lloyd’s 
Weekly the audience stood to sing along with the choruses. Across the theatres of  London many proprietors 
were quick to take advantage of  the recent turn of  events, with resurrections of  the opaquely titled plays 
‘Queen of  the Seas’ at the Pavilion Theatre, and ‘Rule, Britannia’ at the Eastern Empire.73 The theatres 
arguably believed that reviews such as these, with their easily recognisable themes stirring up jingoistic 
patriotism would most excite their audiences. The theme ‘holding’ or defending the Empire against an 
external threat was the basis of  much expression during the crisis; this is indicative of  imperial anxieties 
discussed above. 
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‘The Music Halls,’ Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 19 January 1896 
Even the more high-brow theatres held host to their own outbursts of  jingoism in the face of  German 
aggression. The success of  Anthony Hope’s novel The Prisoner of  Zenda (1894) had led to a theatrical 
adaptation in 1895. The St. James’s Theatre proprietor, George Alexander, was fortuitous with the timing 
of  the staging of  the play; Hope’s ‘Ruritania’, a German-speaking central-European autocracy played 
perfectly to the outpouring of  anti-German feeling at the time. Especially resonant was the depiction of  
‘the gallant young Englishman Rassendyll in his courageous dash across Ruritania to the rescue of  the 
prisoners.’ The Pall Mall Gazette recognized of  the aptness of  this image, declaring that if  there was at that 
time a ‘nautical melodrama’ playing in any theatre in London, it would have taxed all the ingenuity’ of  
London’s prop designer ‘to float a flying squadron on the stage.’74 Indeed, “Zenda” proved so successful 
that the St James’s had to run extra matinee performances, and the Pall Mall Gazette’s reporter declared that 
the audience of  Saturday 15 January was the ‘heaviest the management has known’.75 
According to the Glasgow Herald, ‘so vigorous were the demonstrations of  disapproval with which all 
allusions to Germany were received’ that the Lord Chamberlain, the Earl of  Lathom, in close coordination 
with the Foreign Office, was forced to censor several theatres in order to calm the ‘patriotic fervour’.76 The 
words of  ‘Hands Off!’ were swiftly altered so that allusions to the Kaiser and Germany were kept to a 
minimum. ‘Hands Off! Germany!’ became ‘Hands Off, all of  you!’, while ‘“Kruger boasts and Kaiser brags” 
was changed to “Boers boast and Deutscher brags,”’, amendments which did little to allay the outburst of  
anger. The Pall Mall Gazette described in detail how the character of  a German music master in “The Strange 
Adventures of  Miss Brown” was comically booed and kicked off  stage in ignominious fashion. Elsewhere, 
the Pall Mall Gazette displayed distaste at how ‘the low comedians almost fight nightly for the privilege of  
getting down close to the footlights and saying “Made in Germany.”’ Furthermore, it described a scene at 
Daly’s theatre with evident self-righteous indignation: 
Mr. Harry Monkouse, wearing a burlesque German military uniform, and carrying a toy drum 
and a penny trumpet, comes on with Miss Decima Moor, who is for a time taking Miss Lind’s 
place, and the two sing a buffoon duet, the object of  which is apparently to insult the German 
Emperor. It succeeds. The censor would not allow “Hands off ! Germany” in the song, although 
“Hands off ! Germany” is just what the Government and the newspapers have been saying. It 
seems rather strange that he should have passed this insulting personal allusion, which is neither 
good patriotism, good humour, nor good business. 
The ‘low’ humour in the music halls, as so often the case, generated displeasure in ‘high-brow’ journals. 
Such comments suggest that the newspaper outburst was reflected in popular sentiment amongst the 
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working classes in London; the popularity of  ‘Hands Off!’ in theatres in Glasgow, Sheffield and Newcastle 
indicates its influence across Britain.77 
There is strong evidence to suggest that the general public was outraged. The press obviously played a 
role in stoking anger through its fevered reports of  events, but the increasingly outspoken nature of  
coverage during the crisis may suggest that the public and the press roused each other to new heights of  
sensationalism and outrage. The popularity of  the music-hall’s interpretation of  events among working and 
middle classes also indicates that this was more than simply a ‘press storm’. One lofty commentator chastised 
the ‘ungentlemanly and uncalled for proceedings’.78 Some left-sided opinion did run against the grain; on 
11 January, for example, the Speaker advocated ‘more self-restraint and greater leniency’. At the end of  the 
first week of  crisis, it published a diary of  the past week’s events in which the behaviour of  the majority was 
critiqued and criticised. The Speaker found fault with the major newspapers, the masses and the Government, 
whom it accused of  jingoism and war-mongering, with ‘needless bluster’. It languidly advised: ‘...it would be 
well if  people in this country would take a less passionate view of  the situation.’79 Very few of  the usual 
opponents of  aggressive patriotism, overwhelmingly in the minority, felt compelled to argue against a 
groundswell of  anger during the crisis. Regardless of  party-political persuasion, the high literary journals, 
the traditional broadsheet newspapers, recently established ‘yellow dailies’, popular Sunday weeklies, 
monthlies and regional newspapers, all condemned the telegram. Some papers such as the Morning Post and 
Evening News were almost entirely filled with stories of  the ‘Transvaal Crisis’; in almost every copy of  every 
newspaper for the whole of  January, at least some mention can be found of  the crisis. Dissenting voices 
could be heard, but they were predominantly pleas for calm in light of  potential catastrophic international 
consequences, rather than defences of  Germany or Wilhelm. It is possible to infer from this gathered 
evidence, added to the other commentaries presented throughout this chapter, that the Kruger Telegram 
outburst was both broad-based and widespread. 
The Themes of  Outrage 
Jingoism and Overstretch 
The reaction to the Kruger Telegram was coloured by both a sense of  anger and unpreparedness. As 
discussed in chapter one, by 1896 the British public was well acquainted with the idea that the Empire was 
overstretched and weakened. The intrusion of  Germany into British affairs presented a new external threat 
to British imperial possessions. Songs, newspapers and novels regularly declared that Britain should rise in 
time of  national trial to meet its enemies. It is essential to recognise the imbrication of  ideas of  imperial 
overstretch and popular jingoism in British popular imagination throughout this period, and especially 
during the Kruger Telegram Crisis. The very assumption that Britain was weakened and exposed engendered 
such aggressive responses.  
The Evening News, the most popular London evening paper of  the time and recently purchased by the 
press baron, Alfred Harmsworth, was amongst the most jingoistic papers during the crisis.80 It declared in 
Shakespearean style on 8 January that, ‘England Stands Alone’. A new time of  national trial had arrived with 
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this particular ‘insult and injury of  the most intolerable kind’; it argued that though England was not looking 
for a war, there were limits to its ‘good-humoured forbearance.’81 Expressions of  shock turned to more 
bellicose threats of  reprisals; ‘jingoism’ was rife.82 The popularity of  the phrase, ‘Hands Off!’, most obvious 
in the success of  the famous song reveals the presence of  fear in the popular imagination of  losing parts 
of  the Empire. The frequent utterances of  this angry declaration indicate that the empire was emphatically 
something worth defending, by force if  necessary. The lyrics of  ‘Hands Off ’ made this explicitly clear: 
‘They’ll have to kill the lion first, who’d wear the lion’s skin.’  
The British press was almost unanimous in its determination to stand up to Germany. The Telegraph, - 
the best-selling daily in Britain in 1896 and described by a contemporary as reflecting ‘the average thinking 
and believing of  one or two great layers of  London life’83 - and the widely respected Tory Standard, focussed 
a great deal of  attention on the military preparations with a supportive tone. Meanwhile the Globe, a popular 
Conservative evening newspaper, concentrated upon ‘Activity in the War Office’, implying that a major 
announcement of  military action was pending.84 Even the anti-jingo Manchester Guardian was willing to 
entertain the idea that the German activities in Delagoa Bay might represent a ‘direct challenge to British 
supremacy’, and advocated a strong Government response.85 When the Government ordered a ‘flying 
squadron’ to ready for South Africa on 8 January the press was full of  praise for this strong and decisive 
measure. Regional dailies ran full page spreads on the Transvaal Crisis, and detailed the preparations of  the 
fleet.86 Throughout the crisis broadsheets, periodicals, and especially recently established ‘yellow’ dailies, 
such as the Evening News trumpeted the struggle for English rights in the face of  the German menaces and 
perils.87 Enthusiastic reports of  the crisis in Dominion papers told of  ‘great public enthusiasm all over 
England’; a ‘[g]reat war feeling’ had been perceptibly stirred up. The response from the colonies was, 
typically, more extreme than in Britain.88 Punch, the influential satirical weekly, celebrated this imperial 
response with a cartoon entitled ‘Bravo Young ‘Uns’ with the caption: ‘Well done Dad! We’ll stick to you!’89  
The need for a strong armed response was increasingly emphasised. National and regional newspapers 
reported enthusiastically on ‘warlike’ preparations in Britain’s docks, and a ‘British counterblast’.90 Anger 
toward Kruger and the Boers declined, while the Kaiser and Germany increasingly bore the brunt of  British 
anger.91 Pride in the British response was plain across the printed press and amongst the general public.92 
For several weeks there was an acceptance that war was increasingly likely; references to a ‘war cloud’ or 
‘war feeling’ in Britain were common. Stories spread of  mass meetings, public hissing, booing, and rumours 
of  burnt effigies of  the Kaiser, or attacks on German shops.93 The Globe stated, ‘[t]here is no war party here; 
but the entire empire would so become’ if  the words of  the Kaiser were followed by deeds.94 It was even 
declared that, ‘the country must administer a smart lesson to such persons as the German Emperor, and all 
who concoct plots and conspiracies against British dominion.’95 There was an evident appetite for bold 
gestures and a strong statement that the British Empire was not to be threatened by any power. Left-wing 
and liberal papers, such as the Speaker, warned of  the dangers of  such public vaporing, without daring to 
                                                     
81 Evening News, 8 January 1896. 
82 Cunningham, H., ‘Language of  Patriotism’, pp. 8–33. 
83 Massingham, H.W., ‘The Great London Dailies: The Daily Telegraph’, Leisure Hour (May 1892), pp. 455–60 
84 Washington Post, 8 January 1896. 
85 Manchester Guardian, 9 January 1896; Aberdeen Journal, 9 January 1896. 
86 Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, 31 January 1896; Berrow’s Worcester Journal, 11 January 1896; Hampshire Telegraph, 18 January 1896. 
87 Evening News, 4 January 1896; Morning Post, 9 January 1896. 
88 Brisbane Courier, (Qld.), 6 January 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, (NSW), 6 January 1896; West Australian, (Perth, WA), 8 January 1896; Launceston 
Examiner, (Tasmania), 9 January 1896. 
89 Punch, 25 January 1896. 
90 Launceston Examiner, (Tasmania), 7 January 1896; Morning Post, 9 January 1896; The Standard, 9 January 1896; Reynolds’s Newspaper, 13 January 1896; 
Evening News, 10 January 1896; The Standard, 10 January 1896; Hampshire Telegraph, 18 January 1896; Berrow’s Worcester Journal, 11 January 1896; 
Aberdeen Journal, 10 January 1896.  
91 The Times, 9 January 1896. 
92 Yorkshire Herald, 6 January 1896; Pall Mall Gazette, 6 January 1896. 
93  The Yorkshire Herald, 10 January 1896. 
94 The Globe, 4 January 1896; ‘The Attack Of  The German Emperor On Great Britain’, Economist, 2733 (11 January 1896), pp. 34–5 
95 Yorkshire Herald, 6 January 1896. 
 The Kruger Telegram Crisis 57 
 
 
defend Germany’s actions: ‘We are not drifting - we are rushing towards war.’96 For a sustained period 
popular sentiment ran away with this ‘war feeling’. 
Throughout the crisis the Times maintained a daily interest in German press and public attacks upon 
Britain. It proclaimed that the ‘paramount duty of  this country at the present time’ considering the ‘sudden 
explosion of  unprovoked hostility’ offered by a nation who, it argued, was increasingly envious and 
aggressive, was ‘[t]o strengthen our national and Imperial defences.’ Furthermore, it stated that, 
‘...Englishmen are in no mood to part with an iota of  their rights under a threat of  coercion.’ This 
determination to defend British rights, with force if  necessary, was equated to a question not only of  honour, 
‘but a dictate of  necessity.’97  
Across the press a key response to the revelations of  the telegram and rumours of  German interference 
was to immediately advocate ‘increased armaments’. One regional Australian newspaper even declared, ‘it is 
high time it is made clear to the world that England will not submit to be bullied either by any single power 
or by all the European powers unitedly.’98 Letters to the editors of  various newspapers, identified a need, in 
light of  the Transvaal crisis and the interference of  Germany, to rearm and re-man the navy, and to 
strengthen the army too. Thomas Gibson Bowles, in a letter to the Times argued that Britain should learn 
quickly from this crisis and called for: 
the immediate entry of  a large additional number of  boys into the Navy...an immediate 
doubling in numbers of  the training ships...; an immediate raising of  the numbers of  the Royal 
Naval Reserves...; [and] a large increase in the Marines.99 
Bowles subscribed to the view that the Navy was the key to guaranteeing the continuing security of  Empire. 
The tone of  the telegram, it would seem, was interpreted as the beginning of  the rise of  Germany as a new 
imperial threat. Thomas Judge, contributor to the Morning Post referred to ‘anxiety’ over the present 
circumstances and suggested ‘[t]his scare should convince us that it is our bounden duty to accumulate 
strength both on land and sea…’100 Faced with a new imperial enemy, the rising tide of  jingoism called for 
immediate and vast investment in the defences of  the nation. Harold Finch-Hatton demanded urgent re-
investment of  the budget surplus into the navy and army. Finch-Hatton argued, ‘Let there be no aggression, 
but let the nations know that we are prepared to defend ourselves, from whatever quarter or quarters the 
attack may come - in Europe or in America’.101 A common sentiment, expressed here, suggested that Britain 
was not aggressive, but would defend herself  against any aggressor, or aggressors. This echoed the words 
of  McDermott’s jingo song of  the 1870s:  
‘We don’t want to fight but by jingo if  we do, we’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, and got 
the money too!’102 
The anger was directed at Wilhelm and Germany. Nevertheless, the defiant message was directed to all 
powers in the world, emphasising again the link to wider anxieties about the defence of  empire.  
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In patriotic mood, on 18 January Punch published a typically imperialist image (see above) entitled 
‘Ready!’; Britannia was depicted with shield and sword, gazing out upon a stormy sea. In the caption Punch 
quoted Shakespeare’s ‘King John’: ‘Come the three corners of  the world in arms, and we shall shock them: 
nought shall make us rue, if  England itself  do rest but true.’103 By February, as the crisis calmed, Punch 
critiqued loud calls for armament in its piece, ‘Money No Object’; when Britannia is warned that the calls 
for armaments ‘will run into money’, she responds aggressively, ‘Never mind about that as long as I continue 
to rule the world!’ Punch made explicit the direct link between the need to rapidly improve the unprepared 
naval and military defences and the security of  the empire.104 The images are striking, and the messages 
explicit: Britain in 1896 was surrounded by enemies, its empire threatened and dark clouds were gathering; 
its response was patriotic, imperialistic and aggressive. 
The Punch cartoon succinctly encapsulated many of  the anxieties of  the age. The combination of  the 
strong outburst of  jingoism and calls for armament and military readiness indicate both the strength of  the 
response, and the feeling that Britain was somewhat unprepared for the challenges which faced it. The press 
and politicians advocated heavy investment in armaments to ward off  any potential threat to ‘not only our 
country but our possessions.’105 Britain was repeatedly described as isolated and surrounded by both known 
and unknown foreign enemies. These nationalistic declarations in the press and public suggest that there 
was a desire to show jealous enemies that Britain was strong, despite concerns about its weakness. Such calls 
for rearmament suggest that many felt that the Empire was woefully underprepared to face its enemies. 
Since the 1870s debates about the maintenance of  military and naval power had revolved around the idea 
that the Empire was overstretched. The Kruger Telegram Crisis adopted the same themes, and shaped them 
to meet the new German threat.  
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The Kaiser’s Absolutism 
In a period where royal personages received a great deal of  attention – both positive and negative – perhaps 
inevitably the press and public swiftly turned their anger towards the Kaiser. Political cartoons of  the day 
often equated monarchs of  a country with their national values and stereotypes.106 This focus upon the 
monarchs, their opinions, movements and behaviour - was exaggerated in the extreme with Wilhelm II. His 
perceived autocratic system of  rule, his youthful arrogance and, most importantly, his propensity for 
outrageous statements made him a target for both praise and intense criticism. In the case of  the Kruger 
Telegram, this criticism was white hot. The sense of  betrayal, and his perceived role in the drafting of  the 
telegram allowed British newspapers to open the floodgates to a tide of  personal assaults upon the Kaiser 
and his methods. In particular, the Kaiser’s absolute rule over his country drew much disapproval. Previous 
imperial anxieties were rekindled by the prospect of  facing yet another absolutist enemy like France and 
Russia. Throughout the crisis the theme of  absolutism was employed by the press to suggest that the Kaiser 
should be criticised and also feared; German society was imagined as a form of  police state, while the 
Kaiser’s intentions, his impulsive aggression and desire for greatness might, it was argued, threaten the 
British Empire.  
On 6 January the newspapers of  Great Britain erupted in a torrent of  abuse. The Financial Times accused 
Wilhelm II of  being ‘bent on making a name for himself, by fair means or foul’ and of  aping the ‘tradition 
of  bygone days’ of  the Hohenzollern monarchs.107 The Yorkshire Herald, a York-based liberal newspaper, 
called Wilhelm ‘arrogant’, while the Evening News declared the ‘swaggering message’ a deliberate attempt ‘to 
gratify anti-English feeling’. Furthermore, the Evening News went on to say that whatever the views of  the 
British public toward Jameson and his folly, ‘there is only one view held as to the Emperor. He finds no 
apologists in this country.’108 The Daily Telegraph stated that the Kaiser had managed to outdo even Jameson 
‘in startling abruptness and impulsiveness of  procedure’, while the Pall Mall Gazette, never one to mince 
words, attacked with: 
He is probably the only European sovereign who would be guilty of  such a blunder, and we 
could afford to overlook it with a smile if  it were no more than one of  those childish freaks of  
vanity which have time and again made him the laughing-stock of  the world.109  
Such reports suggest that 6 January represents a spike in the level of  abuse directed at the Kaiser, but it was 
by no means isolated. Throughout January criticism was constant.  
In an article discussing ‘The Amazing Telegram’, the Saturday Review, speaking for right-wing ‘educated’ 
opinion, argued that the German Emperor was ‘revealed as a man foredestined [sic.] to failure, humiliation, 
and disaster. There are no longer any doubts about him.’ The ‘gratuitous insolence’ with which Wilhelm 
delivered his telegram was followed by a ‘calmer second thought’: that Wilhelm, and ‘the country whose 
misfortune it is to have him on its throne’ should be the ones ‘disturbed’ by the passage of  events. The 
image of  Wilhelm as autocratic ruler is evident in the description of  him as ‘idol of  all his people’. The 
Saturday Review concluded with a typically patriotic assertion that Britain will resist ‘with a steady nerve’, and 
a warning to Germany that ‘the angriest Englishman could wish him nothing worse than the outlook before 
him.’110 This article was by no means a single call to defend ‘English’ rights, but was representative of  the 
message peddled by many of  the ‘yellow’ and periodical press. The Economist was unusually outspoken in 
praising Britain for ‘[t]he instinctive yet most determined resistance’ to ‘the arrogant dictation of  the 
German Emperor’. The result was the elimination of  the ‘almost universal’ myth that it was ‘safe to insult 
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or even injure Great Britain.’ The Economist’s view echoed that of  the Saturday Review by insinuating that the 
Kaiser’s policy of  bluff  was a complete failure. Once again criticism of  German autocratic rule is very 
obvious,111 especially in the suggestion that the Boers, in spite of  Britain’s record of  intrigue and imperialism, 
would never exchange the mild rule of  Britain for the ‘German Emperor’s oppressive as well as vigorous 
autocracy.’112 
 
 
‘The Queen’s Letter to the German Emperor,’ Punch, 18 January 1896. 
Language grew in ferocity over the first weeks of  the crisis; soon, expressions of  shock had turned to 
more bellicose utterances of  reprisals and a message for Germany and the rest of  the world.113 The Pall 
Mall Gazette led the self-righteous condemnation of  the Kaiser and his officials with its article of  January 6 
entitled ‘Hands Off!’:  
The German Emperor has succeeded in beating his own record. He has done many things that 
were foolish, and some that were undignified, but nothing quite so lacking in good sense, 
dignity, and wisdom as his message of  congratulation to President Kruger….But this hot-
blooded and eccentric sovereign has no regard for the decencies of  diplomacy…114 
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Concerns were strongly voiced about the German Emperor’s personal character, and the perceived folly of  
Germany’s autocratic system of  rule. These would later become key distinguishing features of  the British 
anti-German discourse. By 11 January the Economist, usually a sage and calm publication sought to elucidate 
on the reason for such extreme indignation, ‘…perhaps never since Napoleon was sent to St Helena’. The 
invocation of  the old absolutist aggressor, Napoleon, indicates how previous anxieties about France were 
neatly transposed onto this new enemy. Wilhelm’s war-like impulsivity comfortably fitted this long-standing 
blueprint. The Economist was ultimately forced to declare that the telegram was a ‘wilful affront’ which 
William himself  would have answered with ‘a declaration of  war.’  
By 25 January the editors of  the Economist took an even more outspoken stance, perhaps encouraged 
by the continuing popularity of  that approach. The German Emperor was once again criticised for his 
‘peculiar temperament’, and his popularity within Germany was also questioned. He was increasingly 
depicted as ruling in a ‘tyrannical’ fashion, ‘if  we may use a word which in Germany would be strictly 
forbidden.’ The image that the Economist constructs is that of  a land ‘covered with spies’ where the ‘most 
drunk are the most disloyal’ – evidence it is supposed for the true ‘latent feeling’. Reading this article could 
easily lead one to imagine a virtual totalitarian state where the masses feared to utter ‘ill-words spoken of  
the Emperor’. The Kaiser had, it was argued, become increasingly angry, ‘as often happens with men who 
are slightly histrionic and greatly value applause’, and increasingly militaristic in action and word. There is 
undoubtedly some truth in the piece, but there is a distinct sense of  exaggeration and embellishment, which 
indicates the Economist’s desire to promote an image of  an erratic autocrat – a cruel temperamental warlord. 
The Economist was exaggerating considerably, but this indicates how far the negative characterisation of  
Wilhelm, and of  the political state of  Germany, had developed. The Economist warned the Kaiser that his 
‘beautiful dream’ of  ‘world-wide dominion’ will not be accepted by his subjects as ‘full compensation for 
the loss they are sustaining of  liberty, freedom from espionage, and that easy intellectual life which so 
sweetened and ennobled the old German narrowness of  means.’115  
Reflecting upon the month that had passed, George W. Steevens, a rising star of  journalism, wrote a 
lengthy piece entitled ‘The Indiscretion of  the Kaiser,’ for the New Review, a literary review popular until its 
demise in 1897.116 Later in 1896 Steevens was employed as a correspondent for the newly established Daily 
Mail. His modern, sensationalist style and language for the New Review helps to explain why the Mail’s 
proprietor, Alfred Harmsworth (later Lord Northcliffe), was so keen: 
WHY did the Kaiser do it? It will not serve to answer that William would do anything. It is 
plausible, but it is not true, and it is not relevant. He meant something by that world-renowned 
telegram. William may be hasty, he may be swollen-headed, he may be mad, but William is not, 
in the ordinary sense, a fool…. If  he is mad, then three million men and twenty battle-ships 
are mad also, and it ¡s not so easy to slip the straight waistcoat on to them. 
Steevens’s article is a fitting summary of  the crisis over the month of  January. Themes included the initial 
shock (‘he seized the very moment when we could not defend ourselves to insult us’); the rumour of  possible 
German activities in the Transvaal; and the sense of  betrayal after Britain had treated him so kindly (‘He 
came to us year by year, and we welcomed him with friendship and respect.’). Like many others, Steevens 
was drawn to conclusions which attest to the Kaiser’s unpredictable temperament, his cruel autocratic rule 
and the future menace which he so clearly intended towards Britain. In concluding, Steevens’s message was 
firm and clear: ‘He preferred to kick us when we were down, and we shall never forget it. We do not 
recommend him to visit England again.’ Such a baldly aggressive statement indicates the sensational effect 
of  the telegram. In spite of  Wilhelm’s actions, addressing any monarch in such a bellicose manner, at a time 
when royal patronage and subordination was still prevalent, was an extreme measure.117 Attacks upon the 
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Emperor and German society throughout the crisis suggest that in the popular sphere the same comparison 
of  liberalism versus autocracy was a powerful component in the development of  the idea of  a German 
Menace to the British Empire. 
German Covetousness 
Foreign jealousy was a recurrent theme in British imperial anxieties. Germany’s actions towards the 
Transvaal meant that it was quickly attributed the same envy and jealousy that had previously been associated 
with France or Russia. The initial surprise of  Germany’s interference provoked both shock and anger; a 
previous friend, and more importantly an underestimated threat had challenged Britain. Joseph Chamberlain 
remarked in late January:  
A few weeks ago we were startled by an extraordinary manifestation of  hostility on the part of  
Germany - (hear, hear) - a manifestation the more surprising because it was totally unexpected 
and entirely unprovoked (hear, hear).  
The element of  surprise and the lack of  any warning of  Germany’s ambitions in South Africa led to the 
press conducting an inquest as to the true meaning of  the telegram.  
The initial burst of  fear and indignation was compounded by rumour-making and further revelations 
in press. Panic was compounded by revelations that not only had there been a verbal assault upon the British 
Empire, but that a physical assault had narrowly been averted. Rumour and fact were readily confused so 
that the truth – that a tiny force of  German marines had nearly been ordered to march to Johannesburg 
with no further directions than to protect German property and civilians – was dismissed as cover for a 
much greater scheme. Even as the news of  the Kaiser’s aggressive message hit British presses, rumours of  
conspiracy were already rife. The sensationalist Pall Mall Gazette ran a piece on the evening of  4 January 
which claimed President Kruger had been planning a coup against the Uitlander in the Transvaal. He 
allegedly aimed to ensure full Boer control of  the Transvaal and install a proxy leader in charge of  the 
neighbouring Orange Free State. Furthermore, it was claimed that Dr Leyds, Special Envoy for the Transvaal 
Republic in Europe, was ordered to Europe with a purse of  money to purchase press support for the Boer 
Republic against Britain.118 Though entirely unsubstantiated, this conspiracy theory received considerable 
attention across the British and wider Anglophone press over the next few days.119 
The German Government, as stated above, had announced that had Jameson’s Raid not failed, they 
were prepared to send a small force of  marines to secure German lives and property in Pretoria and 
Johannesburg against any armed insurrection. This calculated gesture was designed by the German 
Government to test the resolve of  the British Government. However, rumours and exaggeration in the 
British press provoked the public into an angered frenzy; the Manchester Guardian’s London correspondent 
observed: ‘I have not met a single person in any rank of  life who has not unhesitatingly declared that if  
Germany were to adopt this course it would constitute a casus belli...’120 Throughout the crisis a variety of  
conspiracy theories were developed out of  this relatively minor but potentially insulting German plan. The 
Sydney Morning Herald reported upon ‘alarming disclosures’, a ‘huge anti-British scheme’ with ‘German 
cruisers ordered to South Africa’.121 William Stead’s non-partisan and highly sensationalist Review of  Reviews 
referred in its February edition to ‘German Designs in South Africa: The Conspiracy in the Transvaal’.122 
Added to the Delagoa Bay concerns, other conspiracy theories appeared. The Pall Mall Gazette, foreman of  
the rumour mill, reported an interview with ‘Mr. H.B. Abercrombie, a well-known Transvaal mining man,’ 
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who claimed that German intrigue had ‘forced matters’. The Manchester Guardian alluded to other rumours 
of  ‘conspiracy number two’ (following that of  the Pall Mall Gazette in early January) originating in Cape 
Town, suggesting a deliberate ploy by the Transvaal Government to ‘whip up conflict’ between Britain and 
Germany.123 Though many of  the stories contained little or no accurate information, they reveal much about 
the state of  the popular British consciousness in this period. 
Alleged ‘German-Boer Intrigue’ was commonly discussed, and the pro-Conservative Aberdeen Journal 
even suggested the supposed conspiracies were a distraction for a sudden invasion of  Britain.124 The 
Aberdeen Journal then highlighted a letter to the Times from Major-General Alex Elliot, a veteran of  the 
Crimean War, which claimed that a conversation with Count von Blumenthal ‘some years ago’ revealed that 
‘the Germans had a matured scheme for the invasion of  England’. In response to the suggestion that the 
British Navy would stand in their path, Blumenthal supposedly claimed:  
Oh...we should hope and expect to be able to have diverted your navy to other parts of  the 
world by centring interests, and of  course we should be prepared for the loss of  some of  our 
columns through contact with the Channel Squadron.125 
The fact that this letter made it into the Aberdeen Journal’s Leaders page shows the morbid fascination which 
gripped public opinion during the crisis. Similarly, the Morning Post debated the likelihood of  an invasion of  
Britain. It wished to offer ‘the assurance of  unanimous support from the public’ and to prepare the public 
for the struggles ahead, and of  the role of  the Navy in preventing any invasion. The tone of  the whole 
article was intensely patriotic, but also anxious; the Morning Post sought to reassure its readership, and perhaps 
itself, that Britain could stand up to any challenge.126 Not only does this represent an early example of  anti-
German invasion anxiety, but also suggests the ubiquity of  rumours and the propensity of  the press to 
intensify anxiety. Furthermore, it indicates that links were made between an imperial threat – in this case a 
distraction in South Africa – and a threat to the metropole. This conceptual link would grow to be 
increasingly important in the following decade. Many of  the conspiracy stories contained little or no 
evidence, but their popularity reveals the state of  British popular sentiment. 
Many newspapers found it easy to explain German actions in terms of  plots and intrigues. Rising 
patriotism, combined with contemporary anxieties concerning imperial defence, gave further impetus to 
conspiracy-related explanations of  German policies. Reports from Valentine Chirol, Berlin correspondent 
of  the Times, suggested Germany had advanced a ‘long projected scheme’ to interfere with British interests 
in South Africa. The theme of  German conspiracy and covetousness had spread as far away in the British 
Empire as Tasmania; the Launceston Examiner commented: 
[t]he increase of  territory gradually being obtained by Great Britain in the Dark Continent and 
the great increase of  British population had aroused the jealousy of  the Germans, and it was 
proposed to make a great effort to check the progress.127  
The Evening News commented that Germany, ‘an enemy of  a very different calibre’ had ‘been worked up by 
jealousy of  our extending Empire and the comparative failure of  their own policy of  colonial expansion to 
the point of  provoking war.’ The telegram alone was not the key to this opinion, but the suspected activities 
around Delagoa Bay were suggested as evidence of  Germany’s secret plans and brooding envy.128 Later the 
Evening News even argued that France had declined as a threat and that Britain should attempt to come to ‘a 
peaceful yet honourable solution’ with America; yet this was no cause to fear any less for the security of  the 
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Empire. With ‘Germany jealous to striking point’ Britain should turn again to manning the ‘splendid’ Navy 
and defending its interests across the world. Evidently the Evening News was thinking in terms of  a pan-
imperial state of  readiness against the assumed threat of  covetous and seditious enemy powers.129 The Times 
remarked upon the ‘unprovoked’ hostility in Germany towards Britain, and argued defiantly that Britain had 
not been ‘thrown off  our balance by the disclosure of  unsuspected jealousy and rancour.’130 The link 
between previous imperial fears – France and Russia – and Germany’s entry emergence as a new menace to 
Empire was immediately made by the Yorkshire Herald. As soon as news of  the telegram arrived, the Herald 
explained Germany’s policy originated in ‘the jealousy with which our unquestionable strength is regarded’. 
The Herald spelled out that with its action, Germany had joined France and Russia as a major threat to 
Empire.131 Thomas Gibson Bowles wrote to the Morning Post in order to urge that ‘the English people at 
last…see and understand’ that Germany was ‘the permanent antagonist of  England’132 
Many referred directly to the themes of  German covetousness and jealousy, suggesting that these ideas 
were increasingly common, and that imperial anxieties were prevalent. When Parliament sat in February, the 
Earl of  Rosslyn commented on the Kruger Telegram, recommending that Britons: 
remember that the very greatness of  a nation such as ours is may in itself  become the source 
of  envy and hostility on the part of  others, and strong though we may be, in view of  all that 
has recently occurred, we should devote ourselves still further to Imperial Defence, to protect 
not only our country but our possessions, to protect not only these but our commercial 
interests. 
Rosslyn expressed the sense of  isolation felt in Britain, the recognition of  an embattled position in the 
world, and the assumption that other nations, and especially Germany, were a menace to British imperial, 
as well as domestic, interests.133 This sense of  embattlement and international jealousy was present again 
during debates about shipping in the House of  Commons in April, when Mr. W. Allan argued that recent 
events made clear that ‘[t]he commercial success of  Great Britain had undoubtedly created a feeling of  
jealousy among other nations’. Such statements convey a sense of  both the arrogance of  British imperialism 
around the turn of  the twentieth century, but also the inherent contradiction of  this confidence – that other 
powers were seeking to steal it away, and threaten Britain’s favourable position.134 The Economist commented 
on the mood in international affairs in March 1896, explaining that recent months had led to the ‘depression’ 
of  statesmen, with all nations in a ‘snarling mood…fiercely jealous of  each other’ and ‘armed to the teeth.’135 
These examples illustrate the general sense anxiety about imperial affairs, and the precarious and isolated 
position of  the British Empire. They also show how quickly such anxieties had been transposed onto 
Germany. This jealous new imperial enemy seemed to covet British possessions and was willing to try to 
steal them away.136 
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Causes of  the Unprecedented Outburst 
There is no simple explanation for why the British response to the Kruger Telegram was so virulent. There 
had been public disputes between Germany and Britain in the few years before 1896, but these were minor, 
peripheral and short-lived incidents with little popular impact.137 The Kaiser had been subjected to British 
press criticism in the past but this was by no means consistent. There was a general sense that Germany’s 
‘Neuer Kurs’ made it increasingly active both in Europe and as an imperial power. Before the Kruger 
Telegram Crisis, however, there had never been anything like the anger and abuse directed either at Germany 
or at the Kaiser himself. Before 1896 Germany had occupied the position of  a rising competitor; the term 
‘made in Germany’ was levelled at German firms as a term of  abuse for cheap sub-standard goods.138 
Similarly, there had been sporadic concern about German methods of  imperialism, the Heligoland-Zanzibar 
Treaty (1890) and numerous other minor incidents. The Kruger Telegram Crisis marked a key turning point 
in popular perceptions, and pre-existing concerns began to crystallize into a much more cohesive cluster of  
ideas about a German Menace to empire.  
Before 1896, Wilhelm’s ‘qualities’ as a leader were relatively well-known. He was recognized as someone 
young and impulsive, who had taken some dubious decisions with regard to the Ottoman Empire and the 
Armenian Crisis.139 In a period where royal heads of  state achieved celebrity status, Wilhelm had always 
been one of  the biggest column-fillers; his decisive and divisive acts, speeches and policies attracted 
international attention throughout his reign. He had nevertheless, as the grandson of  Queen Victoria, been 
warmly welcomed to Britain. Regular visits had rendered him a popular figure, and crowds always turned 
out to greet him.140 This ‘kinship’ which was so often referenced prior to and after 1896, should be seen as 
one cause of  the initial anger created by the telegram. As opinion built up in the press, on the streets and in 
the music hall, a sense of  betrayal coloured the popular perception. This previous ‘special relationship’ had 
set Germany and Wilhelm up for the inevitable disillusionment which would occur as British and German 
interests clashed. One contributor to the Pall Mall Gazette questioned what Britain’s ‘ostentatious friendship 
towards Germany’ had gained them; the favours and generosity Britain had supposedly offered to Germany 
had been reciprocated with envy and malice. The contributor went on to criticise the British press for 
treating the man ‘whom you of  the press persist in calling “Kaiser”, that “enfant terrible” with such past 
warmth and kindness.’141 The sense of  betrayal was contrasted with British friendship and neutrality, and 
made Wilhelm’s gesture seem even more outrageous. 
A key component of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis was the geographical specificity of  the imperial threat. 
Germany had chosen to interfere in South Africa, one of  the most recognisably important and highly valued 
British imperial assets. Over the nineteenth century the British Empire had developed from a predominantly 
economic enterprise, to a much more territorially focussed entity, especially in India where economic 
exploitation was gradually replaced by an impulse to control and to ‘improve’.142 Outside of  India, however, 
several more recent imperial interests had developed in importance as the economic value of  the ‘jewel’ 
declined. As well as informal interests in South America and the Far East, British imperialists increasingly 
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saw North Africa and South Africa as vital to the continuance of  British global commercial dominance. 
During the 1880s Britain seized control of  Egypt, and consequently dominated the Suez Canal. This was a 
vital move to guarantee a fast link between Europe and India, but Suez was surrounded by potentially hostile 
strategic powers, and maintaining another route to India was vital - both economically and strategically - to 
the security of  Empire. The Cape Colony therefore was an essential element in the British imperial network, 
acting to guarantee British naval and commercial supremacy between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.143 
Any potential threat to British security and dominance in South Africa was viewed as crucial by both the 
British Government and in British popular culture. The prestige of  the British Raj was guaranteed by these 
vital strategic points.144  
South Africa was also important because of  its inherent value. A key site in this period for British 
emigration, it was populated by growing numbers of  white British settlers; the Cape Colony and Rhodesia 
were increasingly recognised as valuable imperial territories. Cecil Rhodes was lauded in Britain as a great 
imperialist for his successes in expanding British influence northwards from the Cape. The temperate 
climate of  South Africa made it appealing to British emigrants seeking to ‘make it rich’ in supposedly virgin 
territory. Of  much greater value however, were the vast untapped mineral resources of  the region. South 
Africa remains today an exporter of  vast quantities of  diamonds, and possesses substantial mineral deposits 
of  gold, platinum and other precious metals. The tensions between the Boer Republics and the British 
between 1880 and 1902 were inevitably linked to this mineral wealth. The importance of  gold, in particular, 
was vital to the on-going international influence of  Britain, and it should not be underestimated as a factor 
in on-going Anglo-Boer tensions and intrigue.145  
South Africa, then, was valuable to Britain both as a strategic asset, and as a possession in its own right. 
A year before the Jameson Raid, British Foreign Secretary Lord Kimberley had warned Berlin that, ‘the 
Cape Colony was perhaps the most vital interest of  Great Britain because by the possession of  it 
communication with India was assured… [it was] of  even greater importance to England than Malta or 
Gibraltar.’146 South Africa had a special place at the heart of  late nineteenth century imperialism and it was 
hotly defended when challenges to British control were presented. British entrepreneurs and financial 
interests sought the raw materials on offer there too, and their substantial influence upon the government 
should also be considered. South Africa was recognised by the public as the site for famous imperial 
triumphs under Rhodes, but even more so for its value to the imperial economy.147 This offers only part of  
the explanation for the strength of  the reaction to the Kruger Telegram, and the surge of  popular 
imperialism during the later South African War.  
It is necessary to look to factors beyond the Anglo-German relationship to understand the nature 
outburst. The growing importance of  imperial anxieties over the 1880s and 1890s represents a key 
convergence. The sense of  increasing danger to the Empire, now increasingly appreciated by the British 
public, had pushed public perception into a state of  tension. Recent events such as the 1885 Penjdeh 
Incident, naval scares in the late 1880s and the signature of  the Franco-Russian Treaty in 1894 had impacted 
heavily upon popular debates in Britain. Britain’s potential enemies appeared to be moving closer together. 
In popular culture, the sense that Britain possessed a valuable, yet weak and bloated empire combined with 
the assumed jealousies of  other powers. In the short term, tension during 1895 over the Armenian Crisis, 
continued imperial insecurity in Africa, and the Venezuela Crisis in December 1895 gave the British serious 
cause for concern. With America turning its ire sharply upon the British imperial project, it seemed that 
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almost every power of  any significance had developed an acute sense of  anglophobic jealousy, and a 
willingness to confront British interests, politically or otherwise. 
The popular reaction to the Kruger Telegram was so strong because of  a coalescence of  several key 
factors: the wider imperial anxiety and defensive popular patriotism meant any threat to the British Empire 
was received with a heightened sense of  panic and resultant aggression. The specific character traits attached 
to Wilhelm’s Germany in the few years before also exacerbated matters, while the seemingly absolutist nature 
of  the Kaiser’s intervention, added to the perception of  underhand German conspiracies, aligned fittingly 
with Britain’s past experience of  external threats to the Empire. Finally, by the mid-1890s South Africa was 
an increasingly important imperial possession. During the South African War, both officials and the general 
public recognised that this potentially rich and valuable ‘white’ colony was a particularly sensitive and valued 
part of  the imperial system, defending the route to India and producing valuable mineral wealth. An attack 
upon a valued imperial possession, by a new menacing power, in a period of  great sensitivity produced the 
uproar of  January 1896.  
 
The Aftermath of  the Crisis  
On 18 January 1896, only a few weeks after the infamous telegram, Wilhelm II announced, in a speech 
celebrating the twenty fifth anniversary of  German unification, that Germany was now a ‘World Empire’. 
The speech, in recent studies, has been seen to represent a key change in the course of  German foreign 
policy, towards Weltpolitik, which characterised its official planning after 1896.148 As the popular uproar 
over the Kruger Telegram Crisis abated, and diplomatic tension subsided, this new revelation combined 
with existing narratives and over the following years it was increasingly recognised as a portentous 
revelation.149 This also represents a vital unifying factor in the establishment of  the trope of  an imperial 
German Menace. The press responded quickly to the ‘World Empire Speech’. An article in the Fortnightly 
Review, an intellectual journal, offered ‘A Lesson in German’, which emphasised the treacherousness of  
German foreign policy over the past twenty five years drawn directly from the ‘Machiavellian school’ of  
foreign politics. In retrospect, the author argued, Germany followed the rule: ‘let enemies and friends perish, 
if  only Germany can scrape together enough to live.’150 Another ‘high-cultural’ journal, the Contemporary 
Review, discussed the past twenty five years of  ‘Germany Under the Empire’, giving numerous examples of  
the cruelties of  lese-majesté and terrible treatment of  ordinary people in Germany.151 That same 
authoritarian regime also presented a danger to Britain too: ‘England is just now, with respect to Germany, 
in the position of  the man who dare not even look over the hedge whilst another may with impunity steal 
the horse.’152  
The Kruger Telegram had increasingly led the press to imagine Germany as a covetous and 
untrustworthy enemy. Wilhelm’s speech on 18 January added to these prevailing suspicions; it was 
increasingly acknowledged that Germany desired her own empire and that this new colonial empire would 
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need to come at the expense of  Britain.153 Responding to the speech, the Morning Post offered a summary 
of  the current state of  British imperial anxieties on 20 January: 
Russia may at any time set out on her mission of  upsetting the British Empire in India; France 
has an old account to settle with Great Britain; and therefore the Franco-Russian Alliance may 
at any moment come to be directed against England. That moment will be Germany’s 
opportunity; that will be the time for Germany to carry out her anti-British intentions in South 
Africa. Nothing could be plainer. German policy is to take such parts of  the British Empire as 
she covets, and the chosen means is, if  possible, to egg on France and Russia to attack England, 
to give them a pledge of  German neutrality, and then, when England has her hands full, to 
extort from her embarrassments concessions which Germany can neither claim as a right nor 
extort by her own exertions.154 
Germany was depicted as a scheming opportunist, seeking to steal away ‘parts of  the British Empire...she 
covets’. At this time the spectre of  a Franco-Russian alliance still loomed large in the popular imagination, 
but with the Kaiser’s two recent announcements of  his imperial intentions – the telegram and the speech – 
Germany was included in an anxious imperial world view. 
On the same day the Pall Mall Gazette also commented upon these new global German ambitions, 
scornfully dismissing life in Germany’s colonies as ‘unendurable’. Furthermore, the Pall Mall Gazette 
suggested that the speech might indicate that Wilhelm was ‘thinking of  yet further annexations, the 
Transvaal, maybe, or India.’ Such reports indicate the way that Germany was increasingly being conceived 
of  as a menace to all parts of  the empire, even including India. If  the telegram had announced Germany as 
a new potential enemy, the ‘World Empire Speech’ had confirmed to the British imagination that its anxieties 
were well founded.155 The speech served to crystallize many of  the imagined menaces of  the past month. 
Those who had warned of  an imperial menace during the first weeks of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis 
appeared to have been vindicated by this ignominious announcement of  German imperial expansionism.  
 
In February 1896 a revealing article, indulging in then prevalent racial theory, predicted the future path 
of  British foreign policy. In ominous fashion “A Biologist” argued that in the coming epoch all races would 
face a ‘struggle to the death’; ‘when two growing nations find no room for expansion save by compression 
of  one.’ The article warned that the most immediate threat was posed by Germany: 
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Here is the first great racial struggle of  the future: here are two growing nations pressing against 
each other, man to man all over the world. One or the other has to go; one or the other will go. 
The gathering fear of  Germany as an imperial menace was clearly in evidence. Germany represented a 
world-wide existential threat to British interests and a titanic struggle was predicted before this could be 
revolved. This fascinating example of  Social Darwinism links importantly to themes of  imperial anxiety, 
potential degeneration and a struggle to the death for national survival.156 Here is evidence for a perceptible 
paradigm shift in the perception of  Germany. There had been concerns about the aims and objectives of  
the Kaiser’s government before 1896, but the Kruger Telegram Crisis and the announcement of  Germany’s 
‘World Empire’ had shifted debates towards a more generalised fear of  the German imperial menace. Many 
others joined in expressing their deep concerns about ‘an underhand influence that thwarted or hampered 
us wherever our interests were most deeply involved.’ German interference, claimed the Saturday Review, had 
caused ‘our Colonies in Africa and Australasia [to be] wild with fear and anger’ and was universally hated 
throughout the empire.157 There was gathering opinion that Germany could not be trusted. In this age of  
imperial power struggles the inevitable conclusion was that Germany’s ambition for an overseas empire, 
allied to a ‘proven’ tendency for deceitfulness made her a significant threat to Britain and her Empire.158  
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3 
The Legacy of the Kruger Telegram, 
1896-1902 
The end of  the Victorian age was marked out by imperial antagonism, colonial wars, socio-economic 
disruption and international tribulations. The imperial anxieties of  the 1880s and 1890s continued to feature 
strongly in British press, politics and literature, and reached a new high during the South African War. In an 
increasingly insecure international climate questions were raised about the way society, the army, the navy 
and the economy were organised. This chapter will describe how the British perception of  an imperial 
German Menace developed over the period 1896-1902. The tropes about Germany, which began to rapidly 
crystallize during the Kruger Telegram Crisis, developed and coalesced into a more coherent idea during the 
following six years. Initially propounded by imperialist or conservative interest groups, persuasive and 
populist stereotypes gathered authenticity through a variety of  domestic and international developments, to 
the extent that there was a much clearer and more coherent perception of  a holistic German Menace to the 
British Empire. Contrary to past historiographical focus, imperial antagonism, particularly inspired by the 
Kruger Telegram, was crucial in the development of  anxiety and antipathy towards Germany. Furthermore, 
this period, previously viewed as less central to the development of  Anglo-German popular antagonism 
than the later naval armaments race, was in fact instrumental in laying the foundations for coherently formed 
stereotypes about Germany. By the dawn of  the Dreadnought race (from 1904) the British popular 
imagination was already well versed in the themes of  the German Menace. 
Britain and Germany in International Context  
Mit einem Worte: wir wollen niemand in den Schatten stellen, aber wir verlangen auch unseren 
Platz an der Sonne.                                          Graf  
Bernhard von Bülow, Speech to the German Reichstag, 6 December 18971 
From February 1896 to mid-1897 British foreign and colonial policy was focussed upon imperial matters, 
such as on-going wars in Sudan and Ghana. The Eastern Question continued to trouble European foreign 
offices and governments, outwardly Anglo-German international relations were placid, though there 
remained lingering resentment both diplomatically and more open aggression in popular discourse.2 This 
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relatively peaceful period in international events was ended by German activities in the Far East; between 
1897 and 1899 the German Government moved toward an overtly imperial and global foreign policy, so 
called ‘Weltpolitik’. Chancellor Bülow’s famous ‘Platz an der Sonne’ speech was one of  a number of  stark 
announcements that Germany was now a world power with global interests. Germany pursued an 
increasingly aggressive course in various areas of  the world.3 The cycle of  German expansionism and British 
press anger became well-established. Germany’s actions provided the ammunition for British press and 
literature to exaggerate, embellish and criticise Germany and its actions and methods. These outbursts of  
anxiety then laid the foundation for greater sensitivity to each following act of  German foreign policy.  
In the winter of  1897 the German Reichsmarine forcefully established a new imperial possession on 
Chinese soil.4 The murder of  two German missionaries by locals in the Shandong peninsula provided the 
excuse necessary for the German Navy to occupy the Chinese city-port of  Tsingtao and the harbour of  
Kiao Chau.5 After landing marines under the guns of  a fleet of  cruisers on 14 November 1897, Germany 
established de facto commercial and organisational control over first the port, and then the wider Shandong 
peninsula. The newly modernised port became a vital strategic possession for Germany, with a strong 
harbour acting as a base of  operations for the German Pacific fleet; as a bonus it became a hub for economic 
activity and trade acted as the main port for the whole region.6 Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the newly 
appointed Secretary of  State for the Imperial German Navy was instrumental in the selection and 
acquisition of  Kiao Chau.7 The establishment of  a colony at Tsingtao was a well-aimed propaganda coup, 
and played a key role in the eventual passing of  the First Naval Law in March 1898.8 In Britain, this new 
German imperial activity was well noted, and concern grew over the character of  Wilhelm’s autocratic 
expansionism. Russia, France and Britain soon responded by seizing their own territories along the Chinese 
coast in order not to miss out on any potential imperial ‘scramble’. 9 
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The Landing of  Troops at Kiao Chau, November 1897 
Across the world, in China, the Middle East, the Caribbean, Africa and the Pacific, Imperial Germany 
was an increasingly active force. In the Caribbean, German naval and colonial policy showed its increasingly 
aggressive nature during the Lüders Affair in Haiti. The bullying tactics of  the German Navy in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific attracted attention in many British press articles. During the Spanish-American 
War (1898-99) Germany provoked Anglo-American suspicion with her jockeying for control of  the Spanish 
Philippines. The global posturing of  Germany was both noted and deplored in the British press.10 In 1899 
Wilhelm and his advisors succeeded in procuring rights from the Ottoman Government for the construction 
of  a railway which would eventually link Berlin to the Persian Gulf. The Kaiser’s continuing warmth toward 
the Turks went against the wishes of  the other European imperial powers, who viewed Turkey as a major 
problem for continuing peace, and continued to battle for the rights of  Armenian Christians.11 Through 
1898 and 1899 another imperial clash in the Pacific islands of  Samoa saw British, American and German 
imperial endeavour faced against one another.12 Although a peaceful settlement was achieved, a storm of  
German press attention surrounded these discussions, and was only worsened by Kaiser Wilhelm’s visit to 
Britain in November 1899.13 There was increasing recognition that the German public clamoured for greater 
colonial possessions and Britain was the power which stood most in its path.14 During the South African 
War, the German press and public indicated their antipathy towards Britain with loud declarations of  hatred 
for Britain. At Britain’s weakest moment, Germany seemed to have shown itself  to be spiteful and jealous. 
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Events during the Boxer Rebellion reemphasised the autocratic and brutal nature of  Germany and its own 
brand of  imperialism.  
In the established historiography the naval race, which commenced in full after 1904, has been allowed 
to colour events prior to the outbreak of  open strategic antagonism. The calls for naval expansion in the 
German Reichstag between 1897 and 1903 should not, however, be seen as the domestic or home defence 
issue that it later became. Instead, the attention paid to the German Naval Bills in 1897 and 1900 was marked 
specifically by imperial anxiety. Germany avowedly desired a navy to protect its ‘World Empire’ and to 
project global influence.15 Thus, the British press conceived of  German naval expansion in terms of  a global 
and imperial threat.16 Predominantly Conservative naval theorists warned of  the globalised aggression and 
ambition of  Germany; these polemicists warned that Germany had designs across the world: South 
America, South Africa, the Ottoman Middle East, China, the Pacific and even the Balkans.17 Such views 
were closely associated with the themes developed during the Kruger Telegram crisis, and their fears, though 
based on naval power, were part of  a tradition of  imperial anxiety.18 Unlike the later naval race, the German 
Menace in this period remained resolutely imperial, seen in terms of  global perspective rather than home 
defence.  
The development of  this imperial anxiety was aided by real changes in the outward face of  German 
imperial policy and in radical changes in the British domestic and imperial situation. The increased activity 
in German foreign policy combined with significant domestic social and cultural insecurity provided the 
ammunition for popular cultural outlets to expand upon the ideological archive of  anti-German tropes 
firmly crystallized in January 1896. By indicating how active Germany became after 1896 and the stresses 
placed upon Britain during the South African War, this chapter aims to demonstrate the links between 
stereotype formation and real-time events. Although the Kruger Telegram was a vitally important event in 
changing perceptions of  Germany, these tropes would be unlikely to maintain lasting importance without 
the repeated warnings and prophesies offered in popular discourse, and the authenticity they were able to 
draw from German foreign policy.  
The German Economic Menace after the Kruger Telegram 
Austerities, simplicities, and a common danger breed virtues and devotions which are the 
parents of  prosperity. Prosperity breeds arrogance, extravagance and class hatreds. Opulence 
and pride in their turn breed national disasters.19 
C.F.G. Masterman, The Condition of  England (1909) 
In the wake of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis this anxiety about Germany as a new economic powerhouse 
gained popular currency through a number of  popular books and a barrage of  press coverage. The most 
successful proponent of  this perceived menace was Ernest E. Williams who became something of  a national 
celebrity as a result of  his most successful work, Made in Germany (July, 1896).20 Though there was an 
awareness of  growing commercial rivalry, until 1896 German goods were viewed as substandard and 
unthreatening. However, the phrase ‘Made in Germany’ assumed a much more threatening implication in 
January 1896. On 4 January 1896 the Pall Mall Gazette revealed its initial reaction to the Kruger Telegram 
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with the headline: ‘Made in Germany’.21 In a call-back to the previous debates over German competition 
and interference, the Pall Mall Gazette reinvigorated the old catchphrase.  
E.E. Williams’ book Made in Germany, first serialised from January in the New Review and published as a 
book in July 1896, posited that Germany was fast overtaking Britain in every statistical aspect and soon 
Britain’s power and influence would be subverted in favour of  Germany. The events of  January 1896 pushed 
Williams’ argument to the forefront of  the national debate. It caused a great stir across the newspapers, 
received both criticism and praise, and continued to sell and be debated for years afterwards.22 Williams was 
a trade protectionist and used the threat of  Germany to sell his argument. He was determined to counter 
the opinion that he was merely a protectionist reformer, arguing that the threat of  Germany transcended 
the debate. By deploying Germany as his antagonist, Williams gave birth to a popular narrative which 
gathered pace from 1896. It helped to inspire the later Tariff  Reform movement and the ideas behind 
‘national efficiency’, and also pushed the menace of  Germany towards the mainstream of  British popular 
imagination. 
In his first article, ‘The Departing Glory’, Williams opened with the Wellsian prophesy: ‘The industrial 
glory of  England is departing and England does not know it.’23 He was concerned that Britain was sitting 
idly by whilst other more vigorous nations superseded them. The old usage of  the phrase ‘Made in 
Germany’ was ‘raw material for a jape at the pantomime...But the nation at large is yet as little alive to the 
impending danger as to the evil already wrought.’ Williams’ concluded with comments typical of  the 
sensationalist and depressive malaise often associated with fin-de-siècle British thought:  
We have seen agriculture…hopelessly depressed, and as little able to save us as the faded deities 
of  Rome the falling Empire. Now we see our new gods deserting us for other nations. Industrial 
depression has of  late years been the rule, instead of  the exception. Our population is still 
waxing, and our means of  providing it with an income are dwindling. Is it not time to look 
things squarely in the face?24  
This mind-set was increasingly popular; as mentioned above, there was much agitation for reform during 
this period, embodied in the movement for national efficiency, army, naval and educational reform, calls for 
conscription and tariff  reform. Invoking the rhetoric of  decline and regeneration, Williams tapped into a 
popular debate, increased in its popular appeal by the employment of  the ‘German’ as the foil. The sudden 
arrival, as it seemed, of  Germany to the international ball-game had inspired a great interest in their affairs.  
Williams utilised the increasing sense of  a looming German danger to great success; by 1897 his book 
was already in its fifth edition with a great deal of  popular support. Naturally some criticised Williams; 
including notable politicians such as John Morley (outspoken Liberal anti-interventionist); Joseph 
Chamberlain (at this time opposed to tariff  reform, although a later U-turn in 1903 was of  great 
significance); and Charles Ritchie (Conservative MP and President of  the Board of  Trade) driven by their 
support for free trade and laissez-faire politics.25 The fact that such major personalities felt it necessary to 
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challenge Williams, both in his insinuation of  British failings, and also in his usage of  the German ‘menace’ 
as a motivating factor, indicates the importance of  the ‘Made in Germany’ debate.  
Many others joined Williams in warning of  the doom which Britain would face as a result of  the attitude 
of  denial. April 1896’s edition of  the National Review critiqued the ‘Made in Germany’ articles, arguing that 
they although it was ‘triumphantly proved by the clever critics to contain many confused statistics, 
and…obviously vitiated by its author’s prejudice in favour of  Protection,’ the message should not be 
ignored. In reporting this article the Review of  Reviews argued that ‘many good ostrich-like citizens have gone 
to sleep thinking that the German scare was baseless’; these ‘slug-a-beds’ would do well to heed Sir Philip 
Magnus’s warnings, which were a ‘timely reminder’ of  ‘the danger of  German competition.’ Magnus was 
not original in his arguments that technical education, lower wages and government assistance were the key 
to German success, but both his article, in the view of  the Review of  Reviews give a clear indication of  the 
concern amongst some in society about this growing menace, and the influence of  the ‘Made in Germany’ 
dispute.26 
In August 1896 the Daily Chronicle, a working-class liberal imperialist newspaper,27 inspired by Williams, 
published its own account of  ‘the great peril’ in a series of  articles entitled ‘The Truth about German 
Competition’; in response, the Saturday Review was delighted to remark that the Chronicle had joined Williams 
in highlighting the menace that German commercial competition posed. The underlying factor in all 
discussions of  German trade and competition was undeniably the debate about continuation of  free trade 
or a turn towards tariffs and state protection. The Saturday Review, although frustrated to find that the 
Chronicle had failed to see the true realities of  German competition - that state-protection was the real answer 
to Britain’s economic woes - was pleased that another publication had joined the outcry against Germany.28 
The Saturday Review and Daily Chronicle were amongst a growing number of  periodical and daily publications 
to join the increasing body of  opinion which expressed anxiety over the threat of  a German ‘menace’ to 
British commerce and industry. In spite of  the right-wing bias, even left-wing dailies and periodicals were 
forced to admit to some of  the points raised, and many liberals were lured by the ideas of  efficiency and 
the need for reform.  
In this period commerce and industry were equated to world influence and security. If  Britain was to 
remain the strongest power in the world it needed global trade networks and domestic industries protected 
in order to provide the goods to facilitate that trade. Lord Rosebery, Liberal Prime Minister (1894-1895) and 
political firebrand, was also amongst a number of  prominent proponents of  such views. At the opening of  
a new ‘technical institute and art school at Epsom on 25 July, he was described by the Economist as speaking 
in ‘a somewhat alarmist way’ about German ‘encroachments upon our former industrial supremacy’. A 
strong advocate of  Williams, Rosebery announced: 
We are threatened…by one very formidable rival, at any rate, who…is encroaching on us as the 
sea encroaches on weak parts of  the coast – I mean Germany. 
The Economist was concertedly anti-Williams in its stance. It had previously attacked Made in Germany for the 
holes left in the statistics, something Williams disputed vociferously, but which was undoubtedly a fair 
criticism, given the volume of  such critics.29 Nevertheless, the Economist was willing to look past its numerous 
misgivings in accepting that overall ‘German competition [was] a formidable factor’. But it did not believe 
that ‘the dolorous dirges of  departed greatness in which it is so much the fashion to indulge’ were justified 
overall.30  
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The high profile nature of  this debate over a German Menace shows the change that had occurred in 
British popular discourse over the year following the Kruger Telegram. The debate moved towards a more 
widespread acceptance of  the German desire to undermine Britain, and revolved more around whether or 
not this desire had reached fruition. After the Kruger Telegram Crisis debates in Britain had evidently shifted 
towards an increasing awareness of  Germany and her growing global importance. As shown here, the 
menace was conceived in terms of  global competition situated within the general pessimism engendered by 
the Great Depression which was still rumbling on. The manifestation of  a Germany ‘bogey’ at the heart of  
British economic fears and consciousness implies its deep extent. This economic debate tying Germany and 
free trade versus protection together continued into the second half  of  the next decade; it was a key element 
in a complex of  cultural and ideological aftershocks in the aftermath of  January 1896. 
As a result of  the German seizure of  Kiao Chau British ‘theorists’ began to debate and predict the true 
meaning of  Germany’s changing attitude. In January 1898’s Blackwood’s Magazine an article appeared entitled, 
‘The German Peril’. As has been shown, there was an increasing tendency to couple ‘German’ with words 
such as ‘peril’, ‘danger’ or ‘menace’ in regard to a variety of  events and areas of  interest. Drawing on the 
‘Made in Germany’ debate again, Blackwood’s piece began with the assertion that Germans ‘are simply eating 
into us in the vital parts, intercepting and draining off  for their own use the stream of  our national life, 
which is trade and manufactures.’31 This article is also strong evidence for the solid formation of  the German 
stereotypes so commonplace in the next century: 
…it appears that whichever way we turn we are confronted with a compact body, inspired by a 
definite purpose, to which we have to oppose a nebula of  loose atoms…The whole situation 
is too plainly suggestive of  a mob against an army. 
In the view of  this author Britain was a mob, too busy fighting itself  to face such a ‘compact body’ with ‘a 
definite’ purpose; the model of  efficiency is depicted as a looming, faceless machine which has made a target 
of  British trade and strength and is determined to meet it. Furthermore, Blackwood’s continued to argue that 
this overwhelming force has also been attacking British predominance all over the global empire: ‘They 
swarm over the South and Central American republics, over every British colony, and throughout the 
dominions of  Islam. India is their happy hunting ground.’ For British thinkers and the public, Britain was 
constituted from its industry and dominated the world by trade. Without global commercial control the 
Empire could not exert its dominance; trade, the navy and the empire all represented constituent parts of  
the wider imperial whole. Concerns about German economic competition were one and the same as 
concerns about imperial antagonism.  
The German Menace in Africa 
After the Kruger Telegram, imperial competition and intrigue in South Africa continued to hold popular 
focus; as a result of  the Kaiser’s interference in British African affairs, the British press were increasingly 
drawn to discuss Germany’s conduct in Africa. Germany was increasingly represented as an untrustworthy 
and dangerous influence upon British imperial interests. From 1896 to 1899 Germany was a regular topic 
for concern and criticism in the British press. Then, following the outbreak of  the South African War, 
Germany continued its presence in popular discourse thanks to its popular anglophobia, and its importance 
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as a foil for campaigners for national efficiency. The South African War should be viewed as a specifically 
imperial period of  crisis; in various ways Germany was seen as an increasing malign influence.  
The Public Inquest into Germany after the Kruger Telegram  
As argued in chapter two, a key theme to arise during the Kruger Telegram was the suspicion that Germany 
sought, through plots and conspiracies, to undermine and attack the British Empire. Especially focussed 
upon the Transvaal, over the following years this theme was drawn upon in various contexts; in fictional 
accounts, as well as in journalism, the recurrence of  this theme suggests that the Kruger Telegram helped 
to establish an association between Germany and the idea of  anti-imperial conspiracies. During this period 
British newspapers and authors became increasingly used to using terms such as ‘schemes’, ‘plots’, 
‘ambitions’ and ‘aims’ in reference to Germany and her imperial ventures.32  
Following the Kruger Telegram the negative stereotype of  the ‘filching’ German ran through much of  
the commentary of  Germany’s imperial endeavours. Many commentaries on German colonial endeavour 
attacked Germany’s colonies while complaining of  the numbers of  Germans stealing British trade from 
within the Empire’s borders. The free trade which Germans enjoyed in the British Empire was lending them 
the upper hand in trade deals, as Germany protected its own commerce with preferential tariffs. A key aspect 
of  this was the perceived clandestine nature of  German colonial expansion; it was suspected that German 
merchants were the vanguard for German imperial expansion. William Greswell wrote in the Fortnightly 
Review that with ‘Official Germany’ only becoming a colonising power very recently, its influence in South 
Africa had been gained ‘mainly by intrigue’.33 This surreptitious action was something to be feared, Greswell 
continued: 
We are reminded of  the old story of  the Hanse Cities and the merchants of  the Steelyard over 
again. In the days of  the Tudors enterprising Germans of  the Free Towns came over to 
London, amid availing themselves of  our insular supineness, began, under the protection of  
royalty and dynastic considerations, to filch away British trade from under the very noses of  
British merchants in London. 
The filching German was cause for bitterness for a contributor for the Times, who complained that Britain 
had opened up all the global trade routes, postal services and frontiers and the Germans ‘were enabled to 
take advantage of  this’ without any of  their own investment. The writer used the example of  Burma, where 
Germans were allowed to settle in droves and Africa; the British allowed Germans to trade in their ports 
and live freely amongst British colonialists. In light of  the recent rift between the countries, the writer 
questioned whether these ‘favourable terms’ should be withdrawn.34 The Saturday Review was similarly 
‘conscious of  an underhand influence that thwarted or hampered us wherever our interests were most 
deeply involved.’ German interference, it was stated, had caused ‘our Colonies in Africa and Australasia [to 
be] wild with fear and anger’. The awareness of  a new enemy had the result that ‘from London to the most 
distant Colony the name of  Germany has become a thing of  dislike and distrust quite as intense as that 
entertained towards France a century ago’. The strength of  this opinion shows the extent of  change in 
popular discourse over 1896, and concluded with a sting: ‘She has only shown us how very ill-mannered and 
untrustworthy her diplomacy is, and how necessary it is for us to maintain in her regard an attitude of  
watchful distrust.’35 
The idea of  Germany as untrustworthy and covetous swept into British popular discourse: many argued 
that Germany leeched off  Britain’s hard earned imperial gains, aimed to subvert British imperial activity, and 
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had deliberately undermined British colonial rule in South Africa.36 After the Kruger Telegram at the 
beginning of  1896, there was a brief  lull in official Anglo-German imperial antagonism; during this period 
journalists and authors, predominantly of  an imperialist and nationalist persuasion, reminded the public of  
Germany’s treachery and untrustworthiness. Suspicions had been thoroughly raised by Germany’s actions, 
and the expectation was that Germany would attempt to strike again in future; talk of  military spending and 
armaments was rife as a result. Britain’s most valued asset – the Empire – was worth the cost in the minds 
of  many. With the rhetoric of  industrial decline, and the perception that Germany had surpassed Britain in 
that aspect, the Empire was growing in ideological importance as a vestige of  ‘greatness’ for Britain; it took 
special focus in the increasing popular distrust of  Germany, and therefore lay at the heart of  the growing 
image of  Germany in the popular mind as a key foundation stone. 
Less than a year after the crisis, as the first ‘histories’ were being written about events at the beginning 
of  1896. Many focussed upon the ‘African Crisis’ seeking to reveal the context and reasoning behind 
Jameson’s blunder, and the failure of  the Uitlander of  Johannesburg to rise up against Boer ‘oppression’.37 
Such accounts helped to perpetuate the tropes established in January 1896. In June 1896 George Seymour-
Fort sought to explain the ‘true’ motive for Jameson’s Raid. It was Seymour-Fort’s assertion that a 
‘secret…German-Boer alliance’ was the true reason for the ‘rush to Pretoria’. He purported to know a secret 
truth: that behind Kruger ‘stood an ambitious and potentially aggressive German ally.’ The German 
negotiations over Delagoa Bay were allegedly part of  a much wider plot, not only to throw out British 
influence from the Transvaal using a combination of  a fifth column of  over 1000 German reservists already 
in the Boer Republics, and a force marched over from German South-West Africa, to pose a ‘menace to 
Rhodesia’. Seymour-Fort was convinced of  his theories, despite admitting possessing no ‘documentary 
evidence’; the conclusion was thus that Rhodes and Jameson’s extreme actions were justified in the defence 
of  empire. Furthermore, he warned that Germany’s ‘ambitions…are still alive…and she intends in the future 
to be a dangerous and inimical Power to our Imperial interests’.38  
By 1897 it was becoming increasingly plausible that Germany was an imperial threat equal to France 
and Russia. In September 1897, in an article entitled the ‘Partition of  England’, the Spectator described in 
detail how the European powers would seek to attack the British Empire and divide up the spoils. France 
would gain West African territories, Russia of  course would take India, and Germany would control the 
whole of  East and South Africa, and influence over the whole of  Australasia. The Spectator did not even 
countenance the possibility that these schemes were in doubt. Though such imperial anxieties had been 
common before 1896, Germany had clearly been promoted to the highest level of  threats to the British 
Empire. Both in the Cape and across the Empire, Germany joined France and Russia as a perceived holistic 
threat to the Empire.39 
Also in 1897, F.E. Garret referred specifically to a ‘complot’ and a ‘subterranean intrigue’ The Story of  
an African Crisis (1897). This conspiracy, between Dr Leyds (Boer envoy to Berlin) and Baron Marschall von 
Bieberstein, involved the shipping of  Krupp guns to the Transvaal, and assumed German desires to establish 
their own ‘protection’ over the Transvaal. 40 Garrett, editor of  the Cape Times quoted his own paper: ‘It is 
upon South Africa at large…that the Government’s Hollander clerk and German officers turn the guns of  
their Continental policy, in maniac hatred…’41 Garrett emphasised the same rumours and conspiracy tales 
as highlighted so loudly during the raid; the image throughout was of  Germany as a subversive antagonist 
with a secretive desire to steal Britain’s valued possessions. Similarly, William Stead, the celebrated journalist 
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and editor of  the Review of  Reviews, published in the same year what proved to be a popular but divisive 
account entitled The History of  the Mystery. In reviewing the book, the Speaker claimed that Stead had sought 
to cheaply ‘sensate the public’ and profiteer from popular outrage after the Kruger Telegram;42 it referred 
to the book as a ‘damp squib’ but still accepted that on the issue of  ‘German intrigue in South Africa’, the 
second theme of  the book, ‘we are not so far apart.’43 Stead’s emphasis upon German conspiracies had 
struck a chord even with an outspoken Liberal journal; in recent scholarship Liberals have often been 
considered as dismissive of  anti-German sentiment and British jingoism, but the suggestion that even part 
on the left accepted the truth of  German ‘intrigues’ indicates the extent of  the impact of  the Kruger 
Telegram Crisis.44 P.E. Aston picked up the theme of  a German conspiracy against imperial interests in the 
Raid on the Transvaal by Dr. Jameson (1898). Aston spoke of  ‘anxious and disturbed’ popular sentiment in 
England and the ‘most disquieting rumours’ that the Transvaal Republic was arming in secret; others warned 
of  ‘armed Germans in Pretoria’ and anti-British European alliances.45 Similarly, F.E. Younghusband 
commented that undoubtedly Germany had been trying to undermine Britain in South Africa. If  Britain 
was to maintain its position of  primacy in South Africa and all over the world: ‘[s]he must keep at a distance 
all rivals.’46  
From 1896 to 1899 Germany was increasingly a subject for debate and anxiety in British popular 
discourse. As a direct result of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis, Germany was portrayed as aggressive, autocratic, 
plotting and insidious in popular non-fiction and across the press. Germany’s interference in the Transvaal 
meant that these arguments were inevitably focused around British South Africa. Throughout the sources 
described above, authors seemed to accept without doubt that Germany jealousy desired to take away 
portions of  the British Empire, or indeed to undermine the whole imperial project. Thanks to such 
narratives, by the beginning of  the South African War in 1899 the British were well-versed in the idea of  a 
deliberate and dangerous German Menace to the British Empire in Africa. 
The South African War and German Anglophobia 
The South African War had a profound cultural, political and economic impact on the British Empire. In 
the opening months of  the war the public was shocked by the news of  numerous military defeats. British 
military units in South Africa were poorly prepared to fight a war against guerrilla tactics. Following the 
events of  ‘Black Week’, in which the public learned of  defeat after defeat, opinion about the war was divided 
between a patriotic and jingoistic ground swell on the right side of  politics, and dissent and Pro-Boer 
sentiment from some of  the Liberal opposition, and some trade union movements.47 The war led to a 
national inquest into the inadequacies of  the armed forces and military organisation. Across Britain the 
press reminded ordinary people of  the failings in South Africa; into 1900 news that British forces had turned 
the balance and all but defeated Boer forces in several victories was received with intense patriotic joy. The 
Unionist successes during the ‘Khaki’ election of  1900 revealed the nationalist fervour which had gripped 
Britain.48 With the continuation of  the war and mounting national economic problems, politicians, 
journalists and authors continued to raise questions about British ‘efficiency’.49 
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Though the period of  the South African War has been studied in detail from a popular perspective,50 
few studies have considered the role of  Germany, German fundraising and volunteering for Boer 
Commando corps and press anglophobia in Britain.51  The era of  the South African War has been seen, 
especially from a German perspective, as pivotal for changing Anglo-German relations and perceptions. 
During the South African War, British popular awareness of  German ‘anglophobia’ was an increasingly 
powerful presence in domestic discourse; as Kennedy argued, this anti-British sentiment impacted heavily 
upon both British official decision-making and popular opinion.52 Pauline Anderson’s study, The Background 
of  Anti-English Feeling in Germany, 1890-1902 (1969), climaxed with a discussion of  wartime ‘anglophobia’, 
and the fever pitch which was reached as a result of  the pro-Boer perspective of  the majority of  the German 
press.53 Steffen Bender recently sought to examine the German press and ‘Boer Mania’ during the South 
African War.54 Bender argued, like several previous German authors, that in terms of  popular perceptions, 
the South African War marked a watershed moment in the ‘Anglo-German estrangement’; he went on to 
argue that the outpouring of  anglophobia had a direct impact upon the actions of  the German imperial 
government.55 His conclusions were limited to the German popular viewpoint, although the transnational 
impact of  this turning point in German opinion should not be underestimated.56 Perhaps understandably 
British scholarship has been dedicated to British popular concerns such as patriotism and volunteerism, so 
that few have considered the role of  Germany. Through the conflict Germany maintained a carefully neutral 
diplomatic stance, although unofficially many Germans volunteered to fight for the Boers, donated money 
to fund Boer armaments and demonised the British as brutal repressors. The reception of  these factors in 
Britain has yet to be covered in detail. 
The swelling abuse of  Britain by the foreign press became a major issue in popular discourse. Britain 
appeared to stand alone in an increasingly hostile climate; imperial anxieties were heightened to extreme 
levels as anglophobia raged around the world against British imperialism.57 In spite of  the welcoming of  the 
German Government’s outwardly amiable stance, and continuing public negotiations about the formation 
of  a defensive alliance, the British press paid close attention to ‘German interests’ in the Transvaal in the 
build-up to the South African War.58 Even before the outbreak of  war major sections of  the German press, 
particularly the right-wing papers and Pan-German publications, expressed support for the Boers, and 
strong anti-English sentiment.59 Throughout December and January 1899-1900 the British press assumed 
that noisy right wing Pan-Germans and Agrarians were representative of  the whole body of  German 
opinion, which in turn led more neutral sections of  the German press to turn against Britain’s colonial war.60 
Attempts by Joseph Chamberlain to garner opinion for an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ alliance proved exceedingly 
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unpopular, especially in Germany, but also amongst Britons, and was indicative of  the state of  opinion by 
this time.61  
Much of  the British press, while commenting on the outburst in other countries, reserved their greatest 
criticism for Germany; the Daily Chronicle and many other daily papers found grim satisfaction in reporting 
the abuse of  British politicians in the German press.62 Chamberlain and Kitchener were depicted in German 
cartoons as demons with horns, fangs and tails; Kitchener was even depicted as a child murderer.63 Over 
the course of  the South African War German anglophobia underwent numerous peaks, over the seizure of  
German merchant ships in Africa during 1900 or as a response to Joseph Chamberlain’s rumoured 
comments about the brutality of  German soldierly conduct in the Franco-Prussian War. The British 
newspaper reader was constantly reminded of  this anger, and even hatred.  
In particular German attacks upon the conduct of  British soldiers against civilians, and the painting of  
Britain as an imperialist aggressor caused great sensitivity in the British press. German stories of  wanton 
British slaughter and brutal treatment in the concentration camps enraged sections of  the press.64 In 
response, papers and contributors retaliated with ‘stories of  the war of  1870-71’ in which the sarcastically 
entitled ‘Gentle Germans’ were reminded of  their past misdeeds and their current hypocrisy. No doubt the 
memory of  the German behaviour during the Franco-Prussian War was a vital factor in their association 
with brutality in the British press; however, it had been increasingly common to associate Germany with 
aggression and autocracy since the Kruger Telegram.65 The trope of  German brutality became more 
common as a result of  the rise of  Germany as an imperial challenge; through the period before 1902 British 
newspapers were increasingly ready to refer to German methods as barbaric. It is possible to link to this 
‘slanging match’ between the press in Germany and Britain during the South African War and the 
accusations of  war crimes after the outbreak of  war in 1914. It seems that in both countries this wartime 
tactic of  undermining and demonising their adversaries was rooted in older imperial rivalries.  
Increasingly note was taken of  German methods of  colonial governance and the treatment of  its 
subjects. Referring to the potential for a German-Boer agreement in her 1900 account of  the history of  
South Africa, Violet Markham reflected the falling stock of  Germany: ‘A taste of  Teutonic rule might have 
taught the Boers a few unpalatable but highly instructive lessons as regards so-called British oppression in 
South Africa.’66 Anti-Slavery journals referred to the barbarity of  German colonial methods and the 
continuation of  slavery under their control.67 The view that Germany was unfit to rule colonised peoples 
grew increasingly prevalent, in spite of  the respect their methods generated amongst British imperialists 
who admired the harder tactics that Germany utilised.68 The brutality and autocracy of  Wilhelmine 
Germany was a running debate in British culture during this period, and a common riposte to German 
anglophobia. 
Sustained German anglophobia led many British commentators to seek to understand it. The most 
common explanation of  the intense anger in Germany was the assumed jealousy of  the British Empire; the 
Yorkshire Herald commented, ‘They [Germany] are jealous of  our Colonial Empire’ and even prophesied 
that in the unlikely event of  a British defeat, ‘Germany would attempt to exercise a protectorate’ over the 
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Boer Republics.69 A letter to the editor of  the Morning Post similarly discussed the likelihood of  ‘an attack 
on England by her jealous and watchful rivals.’70 Similar explanations were offered across British regional 
papers, such as the Blackburn Weekly Standard which argued that the other powers and Germany were ‘jealous 
of  our greatness’.71 The Pall Mall Gazette wrote an article in March 1900 strongly condemning German 
abuse: 
…wherever Germans have been gathered together in any part of  the world the news of  what 
they describe with the exaggeration of  hatred and envy as English disasters in South Africa has 
been hailed with uproarious satisfaction…Suffice it to say that we are not in a mood, just now 
especially, to stand by and tamely see our eagerly patriotic Volunteers and our gallant soldiers 
vilified and held up to ridicule of  our bitterly jealous Continental friends (?) 
The Pall Mall Gazette was not the first to imagine that the press abuse of  Britain was representative of  the 
German ‘public voice’. The assumption that Germany’s press was heavily influenced by the Government 
meant that anglophobia was explained as both the popular view, and also a semi-official stance.  
In January 1902 “Patriae Quis Exul” (hence “P.Q.E.”) wrote for the Contemporary Review, stating that the 
anglophobia of  Germany was ‘consistently and maliciously more hostile than that of  France’ and that this 
was cause for deep concern; citing the political or personal explanations for anglophobia “P.Q.E.” argued 
that ‘underlying and embracing the whole’ was envy...’. In a warning tone “P.Q.E.” argued that few had 
recognised the importance of  this anti-British sentiment; British decision makers and the public should were 
advised to heed this prophesy: ‘If  envy is akin to hatred, the genesis of  Anglophobia contains a real source 
of  danger. It is in this sense disquieting.’ The intent of  the article is revealed with the final line: 
But mark this. The Germans are hostile, increasingly so: and they believe we are degenerating. 
Let us not…pass on unmindful. Let us strengthen our fleet. It behoves us to be ready. 
This passage invoked both ideas of  British inefficiency and the vocabulary of  the German Menace, as had 
developed over the past years. In dramatic prose, “P.Q.E.” imagined that Germany, with its global ambitions, 
jealousy and planning was a future threat to Britain for which it should be ready.72  
Throughout the war and afterwards, German anglophobia was repeatedly explained in terms of  
jealousy and envy. The British perceived themselves as a coveted and hunted power and the insecurity 
provoked by the failures of  British military organisation, combined with the nationwide outburst of  
patriotism helps to explain the strength of  the language of  such newspaper reports. George Peel’s The 
Enemies of  England (1902) offered a narrative which revealed the insecurities of  the Edwardian 
‘temperament’; his final chapter examined the growing divide between Germany and Britain. Peel set 
himself  the task of  unravelling what he viewed as the ‘strange phenomenon of  national hatred’ – a 
‘melancholy revolution in the mind of  a great and kindred people’.73 Peel argued that Germany had become 
the ‘great workshop in which the lies against Great Britain have been manufactured, with the most ingenious 
industry and on the most extensive scale.’74 Evidently the recent surge in German Anglophobia, prompted 
by international events following from the Jameson Raid in 1895 informed such opinions. The hard-line 
views espoused in parts of  the German press were taken by sections of  the British press as a statement of  
intent.75  
By late 1902 few in Britain would have been unaware of  the worsening perception of  Germany in 
Britain. When, in November, the new British Prime Minister, A.J. Balfour, was forced to assure the public 
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that there was ‘no prospect of  any disturbance of  the peace between any of  the Great Powers’, the Daily 
Express was sure that Mr. Balfour ‘had Anglo-German relations in his mind’.76 The increasing perception of  
Germany as an imperial threat, a power which coveted British imperial possessions and sought to undermine 
them, helped to solidify anti-German opinion. The German press seemed to show that Germany hated 
Britain, and hoped for its downfall; the development of  anti-British sentiment cemented themes of  
conspiracy and jealousy in the British popular imagination. 
National Efficiency and the German Imperial Challenge 
Nothing can prevent the United States and Germany at least, who are much further from their 
limit of  production, from pursuing an economic evolution like our own. Theirs is commencing. 
Ours is complete. Our ideals are consolidation and resistance: theirs are extension, and in the 
commercial sense, aggression…and the extraordinary interest of  our national problem is that 
it presents the widest possibilities between ruinous decadence and magnificent endurance that 
an Empire has ever offered at any single moment in history.77 
The deepening economic and social concerns of  the later 1890s grew into a forceful tide of  national angst 
which came to a head during the South African War (1899-1902); at the heart of  these concerns lay 
Germany’s increasing presence as an imperial threat. The South African War was represented a crisis for 
British imperialism. During the ‘Black Week’ in December 1899 British fears of  industrial and commercial 
decline and the imperial overstretch seemed to be confirmed.78 Apparently covetous enemies, a weak and 
inefficient army, and an overextended empire led to what Geoffrey Searle termed ‘a psychological shock, 
shattering national complacency and creating an intensified sense of  national danger.’79 Many feared that 
the humiliations in South Africa might entice enemies, old and new, to seize the opportunity to attack the 
Empire while it was weakest. 
In October 1900 the Daily Mail questioned whether England was ‘In Decadence?’ British capitalists 
and businessmen compared ‘to the newer type that is leading the way in America and Germany’ were ‘simply 
amateurish and incompetent’. This attitude was echoed by contemporary historian G.C. Brodrick’s own 
assessment of  Britain as ‘A Nation of  Amateurs’ in an increasingly professionalized international 
environment: ‘the same amateur spirit which cripples the Army pervades nearly the whole of  what is called 
professional and public life in this country.’ As had been the case with Made in Germany in 1896, a solution 
was demanded to this decadence and decline in all aspects of  British society. An article in the Fortnightly 
Review at the end of  1900, entitled ‘Reconstruction or Catastrophe’ put the issue in black and white: would 
Britain respond to the patent decline it was experiencing, or be doomed to imperial destruction?80 
A solution was soon proposed by campaigners for ‘national efficiency’. During the darkest days of  the 
South African War, politicians and journalists began to call for greater efficiency across the British state and 
society. Major personalities in Britain devoted their energies to answering the calls for national soul-
searching. The popular journalist Arnold White and the former Prime Minister Lord Rosebery, a famed 
orator and Liberal Imperialist, were amongst the most prominent advocates connected with the ideals of  
efficiency.81 White’s articles and books generated great popularity for his publishers, and Rosebery delivered 
his mantra of  efficiency across the country to crowds of  thousands, some in excess of  5,000 people; the 
rhetoric of  national efficiency seems to have had wide appeal.82 Many key efficiency advocates argued that 
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an escape from party politics was the kind of  radical change needed to rescue Britain. Members of  the ‘Co-
Efficients’ Dining Group from across the political spectrum – including notable socialists Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb, H.G. Wells, R.B. Haldane (future Home Secretary), Sir Edward Grey (future Foreign 
Secretary), Leo Amery (famed Times War Correspondent) and Leo Maxse (editor of  the right-wing National 
Review) – sought to use their influence to advance this popular philosophy. The ‘national’ non-party political 
ideal was modelled, according to Amery, on the idea of  the German General Staff  which could bring about 
the necessary reforms to save England.83 Although the dining group itself  declined in importance by 1904, 
the mantra of  efficiency continued to have a lasting influence in British politics and its advocates were 
responsible, at least in part, for many political successes (including the Education Act of  1902, Army 
Reform, founding the Committee for Imperial Defence, the London School of  Economics, and the 
conversion of  a number of  colleges of  education into the first ‘red-brick’ Universities across Britain’s 
cities).84  
The ideas of  efficiency achieved national repute thanks to the wide based appeal and provocative 
language used by proponents. Efficiency was also socially inclusive, calling for improvements to the living 
standards of  the working classes, and spoke to the new found patriotism of  early Edwardian society.85 The 
South African War shocked the public into taking note of  the ideals of  national efficiency, and even after 
the end of  the war concerns continued about the next challenge to the British Empire.86 Germany was a 
constant figure in these debates; the German economic and military model played a crucial role. From the 
time of  Made in Germany it was apparent that Imperial Germany was becoming an economic powerhouse. 
In 1897, Lord Rosebery explained his views on Germany: 
I am afraid of  Germany. Why am I afraid of  the Germans? Because I admire and esteem them 
so much. They are an industrious nation; they are, above all, a systematic nation they are a 
scientific nation, and whatever they take up, whether it be the arts of  peace or the arts of  war, 
they push them forward to the utmost possible perfection with that industry, that system, that 
science which is part of  their character.87 
This ‘fear’ of  Germany was based largely upon Germany’s ‘systematic’ nature being applied to all aspects 
of  modern industry and trade. However, from 1896 concerns over German economic competition were 
conflated with strategic and military ones. The weaknesses exhibited during the South African War, 
combined with Germany’s increasing interests across the world began to influence upon efficiency thinkers. 
If  Britain did not act, its empire would be vanquished by a better-prepared, more scientific, and ruthlessly 
efficient rival. 
Writing in October 1902 Arnold White warned that Britain should ‘Make France a Friend’ and pursue 
an alliance with Russia. White dismissed France as a serious threat, describing the Fashoda incident as ‘not 
a conflict of  serious interests.’ Perhaps unwittingly echoing Wells’s War of  the Worlds White argued: 
 The German nation, and more especially the highly-trained thinkers and experienced officials, 
watch the inefficiency of  our rulers and the absence of  directing ability with watering mouths. 
British official incompetence is German opportunity. 
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White’s argument explained succinctly the part Germany played within the rhetoric of  efficiency. British 
inefficiency was all the more frightening because of  Germany’s jealousy and covetousness. The relative 
efficiency of  Germany with scientific ‘thinkers’ and planner was in stark contrast with bumbling British 
efforts in the South African War.88  
The centrality of  Germany to this point of  view indicates the change that had occurred since 1896. 
Established scholarship has yet to make explicit the connection between national efficiency and the German 
imperial menace.89 Most newspaper articles discussing the German ‘question’ reflected upon efficiency; and 
conversely, concerns about national efficiency were rarely voiced without some veiled or overt reference to 
the German imperial challenge. Following the Kruger Telegram, Germany was increasingly discussed in 
British popular discourse. The press and non-fiction writers described the conspiracies and plots of  
Germany in the Transvaal and elsewhere and depicted Germany as ‘filching’ from the British Empire. The 
experience of  the South African War taught Britain to doubt its supposed invincibility, to be wary of  
Germany’s efficiency, anglophobia, expansionism and covetousness. Over the years 1896-1902 Africa, then, 
was an important site for the development of  the imperial menace of  Germany. 
The German Menace in China and the Far East 
China was the other key site for British imperial anxiety about Germany in the period following 1896. The 
view of  Germany as autocratic and brutal developed simultaneously with British anxieties about German 
conspiracies and plotting. Through several events in the realm of  international politics the British popular 
imagination was provided with evidence of  the dangerous impulsive autocracy of  Germany’s ruling class, 
the brutal aggression of  German armed forces and its jealous desire to secretly undermine and attack British 
interests. These interlinked stereotypes, traditionally associated with other focuses for imperial anxiety, 
especially Russia, provided ammunition for the belief  that Germany could become a serious danger to the 
British Empire, and would be a powerful and frightening adversary if  it did.  
The German Seizure of  Kiao-Chau 
In the case of  the German ‘grab’ in Shandong in Northern China, their conduct was represented negatively 
from its inception; the landing of  troops at Kiao Chau on 14 November 1897, combined with continuing 
debates in the Reichstag about the extension of  the German Navy, led the British press to refer to the 
experience of  the Kruger Telegram. The Hampshire Advertiser wrote in a scathing article in early December 
1897 that, ‘since that famous little cablegram…we have heard little of  Emperor William’s exploits at sea’. 
Clearly nodding to contemporary ‘Made in Germany’ debates, the Advertiser wondered if  Wilhelm had been 
maturing ‘some sinister design for secretly introducing prison-made mops into England, as a first step 
towards breaking down the power of  the British Empire.’ The Kaiser was abused and ridiculed, and beneath 
this layer of  humour, the anxieties about the secret plans of  Germany to undermine the British Empire 
were openly voiced.90  
After the landing of  German marines, the German Imperial government was keen to make a bold 
military gesture to reinforce its claim. Thus in December 1897 the Kaiser’s brother, Prince Heinrich, was 
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sent to China with a small fleet to strengthen German control. On the eve of  Heinrich’s journey, the Kaiser 
found occasion for a characteristic outburst: the infamous ‘mailed fist’ speech of  15 December. The speech 
and Heinrich’s reply became as infamous as the actual seizure of  Germany’s Chinese coaling station; in a 
characteristic outburst of  aggressive nationalism he ordered Prince Heinrich: 
Let it be clear to every European out there, to German merchants above all, to foreigners whose 
soil we may be on or with whom we may have to deal, that the German Michael has firmly 
planted on that soil the shield emblazoned with the Imperial eagle… [Should] anyone ever 
attempt to affront us, or prejudice us in our good rights, then strike out with your mailed fist…91 
This strong statement was representative of  the increasingly global focus of  German foreign policy; filled 
with enthusiasm, the Kaiser unwittingly opened himself  up to a torrent of  criticism and mockery by the 
British press who tore the speech apart.92 In a time when public speakers and politicians prided themselves 
in their reserve, Wilhelm’s ebullient performances made easy targets. Regional papers such as the Liverpool 
Mercury (Liberal), Glasgow Herald (Liberal Unionist) and Freeman’s Journal (Dublin, Irish Nationalist), reported 
with sarcastic glee on the phrase which would last longest in the minds of  the British: ‘Strike out with your 
mailed fist’.93 The ‘mailed fist’ would eventually become synonymous with German ruthlessness and 
aggression.94 The Liverpool Mercury accused the Kaiser of  ‘making himself  ridiculous….to make all Europe 
explode with laughter’, while the Aberdeen Journal suggested that though the world was used to being 
‘surprised and amused’ by Wilhelm, this particular ‘exhibition’ was without comparison.95  
Whilst at the time the British press sought to mock Germany and the Kaiser, there was also a growing 
sense of  concern coloured by the memory of  the Kruger Telegram. The Economist attacked the ‘extremely 
illjudged and unusual language’ used at Kiel, had ‘spread through Europe an impression that he intends to 
commence a career of  conquest in China’.96 The Morning Post was dismayed at the ‘barefaced action of  
Russia and Germany’ fearing that the two powers were conspiring to shut Britain out of  China. The Morning 
Post also predicted that there were those amongst Britain’s enemies who dreamt of  ‘a grand combination 
against the quondam Mistress of  the Sea’. This fear of  alliances stretched further for some commentators; 
the Saturday Review, in an article entitled ‘The War Scare,’ described England as ‘ill at ease about these doings’, 
and even suggested that many believed ‘we may be at war with Germany, or with Russia, or with both, 
before we have recovered from the Christmas feasts.’97  
With Britain’s traditional enemy Russia following Germany with its own seizure of  Port Arthur in 
Manchuria, there was concern and rumour about the potential implications for Britain. As it became clear 
that Germany and Russia were determined to keep their new Chinese possessions many British 
commentators complained of  a generation of  British inactivity and ‘isolation’ which had left Britain exposed 
to such aggression.98 Germany’s seizure of  Chinese territory led to fears of  a ‘scramble for China.’99 One 
British customs official in Peking was convinced that ‘the Kiaochow [sic.] business’, if  ‘England means 
business’, would ‘spell war’ with a ‘combination of  three Powers against England.’100 The journalist, 
Archibald Colquhoun, agreed that there was a serious prospect of  rapprochement, at least in the Far East, 
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between Germany and the Dual Alliance. It was Colquhoun’s theory that an entente ‘based upon mutual 
interests’ had been intended to quash British interests in the Far East. He pleaded that the Salisbury 
government ‘drop all this “all is well” theory’ and match the seizures of  land in China, instead of  wasting 
time and energies in Central Africa.101 Common to all observations on the ‘Chinese question’ was the 
assumption that Britain had let its hold on China slip and would lose out to the other powers who had 
gained the ‘inside track’ on Britain.102  
Australian and Hong Kong newspapers watched developments during the ‘Scramble for China’ closely. 
The Hongkong Telegraph repeatedly announced suspicions of  a possible Franco-Russo-German pact against 
Britain, or suspicions of  Germany’s goals in China. According to such reports, across British territories in 
the East, Germany’s actions were the subject of  much discussion and concern; Germany’s recent record 
was a major cause to be concerned for the future success of  the colony. One account questioned Germany’s 
actions with overt anxiety:  
What does Germany want with a big fleet and soldiers and a fortified station here? Not to 
overawe China, for a dozen men in a jollyboat can do that. It is some European war that 
Germany has in mind; and any European war may be a matter of  life and death to the British 
Empire. 
It urged that Britain prepare for this potential threat, of  a ‘35cm Krupp gun saluting us from Kowloon 
cone’, in times of  peace, before it was too late to act.103 The Review of  Reviews expressed similar concern 
toward the developments in China. The seizure of  Port Arthur and Kiao Chau were viewed as equally 
significant, playing upon the long established Russophobia in the press, as well as the nascent fears of  
Germany. In spite of  the traditional anti-Russian or Francophobic stance there was added cause for concern 
as a result of  Germany’s impulsive and unpredictable behaviour. In the Contemporary Review, contributor 
William Des Voeux argued that in spite of  the fact that ‘russophobia runs in the blood’, Britain should look 
to a closer alliance with her. There seemed a growing acceptance that Germany desired more than just an 
expansion of  its trade.104 Germany was increasingly antagonistic towards Britain and other powers (USA, 
France, Russia), and unlike older enemies, her motives and techniques were new and unpredictable.105  
In a reminder of  the recent past, the Times questioned, ‘What would the German Emperor and the 
German Press have to say of  any person unrighteous enough to formulate such doctrine as this, say, in 
South Africa?’106 The Pall Mall Gazette joined in the criticism of  Germany’s move in the Far East, naming 
German Admiral Von Diederichs the ‘German Jameson’. The Pall Mall Gazette sought to remind Germany 
of  the outcry heard in Germany when Britain last mounted such an armed coup – the Jameson Raid: 
We were under the impression that if  there was one thing the Kaiser could not stand it was 
Raids. The incursion of  armed bands into the territory of  a friendly State was, we fondly 
imagined, a most reprehensible proceeding. 
The cutting article ended with the happy declaration that Britain, ‘being less sensitive about international 
rights’ would not protest to Berlin and ‘The German Dr. Jim can go his own way so long as it does not cross 
ours. When it does, we shall know how to stop him.’ This aggressive attitude was present in many press 
responses to German naval expansionism and actions in China; the Kaiser and Germany had touched a 
nerve – the jingoistic responses gave away the anxiety and insecurity prevalent in Britain.107 Wilhelm, 
Germany and the Kruger Telegram were umbilically linked; his speeches and telegrams constantly related 
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back to January 1896. The usually guarded attention applied to Wilhelm and Germany indicated an 
undercurrent of  concern, and this speech and the association of  Germany with naval expansion and global 
influence resulted in a surge in this concern. Though newspapers outwardly sought to ‘laugh off ’ the 
German desire for world power, their outward mocking suggests a strong inner insecurity and doubt. 
Growing fear of  Germany’s economic might and imperial interference helps to explain the reaction of  the 
British public to the ‘mailed fist’ speech. As with the economy, would Germany, the rising power in the 
world, seek to overtake Britain there too? In 1897 the British press boasted of  the naval superiority of  
Britain, but such noisy announcements were a likely cover for deeper anxieties about Britain’s power in the 
world. 
The Contemporary Review viewed the seizure of  Kiao Chau as indicative of  Germany’s aggressive intent. 
It argued that Shantung would serve as ‘a base for offensive operations in trade and war’. The article 
adjudged Wilhelm to be two-faced: ‘his public acts are those of  hostility, every day becoming more clear 
and more confident.’ The piece went on to argue that Russian action in the Far East is ‘legitimate 
development of  a policy as old as our own’, while Germany’s own actions represented ‘intolerable 
interference’:  
The German Emperor wishes to pose as the arbiter of  Europe’s destiny; he thinks he can array 
Europe against England more effectually than Napoleon ever did. With a man holding such 
views, illumined by the wisdom of  God’s anointed, as he conceives, there could be no durable 
understanding….and, such being the case, it is safer to base all our calculations on his hostility. 
Wilhelm’s methods were modern, brash and uncouth and Germany’s desire to play in increasing role in the 
affairs of  world politics did not sit well with the already fraught British imperial outlook. 
Between 1896 and 1898, there was a change in tone in discussions about Germany and her Emperor. 
In spite of  the attempted rapprochement by the German government which was underway during this 
period, responses to the actions of  Germany as publicised in the British press since 1896 had spread set in 
and could not be uprooted.108 In January 1898 the Economist admitted that ‘Germany will probably, in the 
end, show herself  unfriendly’ and the Financial Times indicated deep suspicion of  Germany’s motives for 
action in the Far East.109 Indeed at the outbreak of  the Spanish-American War in June 1898 fears that 
Germany would attempt to usurp US power in the Philippines led British newspapers to debate the future 
of  Anglo-German relations again. The Economist to suggest that with the Emperor ‘advertising himself  in 
his usual way’ Britain would be forced to step in to assist the United States. This anti-German stance was 
swiftly becoming an established theme amongst the British journals.110 In July the Conservative periodical, 
the Outlook questioned, ‘Is Germany about to ‘Kiao-Chow’ in the Philippines?’; it stated amongst the ‘facts’ 
that the entire German Eastern squadron was positioned there, there had been ‘open talk’ in diplomatic 
circles of  the ‘essential’ need for a coaling station in the Pacific for German ships. Once again, British 
affiliation with America was firmly stated: ‘The Anglo-American understanding is already a fact; it becomes 
a pact the moment Germany shows her hand at Manila.’111 British popular imagination remained in the thrall 
of  imperial anxiety, and the British press was keen to remind its readership of  Germany’s continuing 
aggression abroad.112  
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The Boxer War of  1900 
During the latter half  of  1900 European imperialism in China was faced with a crisis of  unforeseen 
proportions. Over the latter half  of  the nineteenth century growing European influence in China and the 
growing presence of  Protestant and Catholic missionaries and their converts had been a point of  
contention. The German seizure of  Kiao Chau had initiated a European race to seize of  territory during 
1898, and the subsequent surge in railway construction provoked the already perturbed Chinese populace 
into violent rejection of  foreign presence. From late 1899 Chinese rebels of  the Yihetuan Movement, 
popularly known as Boxers due to their martial arts training, attacked European missionaries and Chinese 
Christians across China; the uprising led to thousands of  anti-foreign and anti-Christian outrages, and 
challenged the European presence in China.113 In June 1900 the Boxer forces marched on Peking (Beijing) 
and besieged the European Legations. A few thousand Europeans and Chinese Christians were besieged 
and outnumbered by large Boxer army, which was joined on 21 June by the Chinese Empress Dowager 
Cixi’s forces. Small numbers of  British, French, German, Italian, Austro-Hungarian, American, Russian and 
Japanese civilians and soldiers, as well as several other nations, desperately held out against far superior 
forces. In the confusion German Envoy Clemens von Ketteler was murdered brutally on the streets of  
Beijing; the Governments of  the interested powers immediately began negotiating their response.  
As a result of  the murder of  Ketteler, the German Government, and especially Wilhelm, felt that 
German troops should play a central role in any military campaign; as a result, large numbers of  German 
troops were despatched for China, and the Kaiser succeeded in persuading and coercing the powers into 
nominating his Field Marshall Count von Waldersee as Commander of  the troops of  the eight nation 
alliance (Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Russia, and the United States).114 
Nevertheless, before the shiploads of  Germans, or their Commander in Chief  could arrive, other European 
forces under temporary British command had succeeded in relieving Tianjin and Beijing, and affecting the 
surrender of  the Dowager Empress. In essence, when von Waldersee finally arrived in September the 
fighting was over; unperturbed he set about conducting at least 75 ‘punitive expeditions’ into the Chinese 
countryside resulting in countless civilian deaths.115  
The Boxer War gripped the newspaper reading public of  all the nations involved. In Britain, press 
coverage during the second half  of  1900 was dominated by descriptions of  troops in China, while the 
British defeats in the South African War had abated and national confidence was somewhat restored. As a 
result, the particular behaviour of  Germany during the rebellion provoked a substantial amount of  interest 
in Britain; helping to confirm the developing idea of  Germany after 1896, German troops were viewed in 
this important international event, as behaving in a brutal manner, and once again Wilhelm announced 
himself  to the world as an instinctive and aggressive autocrat intent on world importance.  
It was at the ceremony marking the departure of  German troops for China at Bremerhaven on 27 June 
1900 that Wilhelm II delivered his infamous ‘Hunnenrede’ or ‘Huns Speech’; the speech soon attracted a 
great deal of  outrage, both in Germany and abroad. On 28 June British newspapers reported a version of  
the speech in which Wilhelm ordered his troops to behave with efficiency and bravery, but not cruelty.116 
However, as Bernd Sösemann’s (1976) study showed, in fact Chancellor Bülow had the transcript of  the 
speech doctored and delivered a toned down version to official news agencies.117 Despite Bülow’s attempts 
to suppress the wording of  the speech, a more accurate account of  the speech began to trickle through the 
global communications network. On Monday 30 June the Daily News reported a more accurate version:  
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When you come into contact with the enemy, strike him down. Quarter is not to be given. 
Prisoners are not to be made. Whoever falls into your hands is into your hands delivered. Just 
as a thousand years ago the Huns under their King Attila made for themselves a name which 
still appears imposing in tradition, so may the name of  Germany become known in China in 
such a way that never again will a Chinese dare look askance at a German.118 
This time the reaction in the British press was much stronger. Wilhelm’s message was clear: revenge was to 
be exacted cruelly and swiftly. The reference to the ‘Huns’ was seized upon both by the German left, and in 
Britain, as evidence for the cult of  brutal war craft advocated by Wilhelm and his Junker cliques. Wilhelm 
the militaristic autocrat was criticised and mocked.119 In the House of  Commons the outspoken MP Dr 
Charles Tanner questioned whether British troops could possibly be committed to the command of  a nation 
who advocated such barbaric acts.120 Others criticised Wilhelm for his impulsivity, blunders and autocracy. 
Wilhelm’s speech had a lasting effect on the popular consciousness; two years later Rudyard Kipling 
famously referred to Germany as ‘the shameless Hun’ and though the term was little-used in the years 
preceding the First World War, it became one of  the most common colloquial and propaganda terms for 
Germany, synonymous with cruelty and barbarism.121  
Robert Bickers recently argued that the Boxer Uprising had a similar effect to the Indian Uprising in 
Western popular culture, helping to popularise the ‘yellow peril’ in the decades following it.122 Popular 
discourse was gripped by events in China. Contemporary British accounts of  the ‘rebellion’ showed 
Germany and the conduct of  its troops in a resoundingly negative light. G.A. Henty in his memoir, With the 
Allies to Pekin referred to the ‘sudden greed for colonizing’ of  Germany, and the conduct of  German troops 
in heightening the ‘hatred felt by the Chinese for the “foreign devils”’.123 German cruelty during Waldersee’s 
punitive expeditions was condemned in such accounts and helped persuade British opinion that the 
misgivings which had crystallized since 1896 were typical of  this Germany. In his 1902 the Manchester 
Guardian’s China Correspondent during the crisis, H.C. Thompson, referred to the Germans in China as 
cruel seeking ‘unwise humiliation’ of  the Chinese; for Thompson the Germans used ‘first the sword and 
then the horsewhip; they never let the people down at all; they embitter their daily lives far more than the 
Russians do.’ Harsh words, made harsher in comparison to the accepted stereotype that Russians were 
amongst the cruellest soldiers in the world.124 Similarly, the journalist B.L. Putnam Weale populated his own 
popular memoir with unpleasant and brutal Germans; behaving cruelly, their revenge was only limited by 
the presence of  other nations.125  
In November 1900 the Times reported domestic German debates about the behaviour of  German 
forces in China.126 The German opposition, especially the Social Democrats, drew attention to so-called 
‘Hunnenbriefe’, letters home from German soldiers which depicted the cruelties and atrocities committed 
by German soldiers on punitive expeditions.127 The revenge that the reference to the Huns implied from 
the Kaiser’s speech left a lasting impression on the way the main stream of  British press opinion represented 
German behaviour. Though the evidence suggests that the German troops indeed did behave in a punitive 
and vengeful manner during the Boxer War, the effect upon the British popular imagination was nevertheless 
important; it helped to confirm existent stereotypes of  German military brutality, and tied them closely to 
the leadership style of  Wilhelm II. His perceptibly autocratic style continually confirmed the contrasting 
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nature of  German rule to British ideas of  liberal imperialism, and fitted with pre-existing ‘enemy’ 
stereotypes common to long-running imperial anxieties. Furthermore, the menace of  such leadership and 
their evident lust for power through strength was a source for concern. The South Australian Register wrote 
in January 1900: ‘It is generally recognised that the Government is prepared to go to almost any 
Constitutional length that will be of  real service in giving effect to the Emperor’s imperious will.’ Such views 
suggest a belief  the Emperor’s whims, and his power over state and society could potentially presage future 
conflict; the same paper predicted that it was unlikely that the Kaiser’s will would result in benefits for 
Germany ‘in which the mother country [Britain] will have no direct share.’128 The Spectator, relenting from 
its previously neutral stance towards Germany, expressed its concern about Germany while reflecting upon 
‘German Characteristics’ in late 1900:  
The intelligence from China as to the attitude of  the German officers towards the Chinese is 
apt to come as a shock to humane minds…This attitude of  mind is characteristic, we will not 
say of  German, but of  Prussian politics, which are and have been frankly based on the 
Machiavellian doctrine of  creating the sensation of  fear.129 
Both articles explicitly unite the Kaiser, the Prussianization of  German politics, and the attitude of  cruelty, 
revenge and ‘the sensation of  fear’ which Germany seemed to be increasingly engendering. This link 
between German autocracy, brutality and aggression in imperial policy, and British imperial anxieties is 
fundamental to understanding the development of  the idea that Germany was viewed as an imperial menace 
to Britain before 1902. 
The procession of  autocratic pronouncements from the Kaiser about China throughout this period 
and the increasingly imposing Weltpolitik of  Germany added a new layer to pre-existent British concerns 
about Germany. Despite his seeming rehabilitation in 1901 during the Kaiser’s visit to Queen Victoria’s 
deathbed, such anxieties were only temporarily allayed, and an undercurrent of  distrust ran throughout press 
discourse. Germany’s behaviour in China during 1897 and 1898 seemed to prove the fears of  German 
aggression and planning developed in the aftermath of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis. Germany’s actions fitted 
into the pre-existent narrative of  aggression, autocracy and covetousness. Throughout Germany’s 
involvement in the Boxer War doubters were provided with further evidence, and in commentaries of  these 
events it is possible to discern a more clearly established view of  German autocracy and military brutality. 
It has been important to identify two clear occurrences when the Kaiser’s personal brand of  rule and its 
association with aggression and brutality were attacked in the British press. As argued in chapter one, the 
British were well accustomed to fearing autocratic and cruel enemies who jealously conspired against them, 
and the increasing association of  Germany with these stereotypes helped the German Menace to permeate 
popular discourse. Though not yet fully developed, the inception of  the ‘Hun’ appellation and reminders 
of  the misdeeds of  Germany in the wider world provided additional evidence of  the growing menace of  
Germany.  
The German Menace in Fiction, 1896-1902 
Popular contemporary literature from the period 1896-1902 can provide further evidence of  the 
development of  the German Menace in British popular imagination after the Kruger Telegram. As argued 
above, in the popular press and non-fiction – a major element of  British popular discourse – Germany was 
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a regular focus for debate and anxiety. In the literary world the rise of  Germany as an imperial power and 
the implications this had for Britain became a common trope. Increasingly Germany was depicted as a 
nascent threat to the whole British Empire. Added to ideas of  the commercial, economic threat of  Germany, 
the evident anti-British sentiment, and perceptions of  German conspiracies in British imperial territories, 
authors popularised the view that the German Empire increasingly targeted the seemingly weakened British 
Empire.  
In one popular fictional account, Louis Tracy, one of  the most popular authors of  his age engaged 
directly with current events. Tracy’s work is one example of  how literary culture and events were closely 
related, and the popularity of  The Final War, both during and after the Kruger Telegram period indicates the 
longevity of  popular anxiety after a crisis. From December 1895 to August 1896 Tracy wrote a popular story 
of  future war, The Final War; serialized in the successful magazine, Pearson’s Weekly, the novel meandered 
through various stages, depicting Britain in all-out battle with European alliance of  France, Russia and 
Germany. The story began as a reflection of  wider anxieties of  empire:  
a determined attempt was now being made by her great commercial rivals to take from her 
some...of  the advantages gained by centuries of  enterprise...130 
Tracy even described the powers sharing out the empire, ‘Canada falls to France. East Africa to Germany...’ 
and naturally the Russian’s claimed India.131 By the time he submitted his third instalment, news of  both the 
Jameson Raid and the Kruger Telegram began to influence the story-line; clear in these early chapters was 
the desire of  the powers to attack Britain in order to gain this imperial booty. From the outset the British 
were depicted as far superior to their enemies heavily defeating a Franco-German invasion fleet. Britain’s 
enemies were portrayed as hateful and jealous, their brooding envy justifying their emasculation at the end 
of  the novel.132 The influence of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis began to show as the story went on; chapters 
entitled ‘How Germany Was Outwitted’ and ‘The German Emperor Gets a Lesson’ indicate the desire of  
Tracy to dole out fictional punishments for the insolence displayed in January 1896. Tracy even depicted 
‘Dr. Jim’s Second Raid’ in which Jameson successfully captures the German Emperor. Britain was joined in 
its war by the faithful Anglo-Saxon blooded Americans, and handed a heavy thrashing to all of  its enemies: 
The insuperable power of  the British race confronted him [Kaiser Wilhelm]. It was hopeless 
longer to dream of  a happy encounter.133  
Tracy, at the wish of  his proprietor, C. Arthur Pearson, surreally depicted the successful British invasion of  
the capitals of  France, Germany and Russia.134 Tracy’s account was very popular but was heavily criticised 
by literary commentators.135 Tracy reimagined Jameson as a national and imperial hero; like many future war 
narratives of  this era the plot was garbled and fanciful. He attempted to throw in as many recognisable 
figures, themes and plotlines in order to entertain the readership of  Pearson’s Weekly. Regardless of  the lack 
of  narrative coherence or the inherent exaggeration and patriotic bombast, the story was popular and was 
published as a novel in 1896.136  
George Griffith, another popular author of  his era, sought like Tracy to capitalize on popular passion 
about South Africa in Briton or Boer? A Tale of  the Fight for Africa (1897). Griffith’s tale was serialised 
immediately after The Final War in Pearson’s Weekly from August 1896 to January 1897; it depicted a war 
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between Britain and the Boer Republics which shared some similarity with the outbreak of  war in 1899.137 
However, Griffith imagined that a malevolent Russian influence is behind the instigation of  war, seeking to 
benefit from Britain’s misfortune. Though Russia, an old imperial foe, lay at the heart of  Griffith’s narrative, 
it was Germany who financed the Boers and trained their troops: 
Not less than a quarter of  a million had been spent in their construction and arming, nearly 
every penny of  which had found its way into German pockets…All the available forces, 
including strong detachments of  artillery and the German-drilled, uniformed troops which had 
been raised under the name of  police… 
At the heart of  the story are the imperial anxieties which I have argued were common in British culture 
during this period. Griffith’s narrative reads like a lesson in national defence:  
As the history of  all empires has shown, the day upon which any integral portion of  a dominion 
is torn by hostile force from the imperial body, is, for that dominion, the day of  Fate and the 
beginning of  its ruin. 
Like Tracy and many other future war authors, Griffith handed the final victory to the British.138 The Boers, 
abandoned by the European powers, are crushed in a bloody conflict, and Britain learns ‘terrible lessons’ 
about the forces needed to guarantee its empire. Griffith even stretched to providing a ‘shopping list’ of  
military and naval forces needed to guarantee the security of  South Africa. The ‘jealousies and conflicting 
ambitions’ of  the European powers (France, Russia and Germany) are crushed by ‘a whole race in arms;’ 
elements of  national regeneration, racial rhetoric, imperial insecurity, anti-German sentiment and jingoistic 
imperialism ran throughout this tale.  
In 1898 two popular narratives were published to substantial success which emphasise the manner in 
which the themes of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis had been stored and redeveloped in the ensuing two years. 
M.P. Shiel is often associated by historians with the development of  the racialised ‘yellow peril’ discourse in 
British culture.139 The Yellow Danger, written in 1898, is one of  the most important racist texts of  its era, 
helping to popularly establish the fear of  China and the ‘Eastern Races’ in Britain as a popular trope. Less 
often recognized is how it further developed notions of  German threat. E.P. Oppenheim, who became 
known as the ‘Prince of  Storytellers’ through first half  of  the twentieth century, experienced early success 
with one of  his first full novels, The Mysterious Mr. Sabin (1898).140 Popular enough to be followed by a sequel, 
Oppenheim’s tale depicts a German plot to invade Britain, with the help of  French Bourbon loyalists. Both 
stories were accessible to the general public, easy to read and provided gripping plot lines, intrigue and the 
imperial masochism so craved by the British reading public throughout this period. In both stories, Britain 
is under threat from foreign powers, and Germany is presented as the aggressive, uncompromising and 
insidious. Both accounts provide evidence of  wider anxieties of  empire, and link Germany directly to this 
imperial concern.  
Shiel’s narrative sets out, like Tracy’s Final War, with imperial competition between Britain, and an 
alliance of  other powers. Within the tale of  global conflict between the European ‘races’ and the Chinese 
and Japanese united by a common racial cause, Germany plays a crucial role as the instigator of  the conflict. 
Germany’s seizure of  Kiao Chau is blamed for the beginning of  the imperial troubles; following this 
Germany is granted a vast swathe of  China by the Chinese Emperor. The antagonism in China results 
eventually in an unanswerable ultimatum from Germany. Germany and France are allied in a war against 
Britain, much to the consternation of  the British people. The Kaiser is attributed much of  the blame for 
the outbreak of  European war. Shiel described France as a decaying and unthreatening ‘old’ power, while 
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Russia was powerful - but ‘raw, new, and not, I don’t think, a nation at all.’ Finally, Germany was viewed as 
the ‘young’ enthusiastic aggressor, dangerous, covetous and willing to take what it could; throughout the 
novel, Germany was treated with mocking distain: Shiel ridiculed Prince Heinrich’s ‘absurd mailed fist’, the 
German acquisition of  an underwhelming possession at Kiao-Chau, and called the Kaiser the ‘German 
Cock-of-the-Walk’.141  
Eventually the Germany and France are taught a hefty lesson by British sea power and order is restored. 
Then, somewhat strangely, Wilhelm II is handed command of  a British regiment. The possibility of  
redemption for Wilhelm played upon the idea that he could be rescued from his ‘bad’ German heritage and 
restored as a ‘good’ British Prince; despite the Kaiser’s rehabilitation, Shiel blamed Germany’s training of  
the Chinese armies for the rise of  the East: 
So great was the necessity for Western methods, and Western science, in the Government of  
China, that the Chinese were actually compelled at the very time to over-come their shuddering 
racial abhorrence of  the white man, and to pay large salaries to white experts, in various 
departments, to plan and to administer. Germans drilled China’s army… 
In the end, Britain emerges victorious, defeating the eastern forces, conquering Europe and so possessing 
world dominion. Like his friend Louis Tracy in The Final War, Shiel was tempted to portray British triumph 
out of  adversity.142 His tale warned of  dangers on all fronts, but could not countenance an ultimate British 
defeat. With the rhetoric of  the finest national efficiency campaigners Shiel announced in the final chapter, 
‘England, no doubt, will, in truth, absorb the world; the Loadstone is within us. But we must change.’143 
Within one novel the combined themes of  imperial anxiety, the German Menace, and the desire for national 
efficiency were presented to a popular audience.  
These themes had clearly coalesced in E.P. Oppenheim’s Mysterious Mr Sabin, which stands as an early 
example of  invasion fiction with Germany as the aggressor. Oppenheim described an elaborate German 
plan for the invasion of  England, provoked by an imperial crisis.144 There was an indisputable link in the 
plot line to the themes of  the Kruger Telegram Crisis with thinly veiled allusions: ‘Extraordinary Telegram 
of  the German Emperor to Moenig!’ and the British despatch of  ships to ‘Delamere Bay’.145 The 
stereotypically named German Foreign Ambassador, Baron von Knignstein reveals to Mr Sabin, the spy, the 
motive and detail of  the German plot:  
“It is the ties of  kindred,” he continued, “which breed irritability, not kindliness! I tell you, my 
friend, that there is a great storm gathering. It is not for nothing that the great hosts of  my 
country are ruled by a war lord! I tell you that we are arming to the teeth, silently, swiftly, and 
with a purpose. It may seem to you a small thing, but let me tell you this—we are a jealous 
nation! And we have cause for jealousy. In whatever part of  the world we put down our foot, 
it is trodden on by our ubiquitous cousins! Wherever we turn to colonise, we are too late; 
England has already secured the finest territory, the most fruitful of  the land. We must either 
take her leavings or go a-begging! Wherever we would develop, we are held back by the 
commercial and colonising genius—it amounts to that—of  this wonderful nation. The world 
of  to-day is getting cramped. There is no room for a growing England and a growing Germany! 
So! one must give way, and Germany is beginning to mutter that it shall not always be her sons 
who go to the wall… In military circles to-day a war with England would be wildly, hysterically 
popular; and sooner or later a war with England is as certain to come as the rising of  the sun 
and the waning of  the moon! I can tell you even now where the first blow will be struck! It is 
fixed! It is to come! So!”  
“Not in Europe or in Asia! The war-torch will be kindled in Africa!”  
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“The Transvaal!” 
The themes of  German covetousness, jealousy, aggression and conspiracy against the British Empire are 
present in this extract and throughout the book. Oppenheim characterised the Germans as angry and 
frustrated by Britain; German spies and clandestine tactics feature heavily throughout the novel. Indicating 
the endurance over two years of  the tropes exposed in January 1896, Oppenheim armed his Germans with 
insidious imperial plans to undermine the British Empire. We see here one of  the clearest examples of  the 
coalescence of  various stereotypes into a clear conception of  the new Germany.  
In another future war story from 1898 J.N. Hampson described a great European war. In ‘Great Britain 
v. France and Russia’ Hampson described the war of  1900 in which France and Russia seek to attack Britain 
and her Empire. Although the war itself  sees France and Russia attacking Britain both in the Channel and 
across the Empire, Hampson’s moral was made clear: ‘Germany’s attitude towards England during the war, 
though neutral, has been consistently inimical’. In spite of  the more obvious conflict between the Franco-
Russian alliance and Britain, in fact the greatest winner from the war is Germany, which gained much of  
Britain’s trade, shipping and commerce. Thus Germany’s covetous nature had enabled it to filch away 
Britain’s imperial power: 
It has been evident for some years that this Power [Germany] has been preparing to dispute 
our commercial, colonial, and maritime supremacy, and there is a great danger that, now that 
we are just at the end of  an exhausting war...she may take the opportunity of  pressing claims 
which we could not but resist, with the result of  another war… 
Hampson’s concern was both with the immediate menace of  Russia and France, but also the true threat to 
Britain – Germany; its commercial standing, pragmatic policy and scheming official made it a greater and 
more lasting threat to Britain than France or Russia, which could be defeated by British sea power. Tying 
together the linked concerns of  the German economic and imperial menaces, Hampson’s article sent a clear 
message about the enemies of  Britain for the future.146 The theme of  Germans as underhand arbiters of  
imperial downfall was a recurrent theme in early examples of  spy novels and fictions of  future war; 
furthermore, the trope of  an invasion begun by a crisis in the Empire became a common literary device in 
invasion scare novels. William Le Queux, in his immensely popular novel, The Invasion of  1910 (1906), 
described a disagreement in Samoa resulting in a massive German invasion of  England.147 Writers regularly 
made the link between a threat somewhere in the Empire and an invasion of  Britain; any threat to the 
Empire was a threat both to the periphery and to the centre.  
The outbreak of  the South African War in 1899 led to a surge in interest in the events leading up to 
the crisis; the Jameson Raid and the Kruger Telegram were given much greater prominence, and viewed as 
instrumental to the outbreak of  war three years later. Violet Markham, writing in 1900 during the South 
African War, reflected a broad body of  opinion that Germany and the other European powers had no desire 
to help the Boers and in reality sought to use them as a vehicle to snatch portions of  the British Empire.148 
Through these popular histories and pseudo-factual accounts, the idea of  German interference in the 
Transvaal was a minimum requirement. German-Boer intrigue was widely suspected in such accounts. 
In popular literature, the German interest in the Transvaal and British imperial affairs became instantly 
recognisable; serials in journals were quick to draw upon a current theme. In 1897 the pulp-fiction writer, 
Fred M. White, broke briefly from depicting murderous Sikhs and exotic crimes in his series ‘The Master 
Criminal’; in the chapter entitled ‘The ‘Morrison Raid’ Indemnity’, White’s protagonist, the cat burglar 
Gryde, steals a case of  money sent by Germany to procure arms for the Boers in the Transvaal; the heroic 
Gryde subverts an imperial threat, whilst humiliating both the Boers and the Germans.149 The tale involved 
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a series of  negative and timely German stereotypes; largely they are portrayed as insidious and plotting. A 
mass-market author, White’s interest lay in writing material to please consumers suggesting that such a theme 
was required to be recognisable and the storyline gripping.150  
Hume Nisbet’s successful South African War adventure novel The Empire Makers (1900) contained a 
mixture of  anti-Semitism and anti-German stereotypes and blamed German influence for ‘our past failure’ 
in the Transvaal. Nisbet referred to the ‘gallant raid’ of  ‘Dr Jim’, and the lack of  ‘bona fide Britishers’ 
amongst the Transvaal Uitlander. The rest of  the population of  the Transvaal, he stated, were ‘Germans 
mostly…and they made no secret of  their deep and violent hatred of  everything British.’ Nisbet accused 
Kruger of  behaving with ‘greed and tyranny’, supported by German soldiers introduced ‘wholesale into 
their country.’ Published in 1900 at the height of  South African War mania, the novel fed upon the popular 
interest in South Africa, whilst propounding these anti-German stereotypes. Nisbet targeted an imperialist 
audience by attacking ‘anglophobia’, jealousy, and the scheming Germans who had wormed their way into 
a position of  influence in the Boer Republics. He even depicted German soldiers commanding Boer 
Commandos. His references to the Jameson Raid indicate the legacy of  the South African Crisis of  1895-
96 in colouring the representation of  Germany as an interfering and nefarious influence. Nisbet’s angered, 
jingoistic stance was representative of  a significant body of  British opinion during the South African War.151 
Seizing upon popular sentiment during the South African War Nisbet resuscitated previous narratives 
of  German brutality; The Empire Makers described in detail the brutal nature of  colonial Germans. Nisbet’s 
Germans were either Judeo-Capitalist exploiters intent upon wresting British control for their own 
Machiavellian purposes, or brutal jack-booted Prussians. The German Uitlander in the Transvaal were 
described as making ‘no secret of  their deep and violent hatred of  everything British’ picking up upon the 
perception of  German jealousy and covetousness. Nisbet also seized the opportunity to assert his views 
upon the potential of  German colonial endeavour; British rule allegedly ‘liberates and advances every land 
which she protects’ while German rule was quite opposite: 
But when Germany seizes a land she treats it as the warlike Kaffirs did. She butchers the original 
owners, and insists on all outsiders relinquishing their private rights, and becoming subjects. As 
the Kaiser has truly said, “On whatever land the German Eagle fixes its talons, that land is 
German.” This means, it is no longer free, only a German is entitled to civil rights. 
Nisbet went on to describe more brutal behaviour: ‘German mercenaries knock down, kick, and baton the 
citizens without the slightest provocation’. Nisbet’s novel was populated with the most prominent enemies 
of  the British Empire – the Boers and their German helpers. The protagonists cower under German and 
Low Dutch whips, and avoid beatings at the hands of  ‘exaggerated German metal soldiers’ who set about 
their business with cold mechanical precision. Evidently Nisbet harboured deep prejudices about the 
behaviour of  Germans in Africa; by indicating the potential for Germany to undermine Britain in this 
imperial context, Nisbet’s tale suggested the need for concern about German actions and intentions.152 In 
this popular novel Nisbet condensed the growing concerns about German efficiency, imperial intentions 
and the contrast between German autocracy and British liberalism; in so doing he linked long-developed 
imperial anxieties with the nascent German threat. In the context of  an overstretched empire, Nisbet evoked 
a new, unpleasant and dangerous new challenge in a time of  national trial. 
These literary narratives, based roughly around the period 1896-1900 indicate that British readership 
had regular access to stories depicting Germany at least as insidious, and at the worst as a threat to the 
Empire. They helped to provide a solid grounding for Germany’s new role as the British public’s most feared 
nation. Russia continued to influence such fictions, but as I.F. Clarke and Michael Matin have argued, 
Germany became the most frequent enemy of  choice in future war fiction; the narratives of  Tracy, Shiel, 
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Griffith and Oppenheim were instrumental in portraying this new enemy in mass-market narratives in the 
post-Kruger Telegram era.  
In a variety of  literary forms, journalists and authors portrayed Germany as a future naval threat to 
British global supremacy, as an unpredictable, impulsive and aggressive imperial power, and as a secretive 
and menacing enemy, not yet revealing the true extent of  its plans. These tropes were most common 
amongst nationalist and imperialist commentators and fiction writers, of  whom there were many in perhaps 
the most jingoistic and imperialistic of  periods in the long history of  the British Empire. After 1896 the 
German Menace was developed and reinvigorated into a more fixed concept, so that by 1902 mainstream 
media outlets and popular imperial celebrities – Kipling and Rosebery for example – were tempted to engage 
with this new force in British popular discourse.  
*** 
By late 1902 the German Menace, in its layered complexity, was being much more clearly articulated. On 8 
November 1902 the Daily Express discussed the Kaiser and the German Menace in detail across several 
articles, while he visited Britain. The Express, established as a rival to Northcliffe’s Daily Mail by the great 
publishing magnate C. Arthur Pearson (of  Pearson’s Magazine and Pearson’s Weekly), argued, ‘We like the Kaiser, 
for in his character we see many of  the best of  our British qualities’, reminding readers that Wilhelm was in 
fact half  British. However, conflicting with Wilhelm’s British side was his duty to the German empire; that 
duty was made more problematic due to the fact that ‘the interests of  Germany clash with the interests of  
Great Britain in every quarter of  the globe.’ Germany, the growing global and imperial threat, meant that 
Britain and the Kaiser could no longer maintain the bonds of  friendship they had cherished in the past: 
Germany cries aloud for expansion, but every desirable dumping ground for her colonists we 
already hold. She longs to establish a great merchant navy, and finds in us her stoutest 
competitors. She strives to procure new markets for her manufactures, but we have to be ousted 
first. So she hates us, with a slow, bitter, Teutonic hatred that bursts out in disgusting cartoons, 
newspaper lies, and pro-Boer demonstrations. 
The Express went on to warn that any discussion of  a treaty with Germany would be ‘folly’ because Germany 
had ‘no great reputation for her faithfulness or honest in treaty matters.’ Emphasising Germany’s potential 
treachery chimed with the themes of  conspiracy and intrigue which had intermittently been discussed since 
1896. Finally, the intention of  Germany to establish a navy was evidence to suggest that the fears of  a 
German Menace were justified. Several articles in the same edition debated the future relationship between 
Britain and Germany, detailed the naval and imperial ambitions of  Germany, their jealousy, covetousness, 
the will of  the Kaiser and the danger of  German efficiency versus British inefficiency. In so doing the 
Express¸ which often proclaimed itself  to be avowedly neutral in its stance toward Germany, described the 
growing sense of  unease in Britain. The view that, ‘The average German…looks forward to the decay of  
England and to the German inheritance of  the succession’, indicated clearly the association of  British 
decline and the German desire to steal Britain’s imperial heritage. In answer, the Express¸ looked to the 
language of  efficiency for the answer. Britain faced a choice: either ‘the good old plan of  shutting our eyes 
and drifting,’ or ‘put our own house in order, and to concentrate outlay and intellect’ in preparing Britain 
for war, in order to prevent it.153 
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The German Imperial Menace:  
Popular Discourse and British Policy, 1902-1903  
As Britain emerged from the South African War a commonly acknowledged concern about the intentions 
of  Imperial Germany prevailed in popular discourse. From December 1902 to April 1903, Germany 
featured prominently in British popular discourse, as a result of  two major international collaborations: the 
blockade of  Venezuela and the possible construction of  the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Both cases involved 
vast sums of  private and public money, and, more importantly, the foreign policy interests of  the two 
nations. The newly formed British Unionist Government under Prime Minister Arthur Balfour sought twice 
to come to mutually beneficial agreement with Germany, and was twice confronted by an unprecedented 
popular rejection of  their policy from across the political spectrum. In some ways Venezuela and Baghdad 
represented a reversal from previous years, insofar as the negative images of  Germany in popular culture 
broadly supported official policy during the 1890s, but now thwarted it. The issue of  British-German 
relations shows how the processes of  the ‘medialisation’ of  politics, increasingly prevalent in this period, 
could act both to endorse Government policy, as it had during the later 1890s, or in this case to challenge 
it. Governments in this era walked a fine line with popular sentiment, and the issue of  relations with 
Germany indicates how closely intertwined politics and culture were.  
Although there was a range of  causes for this popular rejection of  state policy, I will argue that the 
perception of  the German Menace in Britain was decisive. The danger represented by German efficiency, 
brutality, autocracy, covetousness and insidiousness helped to foment the popular outburst. Though it is 
more difficult to establish precisely the extent to which the British public agreed, there is also evidence to 
suggest that the press and literary attacks on Anglo-German cooperation were popularly supported, 
especially if  we take the view of  the press as at least partially driven by consumer demand. The right wing 
press attacked their own political parties (Conservatives and Unionists), suggesting that pragmatic editors 
positioned themselves in line with the popular consensus, despite their political allegiances.  
The intransigence of  press and popular discourse between December 1902 and April 1903 indicates 
how crucial the Kruger Telegram Crisis of  1896 was in entrenching hostility towards Germany. As argued 
in the previous chapter, by late 1902 there was a much wider perception of  a German Menace to Britain, 
and a clearer sense of  what constituted that menace. This chapter will indicate how powerful a factor the 
German Menace had become both in popular discourse, as well as in influencing political decision-making. 
During two international crises, Germany was ruthlessly attacked, and the Balfour Government was forced 
into two foreign policy U-turns, and a decisive move away from any association with Germany.  
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After 1896, with the goal of  realizing a world empire, the Kaiser’s government began to look both East 
and West for areas into which it could expand informal and formal influence.1 As well as China and the 
Middle East, the Americas were increasingly important to German strategic planners.2 With the purchase 
of  the Carolines from Spain in 1898, Germany announced clearly its interest in the Philippines in 
competition with the USA; following this, German attentions turned toward the Caribbean.3 German 
interest in South and Central America during the period before 1914 has received substantial scholarly 
coverage.4 During the 1970s and 1980s historians from Germany and America investigated the German-
American competition for the Americas during the age of  imperialism. As Matthew Seligmann more 
recently summarised, these historians argued for a geographically focussed German policy of  expansion, 
though there were those in opposition to this stance.5 Miriam Hood and Ian Forbes, in particular, 
investigated the influence of  European, and particularly German, finance capital and informal imperialism 
in Venezuela.6 Holger Herwig later argued that the Venezuela Blockade figured as part of  a wider attempt 
to establish German imperial influence in Venezuela and South America in Germany’s Vision of  Empire in 
Venezuela (1986).7 Nancy Mitchell opposed the view, propounded by Herwig and Forbes, that Germany had 
a concerted expansionist imperialist policy in South and Central America. Mitchell argued that a teleological 
approach had them into attempting to make sense of  German actions as part of  some wider plan, as 
evidenced by Fritz Fischer’s thesis about German war aims.8 Mitchell argued that the German threat to the 
hemisphere was overblown, constructed from ‘a potent mix of  German bombast and American paranoia’; 
instead, German action in the Americas was ‘timid’ rather than aggressive.9 The debate about German 
expansionism revolved largely around this dichotomy between the realities of  German plans and their 
perception in America.  
Few scholarly accounts have sought to understand the popular perceptions and implications of  the 
Venezuela Blockade from the British perspective. There remains scope for investigation of  the reasoning 
behind the press uproar and the impact this had upon the development of  anti-German sentiment in Britain. 
Little attention has devoted paid to the popular dimensions of  the Venezuela Blockade and the Baghdad 
Railway Withdrawal. However, these two linked events represent a key moment in the British popular 
demonization of  Germany. After 1903, British Governments never looked toward active cooperation with 
Germany on any substantial issue. By the end of  April 1903 the popular view of  the German Menace, 
engendered by the Kruger Telegram Crisis, was even more firmly established as an important factor in 
British society and politics. It was these pre-existing anxieties that essentially shaped the more familiar 
discourse of  the naval race; the imperial menace provided the essential lens through which these subsequent 
developments were viewed. 
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Puck, 11 February 1903 
The Venezuela Crisis, 1902-03 
By the end of  1902, amid the debate raging about British efficiency and societal regeneration, a crisis was 
developing in South America which would involve Germany and Britain. European financial houses had 
invested heavily in Venezuela over the later nineteenth century, in railways, mining and agriculture and by 
1896 British financiers had invested more than £11m, equivalent to over £600m today, and were the largest 
stakeholders.10 German and French combined investment accounted for a similar total.11 Over the 1890s a 
series of  coups d’état and civil wars had ravaged Venezuela, severely interrupting trade and payments to the 
European banking houses and investment companies.12 In October 1899 the rebel leader, Cipriano Castro, 
launched a coup from the Colombian border, successfully occupying the capital Caracas and establishing a 
new revolutionary government. Once in power Castro refused to pay the huge outstanding debts owed to 
foreign investors by the Venezuelan government and private borrowers, prompting outcry from European 
inhabitants of  Caracas.13 Although by December 1900 Castro had consented to paying back half  of  ‘the full 
monthly bond instalment’, the Venezuelan economy could barely cope, with a total debt estimated at £26.5m 
(c. £1,500,000,000 today).14  
With Venezuela’s economy ‘dogged by almost continuous revolutions and lack of  revenue’ it was clear 
that European bond holders and money lenders would not easily regain their funds.15 Venezuela was also 
important to British imperial interests due its closeness to Trinidad and its dominance of  the mouth of  the 
Orinoco River – a major trade route. Relations between Britain and Venezuela were further soured by 
British-Trinidadian support for Colombian attempts to foment a new revolution in Venezuela, and heavy 
Venezuelan tariffs on Trinidadian products resulted in several public clashes. Britain and Trinidad supported 
attempts to ruin Castro’s government, including offering shelter to Columbian pirate ships which raided 
Venezuelan trade.16 Against this turbulent back-drop the European powers and the United States were 
locked in debate about what should and could be done. In much the same way as over Egypt in 1882, 
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throughout 1900-02 the European powers deliberated over what action should be taken to gain reparations 
for the debts owed by Venezuela. Resolutions for action by individual powers were delayed due to the 
possibility of  a change of  Venezuelan Government during 1900 and 1901, and concern over the position 
of  the USA also led to indecision by the British, German and Italians.  
Before the crisis the British Government was concerned that Germany might act alone in Venezuela 
to recoup its claims; as Nancy Mitchell argued, this might ‘embarrass’ Britain and so the British Foreign 
Office, now under Lord Lansdowne, began to subtly communicate with Germany over the possibility of  
joint action. Germany was positive and the ambassador in London, Count Metternich, contacted 
Lansdowne in July 1902 to suggest that cooperation would be ‘thoroughly favored [sic.]’’ by Germany.17 
They were keen to have the involvement of  Britain in this venture, and as Kennedy and Mitchell have 
argued, desired to improve Anglo-German relations publicly through joint action. Kennedy argued that this 
desire for popular approval came as a result of  a desire to prevent future panic over Germany’s growing 
fleet in Britain. Once cooperation was agreed, Britain took the driving seat.18 In early November Kaiser 
Wilhelm II visited Britain and met with members of  the British Government and King Edward VII, and at 
Sandringham on 11 November Lansdowne and Bülow came to a formal agreement that Britain and 
Germany would coerce Venezuela to recoup outstanding claims and would not sign a peace treaty separately. 
Britain had willingly agreed to act, and the Unionist Government expected that the United States 
Government would not take issue with the act, nor would it cause any great stir in the press.19 Discussing 
the Kaiser’s mysterious visit to Britain in November 1902 the Spectator invoked Germany’s past record of  
betrayal and conspiracy by raising suspicion of  its aims and objectives: 
We may dislike the Emperor’s autocratic and tyrannical spirit, his restless ambition, and his 
determination to take from Britain if  he can the proud position that is now held by her, yet we 
cannot but admire the eager, active spirit in which he pushes and presses every point to the 
utmost as long as it is to the advantage of  his own Empire…But our admiration for the German 
Emperor must not prevent us watching him and his designs closely, and endeavouring to make 
clear what those designs are. 
The article was rich with the themes of  the German Menace, as developed since 1896. Wilhelm was 
‘autocratic’ and ‘tyrannical’, had ‘restless ambition’ and would eventually seek to take from Britain what it 
held dear. Allusions were made to the ‘deeply hostile’ German people, and their desire for ‘sea-power’ and 
‘world-empire’. The Spectator warned, with remarkable foresight, that Wilhelm was likely seeking support for 
one of  his imperialist pet projects - the Baghdad Railway.20 The article was widely reported across the British 
press and had the desired impact in drawing debate. Balfour responded to it in a speech at Mansion House 
the following Monday referring to the ‘wildest and most fantastic inventions’ in the British press.21 Yet 
Balfour’s attempts to allay increasingly negative comment about Germany in the British press were futile.  
On 7 December Germany and Britain issued a joint ultimatum to Venezuela demanding the repayment 
of  outstanding debts; a British fleet of  8 was joined by four German ships.22 On 9 December with no 
response from Castro’s Venezuelan Government, acted to seize the entire Venezuelan fleet, capturing all 
but one ship within two days. During the action Germany scuttled two Venezuelan ships leading to criticism 
in the British press. Under British leadership, the two fleets bombarded the town of  Puerto Cabello as 
punishment for an insult to the British flag; this too was unwelcome news.23 Expecting President Castro to 
quickly capitulate under this display of  strength, Germany and Britain were surprised when he arrested 
hundreds of  Germans and Britons in Caracas, and on 13 December submitted a claim for arbitration to the 
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United States. Venezuela, officially under the protection of  the USA under the principles of  the Monroe 
Doctrine, therefore sought to embroil Germany and Britain in a much wider crisis. Britain reacted quickly 
seeking to pre-empt the American response and attempted to quickly establish a blockade of  Venezuela. 
However, deficiency in communication led to much confusion, and by the time British ships instituted their 
blockade on 20 December, the British Government informed Washington that they would willingly submit 
to American arbitration, closely followed by Germany.24  
The negotiations between the British and German governments over Venezuela had been achieved 
without alarm in Britain.25 However, the sinking of  the ships and the bombardment of  Puerto Cabello had 
soured the public mood. Most notable amidst the growing popular anger toward the government’s actions 
was Rudyard Kipling who exerted his considerable public influence with his poem, ‘The Rowers’, published 
in the Times on 22 December 1902.26 Kipling’s evocative and impassioned verse both articulated and 
informed British popular opinion; the German ‘anglophobia’ of  only months before was neither forgiven, 
nor forgotten: ‘The dead they mocked are scarcely cold’. Furthermore, Kipling expressed the common fear 
that Britain had placed itself  ‘at the will of  the breed that wronged us most’. Finally, Kipling evoked 
memories of  the Boxer War of  1900, the Kaiser’s bullish ‘Hunnenrede’, with his reference to the ‘the Goth 
and shameless Hun’. The language and imagery he used was powerful, and appeared to capture and 
crystallize a widespread public mood. ‘The Rowers’ marked the beginning of  two months’ sustained press 
agitation against cooperation with Germany.  
In early December the Manchester Guardian immediately called for clarification of  German plans. The 
Guardian was usually one of  the least aggressive of  British newspapers, though it agreed with the justification 
for action on the basis of  recouping illegally seized loans.27 The Economist, which generally took a more 
critical line, wrote about the contrasting foreign policies of  Britain and Germany: ‘There are almost always 
two opinions upon the amount of  severity which it is right or expedient to use, and the German opinion 
seldom leans to the milder side.’ Furthermore, whilst claiming not to ‘pass judgement upon them’ The 
Economist also stated that ‘it is permissible not to wish to be associated with them.’28 American newspapers 
delighted in the British press reaction to the Anglo-German agreement over Venezuela. The Chicago Daily 
Tribune, for example, listed reports in Britain’s daily press; it quoted the Daily News’s accusation that the 
Kaiser had ‘stolen’ British ‘independence’ and its criticism of  the Government for involving Britain in 
‘operations little removed from piracy.’ Other British dailies argued that any alliance risked enraging America. 
The Daily Mail, Standard, Spectator, Speaker, Saturday Review, Echo and Outlook all argued that Britain should 
either act alone, or more commonly go straight to the US Government for arbitration in the issue.29 The 
Mail in particular grew increasingly opposed to the alliance with Germany in this period, questioning 
whether the hapless government actually had a ‘plan’ at all.30 The Yorkshire Post joined calls for a swift 
resolution of  an increasingly risky situation, stating ‘Germany is not so popular in this country at the present 
time…’31  
Sir Robert Giffen, a famed British economist, wrote a public letter to the Times in which he argued that 
no worse ally could have been chosen for ‘this fatuous business’. Giffen stated that Germany was ‘a fatal 
partner’, and a ‘deadly rival’ that intended ‘an attack upon England at a convenient opportunity’; his espousal 
of  ideas concomitant with the German Menace concluded with the warning that Germany would seize 
Venezuelan territory with no fear of  American hostility - the only solution was to escape the alliance as 
quickly as possible.32 Increasingly newspapers and contributors warned of  the ‘danger’ of  cooperation, or 
even allowing Germany to ‘lead us by the hand’ into a catastrophe.33 By the end of  December the British 
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press was briefly placated by the news that Germany had agreed to submit to American arbitration, as a 
result, the Daily Mail claimed, of  public pressure.34  
The uproar was explained by contemporaries in various terms. Firstly, it was felt that Britain, standing 
to recoup the smallest share of  the money owed, should act quickly and leave once it had secured its own 
share. Increasingly it was recognised that Britain was acting as much to gain retribution for the seizure of  
British ships (which had been rumoured to be carrying contraband) as it was to recoup Venezuela’s debts. 
Secondly, a common motif  was concern that interference might provoke the anger of  the United States. 
Many refused to contemplate any regression in recently improved relations with the USA; American 
sensitivity was, at least initially, the greatest concern for newspapers across the political spectrum. The third 
factor, and the one which became most prominent as the Blockade wore on, was British association with 
Germany. It is important to understand that although the anger at any collaboration with Germany was the 
leading force in the popular outcry, the other factors are inseparable from it. The lack of  any real possibility 
of  recouping the finances of  British bankers, added to concern about relations with America, helped to 
catalyse anti-German opinion; during this crisis, Germany was an unwanted and undesirable partner.  
In early January, continuing in the belief  that the blockade would soon be settled, newspapers began to 
offer their verdict on the crisis. Increasingly the themes of  the German Menace were offered as the major 
motivation for leaving the alliance. The Manchester Guardian reminded its readership that blame lay with the 
whole Unionist Government for repeatedly seeking flawed and perilous deals with Germany.35 ‘Patriae Quis 
Exul’, wrote for the Contemporary Review that: 
Germany can never be our friend…[e]conomically, because she has the same aims as we 
have…; politically, because her position between France and Russia…she must make for 
expansion and for command of  the sea-coasts… [and] ‘psychologically, because the German 
peoples are by nature envious, hostile to England, and tend to become more so.  
The lengthy article summed up in plain English that which is latent in many other expressions of  opinion 
at the time: ‘This one thing let us remember. Could Germany crush us, she would.’36 For this proponent of  
the German Menace, no alliance or cooperation could be contemplated because of  the economic 
competition, expansionism, and the natural jealousy and hostility of  the German people. The Daily Express 
reported a fictional tale published in ‘the Berlin daily with the largest local circulation’, in which ‘an 
Imaginitive German Captures the British Navy’ using magnetism. Oskar Klaussman’s story, whilst of  poor 
literary quality, seemed to indicate the ‘mutual unfriendliness’ felt in both camps, and was used by the Express 
to show the untrustworthiness of  their supposed partner in Venezuela.37  
These examples indicate how, across press coverage of  the crisis, themes about Germany’s 
conspiratorial and untrustworthy nature were present throughout the crisis. On 30 January Viscount 
Cranborne, under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, publicly acknowledged to the Sheffield Chamber of  
Commerce that the press had been at least partially justified in their criticism: 
It was a mess (Hear, hear)...undoubtedly it was a mess, but we must not be afraid of  that. It was 
necessary in order to defend our interests.38 
Cranborne was then heckled by the crowd; the Manchester Guardian remarked that an audience member 
exclaimed that ‘he had no objection to our coercing Venezuela, but why did we make a German alliance? 
(“Hear, hear,” and a voice “Why?”).’39 Cranborne’s admission of  the mess only encouraged the newspapers 
to attack the Government’s ineptitude more viciously. Many publications sought to explain how Britain had 
become embroiled in the ‘mess’; in spite of  the fact that in reality it had been the British government who 
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had sought the collaboration with Germany, for several weeks the Mail ran the line that Britain had somehow 
been co-opted into a situation which would only benefit Germany.40 ‘The Trap’ into which Britain had been 
lured could only end in failure and a potential diplomatic conflagration with the United States.41 Insidious 
Germany had sought to damage British relations with America and so to weaken the two powers.42 The 
Manchester Guardian summarised the talk of  the streets:  
It is often suggested that Germany is deliberately edging us into this dilemma, hoping that our 
Government’s promise to her at the opening of  the “war” will be kept, that England and the 
United States will be alienated from each other, and that Germany, the all-invading Germany 
of  the dreams of  nervous Imperialists, will then tackle the divided might of  the Anglo-Saxon 
race by sections in a great bid for the supremacy of  the world. 
Following this succinct summary of  the themes of  the German Menace, the Manchester Guardian sought to 
dismiss such rumour-mongering.43 However, it was alone in suggesting that association with Germany was 
not perilous. Until long after the ending of  the Blockade, public and press were seemingly united in 
consternation over the ‘alliance’ with Germany.44 The London correspondent of  the New York Times 
described the uneasiness felt in Britain ‘owing to the aggressive action of  their partner in this unfortunate 
business.’ Furthermore, the New York Times claimed that the British public could be regularly heard 
exclaiming, ‘If  only we could escape from this entanglement with Germany!’45 
After the agreement to arbitration on 18 December, the most significant event of  the crisis was the 
German bombardment of  the Fort of  San Carlos, provoked, the Germans claimed, by Venezuelan 
bombardment of  the Panther as it entered the Maracaibo lagoon. The Germans flattened the fort town, 
killing several civilians in the process; their actions caused outrage with both the British naval command in 
the Caribbean and with the British and American press.46 This minor military event only went to prove to 
the British that Germany could not be trusted – an upstart, aggressive and cold-hearted ally. Despite the 
relatively smooth procedure of  the blockade itself  the press coverage and public outcry could not have been 
more outraged. Reports spoke in terms of  cruelty, suffering and the German murder of  ‘harmless Indian 
fishermen’.47 The Times correspondent reported on 21 January that according to correspondence from 
Berlin, ‘There were no orders…; the German commander used his discretion. Perhaps it was his indiscretion 
that he used.’48 The heavy-handedness of  the German ships in Venezuela had been repeatedly mentioned 
during the first month of  the crisis, and this bombardment of  the Venezuelan coast appeared to vindicate 
such views; German military brutality was viciously attacked across the British press. The signposts of  the 
German Menace were ever more present with attacks upon cruel and brutal German methods. Rumours 
even spread that the association of  Britain to ‘so high-handed and so ill-advised’ a power as Germany might 
even have resulted in war if  President Roosevelt had not remained so ‘cool-headed’ during the crisis.49 Such 
reports imagined that Britain, dragged at Germany’s heals, might be dragged into a war with a friendly nation 
due to the aggression and autocracy by now commonly associated with Germany 
As the ‘muddle’ came to its diplomatic conclusion, criticism shifted towards the foreign secretary, 
Lansdowne, and the Government as a whole.50 Balfour’s Conservative-Unionist Cabinet fought to defend 
its position but were heavily criticised, less about the acts of  coercion than the ‘alliance’ with Germany. 
Austen Chamberlain, the Postmaster General, and soon to be announced Chancellor, attempted to defend 
the actions of  the government at the annual dinner of  the Birmingham Jewellers and Silversmiths’ 
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Association on 2 February 1903. He was forced to admit that ‘[i]t would be idle for him to affect to ignore 
the unpopularity of  that co-operation or to pretend surprise that it was not very popular in this country.’ 
He took the step of  warning ‘those who lightly used the great powers of  the press and the sources of  public 
information to poison the relations between two great nations’ from creating further difficulties in 
international relations.  
Balfour, Lansdowne and other prominent ministers consistently argued that although co-operation with 
Germany had proved to be deeply unpopular, it would be folly not to honour the agreement early, based on 
‘sentiment alone’.51 When Prime Minister Arthur Balfour returned to the public eye after a period of  ill-
health, he attempted to distance himself  from the decision-making surrounding the Sandringham meeting 
in November. Nevertheless, he was forced to defend Government policy; like Austen Chamberlain, he also 
chastised the press for ‘fomenting international animosities’, which the New York Times argued was ‘the 
obvious resource of  a statesmen at a loss to find argument wherewith to combat the legitimate criticisms 
of  the recognized organs of  public opinion.’52 Balfour also sought to employ an argument similar to 
Chamberlain’s in his public address in Liverpool on Friday 13 February:  
I do not in the least understand, and I have never been able to understand, the causes which 
have produced it [animosity] in Germany, but I do understand the causes which have produced 
it in this country. They are intelligible enough. They are causes with which it is impossible not 
to sympathise. - (Hear, hear.)….If  I could influence public opinion in this direction it would be 
to implore all those who have any command over the sources of  public opinion to remember 
that a great responsibility attaches to any man who indulges in the easy, the facile task of  
embittering the relations between two countries.53  
Balfour found it impossible to argue that the British public was anything other than set against Germany, 
and was unable to challenge that animosity; he only pleaded with the press to keep them quiet. Balfour was 
aware of  the ‘international jealousies’ of  other powers, and the chance that ‘a possible danger may arise in 
consequence of  the jealousies of  one of  the great European States in connection with these less civilised 
communities’, i.e. colonial possessions. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of  the time clearly acknowledged 
the power of  the press and popular opinion to sour international relationships; he naively hoped that by 
persuasion he could inspire a change in popular discourse, but was to be disappointed. Sir Edward Grey 
reflected later the same year:  
I will say this—that really public opinion is the great factor in these matters, and if  two peoples 
really convince each other, through the Press and other channels, that they wish each other well, 
it is worth more to those two nations than if  a treaty of  alliance were made. 
Two of  the greatest politicians of  their age both admitted, in reflection upon the Venezuela and Baghdad 
Railway crises, that ultimately British popular opinion was a vital factor in any political decision-making; 
even, Grey suggested, more important than formal alliance agreements.54 Balfour tried, and failed, to 
counteract the increasingly powerful currents of  popular opinion presenting; this appears to be strong 
evidence of  the increasingly pervasive democratisation of  politics.  
The Prime Minister’s Liverpool Speech failed to convince the public of  the justification for an alliance 
with Germany, and led to heavy criticism from an angry Tory press; national confidence in policy-making 
was damaged as a result: ‘The Ministry rushed into the alliance without having the slightest idea what it was 
doing, and refused to abandon it because of  pledges carelessly given to Germany.’55 To the London 
Correspondent of  the New York Times the press outcry was seen to be less a press creation than a ‘mirror 
of  public thought and sentiment.’ The correspondent claimed that Balfour’s ‘lofty philosophical disdain’ 
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made clear his detachment from the British public mood. His critics sought to make clear to Balfour and 
his Government that the majority of  the British public would not countenance any alliance with Germany.56  
The Liberals joined in the criticism of  the Government and in spite of  past dismissals of  anti-German 
sentiment, evidently sought to follow ‘public opinion’. Sir Edward Grey, an increasingly influential Liberal 
opponent, remarked that, ‘He was not surprised that co-operation with Germany was not popular in this 
country at the present time’ and that though Germany should not be treated unfairly, Grey was relieved that 
‘public opinion…was pressing upon our Government that they must not pledge their word again lightly in 
a matter of  this kind…’57 Similarly, Lord Tweedmouth, an outspoken Liberal Peer, attacked Government 
policy for combining with a country: 
whose claims were totally different from our claims, whose methods were different from our 
methods, whose idea of  policy was different from our idea of  policy, and whose ulterior objects 
with regard to that part of  the world were different from ours. 58 
Those ulterior motives, it was inferred by the Manchester Guardian, were the seizure by Germany of  colonial 
territory in South America, a policy which would have seriously endangered Britain’s future friendship with 
the USA and encroached upon Britain’s trade.59 These Liberal statements were likely intended as a message 
to the Government that Germany, based on its record of  untrustworthiness, should no longer be considered 
as a potential partner in any enterprise.  
In spite of  the attempts of  the Unionist government to save face, the press and public figures continued 
to be vocal in their attacks upon Germany, and Government collaboration. The Conservative MP Ian 
Malcolm even attacked his own party colleagues. Malcolm claimed that the Government had allowed Britain 
to be ‘dragged at the heels of  Germany’ and in future it would be ‘very difficult for him to follow the policy 
of  a Government in favour of  German co-operation.’60 The Mail led a self-righteous crusade against the 
‘morass’, ‘imbroglio’ and ‘entanglement’ in which Britain had been ensnared. Concerns in leading articles 
varied from threatening warnings of  increasing American hostility, warning of  the menace of  Germany and 
repeatedly stating the terrible ‘net results’ of  the ‘mess’ for Britain.61  
With articles typical of  the Edwardian malaise of  pessimism, the Mail, which sold 850,000 copies per 
day throughout January and February 1903, continuously reminded the public of  Britain’s disgrace.62 
Furthermore, it claimed the ‘preposterous alliance’ had resulted in Germany controlling British policy 
‘entirely’. At the will of  Germany, ‘with her truculence and Machiavellian devices’, the affair could have 
drifted ‘into anything’.63 The example of  Venezuela was used to further the argument that the Kaiser and 
Bülow’s desire for a greater fleet and a world role could only be a bad thing; the Mail argued:  
that while great naval power in the hands of  Britain cannot constitute a menace, in the hands 
of  Germany it will be a grave peril to the world, the more so as the recent history of  German 
policy is one of  daring aggression, and as the want of  space at home compels Germany to 
conquer colonies of  others or perish. 
Germany’s colonial and global ambitions were foremost in the British popular sphere. Naturally, concerns 
increasingly turned toward home waters after 1903, as Kennedy himself  argued, but this ‘colonial’ ‘menace’, 
and ‘grave peril to the world’ is an underestimated element in the mind of  the British paranoiac.64  
In mid-February the American arbitrator, Herbert W. Bowen, laid the foundations for a final settlement 
of  British, Italian and German claims against Venezuela but the British press outburst showed no sign of  
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abating. The Mail was joined by commentators from the Times, Fortnightly Review and even the liberal 
Manchester Guardian in announcing their own condemnation of  the ‘miserable affair’;65 many lengthy articles 
summarised attitudes towards Germany.66 British author and critic, Sydney Brooks, discussed the 
‘Venezuelan Imbroglio’ at length in his diatribe in February’s Fortnightly Review; Brooks captured the general 
tone of  the period: ‘the aloofness of  Government, the way in which Government…runs from time to time 
full-tilt against the almost unanimous opinion of  the country.’ This comment was indicative of  the sense of  
frustration felt in the British populace; Brooks argued that ‘nearly all’ of  the current Cabinet had ‘quite 
astonishingly failed to gauge the feelings of  the public.’ Although he did not advocate the American ‘glass-
house’ style of  governance, which he equated to ‘subjugation to the ‘incorrigible mob’, he stated that British 
‘democratic fact’ was distant from British democratic ideals. Even stronger, Brooks argued that the current 
administration had, due to ‘Court influence’ (i.e. King Edward VII), a natural pro-German stance, allied to 
‘an immense ignorance of  public sentiment’.  
Brooks related his broader points to the current situation, claiming that there had ‘not been a moment 
since 1895 when they [the British public] were not interested in the matter of  Anglo-German relations.’ 
Indeed, he went as far as to say that British opinion had ‘been steadily revolting from the pro-German 
tendencies that have directed her foreign policy for the last thirty years’; on the Venezuelan issue, Brooks 
was even willing to question ‘whether the English masses have ever been more determined on any great, 
and more or less abstract, question of  external politics than they are on this.’67 The reasons he offered reflect 
the ideas I have argued were inherent in the German Menace since 1896: 
They have not forgotten the Kaiser’s telegram to Mr. Krueger…Still less have they forgotten 
the ‘foul and filthy lies’ poured out upon the British Army,…upon all Englishmen. They realise 
that though the Kaiser may personally be friendly to England, his people are not. They see that 
public opinion in Germany has for years past been openly and viciously hostile…The savagery 
of  German hatred and contempt. 
Brooks went on to remind the reader of  the indignation felt in Britain as a result of  the Kruger Telegram, 
and the disrespect and disdain with which Chancellor Bülow referred to Great Britain. To further his point, 
Brooks stated that the ‘immense majority of  Englishmen’ agreed: 
that an agreement with Germany is no longer possible as a basis for British policy abroad; that 
what Germany wants is what England now possesses; that her longing for sea-power, colonies, 
and commercial dominion can only be realised at England’s expense;…that the aims of  Great 
Britain and Germany are too much alike for their interests to be identical; that the countries, in 
short, are natural rivals, and not natural allies.  
From these comments it is evident that Brooks believed that colonial competition and global antagonism 
were the ultimate reason for the ‘sense of  outraged national dignity’ currently being expressed in Britain.68 
Brooks’s view was symptomatic of  the coalescence over the past seven years of  the perception of  a 
more generalised German threat to British interests. He was not the only proponent of  this outlook; British 
opinion had increasingly been concerned by Germany’s activities across the world, and the rejection of  
Government policy during the Venezuela Blockade represented key point of  intensification. At the least, by 
the end of  1903 the political Right was dominated by men warning loudly of  a German Menace to the 
British Empire. However, newspapers, spokesmen and politicians of  all persuasions were increasingly drawn 
to recognize the popular mood and declare their own distaste for cooperation with Germany. Brooks was 
by no means alone in emphasising the tarnished reputation of  Germany in British eyes.  
The Times’s leading article on 17 February dismissed the ‘imperfectly’ developed Government 
understanding of  popular opinion – that it was ‘a passing wave of  resentment, aroused by the anti-British 
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demonstrations in Germany during the late war.’ Rather, Germany’s Anglophobia had only served to force 
the British public, ‘to review their relations with Germany for some years past…’ from which they drew ‘the 
conclusion…that the general trend of  German policy has not been favourable to British interests.’ The 
Times echoed the Mail and others in stating, ‘Until that impression is removed by something more convincing 
than fair words the unwillingness of  this country to enter into further engagements with Germany is not 
likely to disappear.’69 The Times directly referred to the increasingly popular perception of  Germany as a 
danger to Britain. The Mail similarly argued: ‘It is all-important for the Cabinet to recognise that Germany 
cannot be counted as a friend, but as a secret and insidious enemy.’70  
The Venezuela Blockade provides strong evidence for the suggestion, made in the previous chapter, 
that by late 1902, Germany was widely perceived as a menace to Britain and its Empire. The extent and 
unanimity of  anti-German press views from December 1902 to February 1903 suggest that the popular 
attitudes had shifted decisively over the past seven years to a resoundingly negative stance. The stereotypes 
typical of  British imperial anxieties from the 1880s and 1890s – enemy jealousy, conspiracy and autocracy – 
were inherent during the Venezuela blockade press outburst. Articles referred to the open desire of  
Germany to undermine the British Empire and eventually to steal it away from the English. Germany was 
variously discussed as a malign and untrustworthy partner, or even plotting to attack and undermine Britain. 
At other times the brutality, aggression and dangerous impulses of  the German Government and its military 
were feared and attacked. These themes could be found juxtaposed in many newspaper formats and from 
all political persuasions. Finally, the change of  government policy that the press and public engendered 
suggests that by this time the Government, despite its desire to cooperate with Germany and keep its 
options open, was forced to follow the tide of  popular opinion and back down from unilateral action with 
Germany. The desire to maintain a strong relationship with America was without doubt a key factor in the 
initial press reaction, but the clear distaste and concern about Germany was inseparable from these other 
factors. The widespread popular perception of  a German Menace had influenced political decision-making, 
pushing the Government to submit to American arbitration.  
The British Withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway Negotiations 
Following the finalisation of  the Washington Protocols, the image of  Germany in British popular discourse 
had soured to the extent that the press now actively looked for other causes to vent, and play upon, popular 
anger and fears. In the two months following the Venezuela Crisis, the British press began for the first time 
to draw significant attention to the growth of  the Germany navy. Though this particular fear slowly grew 
to dominate the imagination of  the British – especially with the spiralling naval armaments race of  the later 
1900s – attention was soon diverted back to another global and imperial issue. At this stage, the British Navy 
was still vastly superior and concerns about a naval challenge remained based in the long-term. However, 
the fact that Germany increasingly became viewed as a challenger to the British navy provided further 
evidence to press commentators of  the growing German Menace to the British Empire.71 
As the furore over Anglo-German collaboration in Venezuela cooled during March 1903, the 
Conservative-Unionist Government - led by its ill-fated Prime Minister Balfour and Foreign Minister 
Lansdowne - were once again dealing with Wilhelm II’s Germany in negotiations over the construction of  
a Railway line connecting Berlin to the Persian Gulf  – known commonly as the Baghdadbahn or Berlin-
Baghdad Railway. The ailing Ottoman Empire – the ‘sick man’ of  Europe – had been at the centre of  ‘Great 
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Power politics’ for the past decade and more. Central to the concern and competition for hegemony in the 
Near East was the issue of  rail transport – connecting the Eastern provinces of  the Ottoman Empire and 
access to the Persian Gulf  to Eastern Europe. As Bradford Martin stated, the nineteenth century was the 
age ‘of  great railway construction’ and in his view ‘imperialism and railway construction ran parallel’.72 For 
most of  the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia had been the two external powers vying for influence 
over Ottoman lands and Persia. As a result of  this cold conflict, little infrastructural investment had been 
put in place by either power, so that both Persia and Ottoman territories were left poorly connected at the 
end of  the century. With the rising importance of  Germany and the overt efforts of  Wilhelm’s governments 
to build a relationship with Turkey, the ‘game’ quickly became ‘three-cornered’. 73  
Since the mid-1890s German strategists had been contemplating an extension of  the railway line from 
Konia in Eastern Turkey, to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. The Ottoman leadership wished to connect its 
eastern provinces with Haidar Pasha (Istanbul/Constantinople) and in so doing strengthen its own internal 
cohesion. To the Turkish Sultanate, Germany represented a new force, untainted by the experiences of  the 
past century; France, Russia and Britain had repeatedly placed pressure onto the Ottomans under increasing 
territorial competition. Sultan Abdul Hamid II hoped that Germany could be used as a vital ally and investor 
for connecting the Ottoman territories and combatting European colonial hegemonic interests.74  
German motivations were manifold. Firstly, Germany’s growing industrial economy of  the late-
nineteenth century was resource-hungry, and a cheaper, quicker route to markets in Asia and Africa would 
be a major boon. Furthermore, a faster route to the riches of  India was highly coveted. Claims were made 
that the route could shorten the journey by up to three days.75 Power-politically, the Baghdad Railway was 
seen as a prestige project. By gaining the concession from the Ottoman authorities in 1899, Wilhelm had 
succeeded in trumping a British tender. And finally the Berlin to Baghdad railway was the first instance when 
Wilhelm II’s Weltpolitik ‘took concrete form’. Germany’s desire to push eastwards - the Drang nach Osten – 
was lauded as the reasoning for this ambitious grand project. Finally, strategically, McMeekin argues, like 
many British thinkers of  the time, that the Baghdadbahn was seen by Wilhelm and his government as a 
strategic asset. Any future war, be it with Britain, or any other Great Power – the United States for example 
– would doubtless be dominated by a fight for resources. Germany’s position in the centre of  the European 
continent left her prone to blockade. A route to the Persian Gulf, across land and protected from naval 
bombardment, would provide a vital route for supplies.76 
In spite of  Germany’s successful acquisition of  construction rights, the Imperial Government failed to 
attain enough financial capital for the project. With this failure to finance the railway alone, they were forced 
to seek financial backing outside of  the German market. As early as 1901 the German government had 
approached Britain with proposals for British financial investment in the railway project. Initially the British 
Government, in light of  the war in South Africa, were unwilling to incur the anger of  Russia by unbalancing 
the situation in the Near East. However, with the end of  the South African War in 1902 the Marquis of  
Lansdowne, the new Foreign Secretary in Balfour’s Government, was convinced that Britain should be 
involved in this ‘international’ venture.77 His thinking was that Britain should hold a stake in the seemingly 
inevitable construction of  the railway – a potential counterbalance to Russian power in the Middle East.78 
Aloof  to the change in popular attitude towards Russia, the British Government was still mostly concerned 
by Russian, not German, ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.79 
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Frank M. McMurry, The Geography of  the Great War (New York, 1919), p. 6 
The Kaiser’s focus upon the Middle East as an imperial project has been the topic of  many historical 
and popular studies. As early as 1917 Morris Jastrow argued that the Baghdad Railway itself  should be seen 
as a major cause for the start of  the war.80 Up to the 1980s scholars debated the link between international 
tension caused by the Baghdad Railway in the pre-war years and the outbreak of  hostilities.81 Recent 
historical accounts have been limited in number with significant room for further study in a variety of  areas, 
including popular perceptions of  the Baghdad Railway. Peter Hopkirk’s popular history, On Secret Service East 
of  Constantinople (1994), and Sean McMeekin’s The Berlin-Baghdad Express (2010) described the Kaiser’s dreams 
to for German expansion into the Middle East and to bring down the British empire’ via the Middle East.82 
Both argued that the Kaiser desired to eventually invade India and secure ‘world power’.83 Others have 
examined German policy toward the declining Ottoman Empire as an example of  ‘Finanzimperialismus’ 
(financial imperialism).84 Donald McKale studied Germany’s interests in the Near and Middle East and 
showed how Germany was covertly involved in Egypt, Persia and Ottoman Turkey.85  
There has been, then, some recognition that the Middle East, as a whole, constituted an important part 
of  Germany’s developing plans for empire. The Kaiser’s repeated attempts to gain closer relations and 
concessions from Turkey during the late 1880s indicate this most clearly.86 However, Richard M. Francis’s 
1973 article represents the only detailed discussion of  the British withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway 
negotiations in 1903. Francis suggested that more than simply responding to public pressure, as argued in 
the historiography before him,87 the negotiations were hijacked by Joseph Chamberlain to launch his 
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campaign for Tariff  Reform.88 Contemporaries and participants all believed in the efficacy of  the press 
campaign, and the popularity of  the withdrawal from the agreement, even if  doubts have been raised by 
some about the subtleties of  reasoning behind the Unionist government’s U-turn.89 In recent historiography 
the event has received little recognition. Nevertheless, it represented a peak of  interest in Britain towards 
German informal imperialism before the beginning of  a clearly defined international antagonism.  
Negotiations over the relative share of  the parties involved – including German, French and British 
financial groupings backed by governments – were on-going. The British group was led ‘by London 
investment banks, Barings and Morgan, under the supervision of  the Foreign Office’.90 In February 1903 
Lansdowne repeated his will that railway shouldn’t be built ‘without a sufficient participation on the part of  
this country’, and that ‘the line should, as far as possible, be placed upon an international basis, so that no 
part of  it would be controlled or guarded by a single Power’.91 Calling for negotiations in Paris, in February 
1903 the German government offered an improved agreement on the Baghdad Railway board:  
The Anatolian Railway Company 10%                     
The French Group 25%                         
The German Group 25%                          
The British Group 25%                           
The other countries, Austria, Switzerland, etc., 15%92 
Through March and into April, terms of  cooperation were hammered out between Arthur Gwinner 
(Chairman of  the German-backed Anatolian Railway Company) and the British consortium, although no 
acceptable terms could yet be established.93  
At the end of  March and beginning of  April rumours spread amongst the British press that Britain and 
Germany were once again drawn into discussions. On 4 April the Spectator warned:  
This being so, the Government, if  they are wise, will allay public anxiety by giving the country 
an early assurance that the rumours as to their contemplated action have no foundation; and 
that if  at any time they are approached by Germany on the subject of  the Baghdad Railway 
they are determined to meet all projects of  co-operation with a decided negative.94 
Days later a question to Balfour in the House of  Commons revealed to the general public that the British 
government was once again in collaboration with the interests of  the German government.95 This disclosure 
prompted a sharp press outcry akin to the Venezuela blockade. The Spectator and the right-wing National 
Review led the press attacks – yet the outburst was not limited to the journals. Again, the same anti-German 
themes reared their head; the project itself  was imagined as some kind of  conspiracy to undermine British 
influence, and to further the plans of  Germany for World Empire. On 8 April the Daily Telegraph 
sensationally exclaimed: ‘Nothing can now prevent them [Germany] from planting themselves across the 
shortest overland route to India.’96 The Manchester Guardian stated that any negotiation with Germany would 
‘inspire considerable uneasiness’ in Britain; it argued involvement in the Baghdad Railway would represent 
‘a far more perilous adventure than the Venezuelan “mess”’.97 Across Britain, daily newspapers condemned 
the Government’s policy of  negotiation. The Chronicle and the Globe argued that a vote in Parliament should 
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be required before any Government action. The Dublin Freeman’s Journal warned that working again with 
Germany would represent an ‘unparalleled blunder’. The Daily News sarcastically questioned: 
Would it not be better for us to become tributaries of  Germany at once? Would not Lord 
Lansdowne and Lord Cranborne look better in German uniforms?98 
The Liverpool Daily Post expressed its dismay that the Prime Minister seemed aloof  to ‘the strong feeling of  
hostility in this country to any co-operation with Germany’.99 The Daily Mail repeated its warnings from the 
Venezuela Crisis; it emphasised the insidiousness of  Germany and prophesied that the only reason Germany 
sought Britain’s help was to act as financier, ‘scapegoat’ and ‘buffer’ against Russia.100 Furthermore, 
Germany’s plans supposedly represented a ‘grave danger’ to Britain: 
Then to admit the “pushful” German on to the Persian Gulf  would be as great a sacrifice as to 
see Russia installed there. England’s policy has been for years to preserve India from any 
menace such as the possession of  a port in the Persian Gulf, and we are now asked to abandon 
that policy.101 
In press coverage a key concern was the possibility that involvement in the railway would cause anger in 
Russia. British publications argued that to keep Russia happy was a primary concern; many even argued that 
seeking closer relations with France and Russia was far more desirable than any association with Germany. 
This represented a clear step-change from the ‘russophobia’ of  the 1880s and 1890s. Beyond the concern 
of  a conflagration with Russia in the Near East, it was increasingly common to refer to the plans of  
Germany as an imperial power; Germany was increasingly ‘“pushful” and aggressive’. 102  
The Fortnightly Review wrote despairingly that there was good reason to believe ‘a Venezuelan partnership 
in the Near East’ was seemingly inevitable. The Fortnightly’s belief  was that ‘the events through which we are 
passing must mark some definite point of  departure in our international relations’.103 The Fortnightly 
predicted that the nation’s future depended upon the foreign policy decisions made at this international fork 
in the road: a choice between a rapprochement with the ‘Latin’ Portuguese and a ‘final reconciliation’ with 
France – which represented the ‘unquestionable and warm desire of  the whole nation’ – or further 
unpopular and potential perilous entanglement with Germany.104 The British had been lured into a scheme 
through the ‘masterly skill’ of  the German Government which had ‘taken cover behind the Deutsche Bank’ 
in order to disguise the needs of  ‘one of  the Kaiser’s most essentially political and far-reaching schemes’. ‘A 
Venezuelan partnership in the East’ would result in ‘the definite subservience of  this country to the whole 
scheme of  German policy’. Furthermore, dismissing the advantages of  a shorter route to India as piecemeal 
and insignificant, the patriotic diatribe evoked the suspicion of  German aims by warning that aiding 
Germany in the Baghdad issue ‘would be like nothing so much as bringing in the wooden horse to strengthen 
Troy.’105  
On 7 April in Foreign Office memorandum Lord Lansdowne indicated his deep frustration at the 
popular response to negotiations with Germany: 
a serious attempt…to discredit the enterprise, and to render it impossible for His Majesty’s 
Government to associate themselves in any way with it upon the ground that it was closely 
connected with the German Government and detrimental to British interests.106  
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Lansdowne referred with frustration to the ‘anti-German fever from which the country is suffering’ without 
which, he was ‘convinced that we should be unanimously supported in holding and acting upon these 
views’.107 These statements provide evidence to suggest that the popular and press response directly 
influenced Government decision-making. Lansdowne’s private recognition of  the impossibility of  
negotiations with Germany reveals high-level Cabinet sensitivity to popular sentiment. In Parliament over 
the following days Balfour, Cranborne and Lansdowne attempted to argue for the financial incentives of  
investment by British banks in the Baghdad Railway Company, as well as the importance of  making it an 
‘international’ endeavour.108 The Government insisted that the project was not purely a German one – 
merely led by a German bank.109  
The Economist dismembered the Government’s defence, dismissing emphatic denials of  the German 
nature of  the scheme: ‘the right honourable gentleman [Balfour], who could persuade most people of  most 
things, could persuade himself  of  almost any thing.’110 The Economist revealed its suspicions of  Germany’s 
intentions for the Baghdad Railway:  
the whole scheme is of  German origin and inspiration, that the German Government is the 
only Government so far which has displayed any interest in it, and…the result will be the 
intimate association of  His Majesty’s Government with that of  Germany in a manner which 
may very seriously hamper our general liberty of  action in the treatment of  Turkish affairs.111  
The Economist commented upon the worsening popular view of  Germany: since December 1902 it argued 
that ‘a most striking demonstration of  the distaste with which any intimate association with that Power was 
regarded by the great body of  English opinion.’ Recent events proved that ‘nothing has happened in the 
interval to modify that temper of  the public mind’. The New York Times agreed that British eyes had been 
opened to the true nature of  the scheme in spite of  the assurances of  Balfour in the week previous. Its 
London Correspondent asserted that it was believed amongst the public that the railway was in fact ‘designed 
to serve the ends of  German diplomacy at the expense not only of  British investors, but of  British imperial 
interests.’ The more the issue was debated, claimed the New York paper, the stronger the conviction that 
the Baghdad Railway served German aims. Those aims were well known and documented – the goal of  
shifting the balance of  power, not only commercially but militarily and strategically away from Britain and 
into German hands.112 
In spite of  Government efforts to ‘de-germanise’ the Baghdad Railway project, the British public were 
un-swayed in their anger. The press outburst continued in spite of  Government attempts to persuade the 
populace of  the benefits of  such a venture. Publications across the political spectrum were unanimous in 
their distaste for British involvement, and Germany’s involvement was commonly the most unattractive 
element. With the tide of  opinion against them, the Conservative Government was forced to announce its 
withdrawal from negotiations. Although some historians have disputed the Government motivation for 
withdrawal, from the comments of  Lansdowne throughout April, the popular outcry seems to have proved 
extremely problematic for the negotiations. Even those, such as Richard Francis, who argue that the 
withdrawal was caused by internal cabinet disagreement led by Joseph Chamberlain, accept that the popular 
outcry had a strong influence upon events, at the very least in part. 113 Unlike the Venezuela Crisis which 
lasted over two months, the 1903 Baghdad Railway outcry was short and sharp; two weeks of  press and 
public indignation had proved to the government that any cooperation with Germany – be it the Imperial 
Government, private companies or German interests in general – was inadvisable.114 The anger of  the 
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British populace and the popular press seemed to have won a victory; popular criticism was not worth 
‘further encouragement’, as Lansdowne put it.115  
British newspapers unanimously announced a ‘long breath of  relief ’…’drawn by the British nation’. 
The strength of  British opinion on the matter in the Near East seemed to have resulted in a U-turn in 
foreign policy. The Times announced: ‘This nation, in a word, does not want the German partnership…on 
any terms’. ‘116 On an issue of  such ‘vital importance to our Imperial system’ as the Persian Gulf, the British 
public had made clear that any association with Germany would not be tolerated. The Prime Minister and 
the conduct of  his Cabinet during the past months had resulted in ‘very considerable uneasiness in regard 
to his clearness of  view and his appreciation of  the forces of  public thought and sentiment on external 
questions.’ What was more, it argued that Germany’s failure to secure the cooperation from Britain which 
‘they undoubtedly sought’ was not as a result of  ‘any independent recognition on the part of  the British 
Cabinet of  the manifold embarrassments’ which had resulted from recent events. The Economist warmly 
thanked the British public for forcing the Government U-turn.117 Thomas Gibson Bowles, MP and self-
professed foreign affairs expert, joined the Economist in rejoicing at the ‘delayed’ danger and the avoidance 
of  any association with the German conspiracy. Speaking at a meeting of  the Central Asian Society, and 
reported in the Times (where he was a regular contributor), Gibson Bowles claimed to cheers that ‘he felt 
very much indebted to the Press for the high-spirited attitude which they had adopted with regard to the 
matter.’ Similarly, regular Times commentator Edward Sassoon MP exclaimed:  
It seems astounding that the Government could have entertained or coquetted with the notion, 
instead of  courteously giving it its coup de grâce the moment it was mooted…we may now 
shed crocodile’s tears on the none too premature jettisoning of  this egregious abortion.118  
Such exclamations of  relief  at the rejection of  the scheme continued in the following months. From the 
tone of  the chorus of  opinion crowing at the change in tack, it was largely felt that a disaster had been 
narrowly averted. A land route to India had been closed; the German imperial plans had for the time been 
obstructed; and a message had been sent to France and Russia that collaboration with Germany was no 
longer on the table.  
The Spectator, a critic of  the Government’s negotiations with Germany since November 1902, gleefully 
welcomed the announcement of  the British financial consortium’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway 
negotiations. The barbed article professed ‘utmost relief ’ at Balfour’s eventual change of  support, and 
argued: ‘we can recall no instance in recent years in which the nation as a whole showed itself  so full of  
anxiety lest the Government should adopt a particular line of  policy.’ The Spectator suggested that had the 
Government not followed public opinion the force of  anger ‘would have been enough to sweep the 
Government away.’ The insidiousness of  German planning was explained in satirical terms. Put in homely 
terms, Germany had said: 
Unless you are determined to show yourself  grossly rude, hostile, and unfriendly to me, you 
will not only lend me a five-pound note at once and back a bill for me, but also stand outside 
my house and act as a lightning conductor. 
Following up on its article from November 1902, the Spectator also reminded Balfour of  his undue criticisms 
of  their prediction of  dealings over the Baghdad Railway: 
We do think...that a British Prime Minister should take care to know his facts before he makes 
a contradiction of  that sort...those who charge newspapers with the manufacture of  wild 
inventions should be specially careful of  their facts. 
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The Spectator’s fears had been proved correct, and its advice went unheeded. The Daily Mail and the Spectator 
reminded Balfour of  these two humiliating facts, completing the embarrassment of  his troubled 
Government.119 
The British outburst over the revelation of  British participation in the Baghdad Railway negotiations 
indicated the strength of  anti-German feeling in Britain. With the Venezuela Crisis fresh in the memory, 
and after seven years development of  the German Menace in British popular culture, the threat of  a German 
imperial project to British interests was a cause for national outcry and Government criticism. The effects 
of  the paradigm shift which occurred during the Kruger Telegram Crisis were being felt more powerfully 
than ever before. This withdrawal provides evidence to suggest that a decisive change had occurred in British 
perceptions about Germany in the period after 1896; henceforth, it seems, the British would aggressively 
reject any association with their menacing rival.  
The press at the time firmly believed that popular clamour had precipitated an ignominious withdrawal 
by Lansdowne’s consortium; Lansdowne’s own comments on the issue through April 1903 seem to 
corroborate this, without records of  private dealings between Cabinet ministers, definitive evidence is 
difficult to ascertain. The popular relief  at this anti-German U-turn, however, indicated clearly the political 
poison that Germany had become, and the Baghdad Railway negotiations marked the last attempt between 
Germany and Britain to cooperate significantly in international affairs. The political decision-makers had 
received sufficient warning of  the anti-German stance of  the British people. What is more, the insidiousness 
of  Germany, as shown in press comment above, had become widely accepted in popular discourse. The 
traps, tricks, and Trojan horses that Germany had laid at the feet of  the British Government were cause for 
popular anxiety and consternation. The German Menace was clearly asserted as a powerful popular and 
political factor by April 1903.  
Over the summer of  1903 the press turned to the ‘Tariff  War’ between Canada and Germany for 
further evidence of  the German Menace.120 Since 1896 and E.E. Williams’ Made in Germany the idea of  
imperial protectionism became increasingly popular in British popular politics, and the Canadian-German 
Tariff  Dispute provided an opportunity for protectionists to prove that the British Empire should look out 
for its own benefit.121 The resurgence of  interest of  this issue in the immediate aftermath of  the Venezuela 
Crisis and the withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway, only added to popular awareness of  British frailty 
expressed by national efficiency campaigners, and the danger that Germany increasingly represented. The 
dispute with Germany, and the popularity of  the withdrawal from negotiations with Germany over the 
Baghdad Railway allowed Joseph Chamberlain, a man ‘adept at creating prejudice in order to strengthen any 
cause which he may be temporarily supporting’, to noisily launch his Tariff  Reform campaign;122 his 
previous advocacy of  an Anglo-German alliance was swiftly forgotten. Chamberlain’s ‘Tariff  Reform’ 
campaign is well covered in British historiography; but the importance of  it as an expression of  ‘imperial’ 
values - deriving a large part of  its emphasis from global competition with Germany - has been understated. 
Recently, eminent historian of  imperial culture, Andrew Thompson, sought to counter the argument that 
Tariff  Reform was intrinsically domestic in its orientation. By emphasising the ‘Imperial Strategy’ of  the 
movement, Thompson showed the importance of  Empire both to those advocating the policy and those 
decrying it.123 Though this is a matter demanding much greater detailed discussion, it indicates the 
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continuing association of  Germany as a threat to the British Empire in later 1903. The demand for a pan-
imperial protectionist policy came as a direct response to the perceived threat posed by Germany’s bullying 
attitude.  
The popular anger during the Venezuela Blockade and Baghdad Railway Withdrawal seemed to have 
proved publicly that the British people did not desire a relationship of  any kind with Germany. After April 
1903 the press continued to discuss and analyse Germany’s behaviour in relation to popular sentiment in 
Britain.124 In May 1903 the Saturday Review published an article decrying the British Germanophobes for 
their desire to reach a ‘general understanding’ with Russia. Though the article, ‘Russian Realities and German 
Bogeys’ claimed to preach sense, it seems that the prevailing flow of  opinion was that anti-German opinion 
had won the argument: ‘Unfortunately the British press is never really happy unless it has a bogey to make 
the flesh creep…now it is Germany.’ The Saturday Review was pushed to announce that the ‘notion that 
Germany is to embark on the enterprise of  conquering and appropriating our colonies is surely too 
ridiculous;’ yet, by its presence, such a suggestion indicates that people in Britain were increasingly persuaded 
that this was in fact the case. In future, assertions that the public should ignore the ‘ink-beasts’ of  the Berlin 
daily press, and push for a closer relationship with Germany, would become increasingly rare and 
unpopular.125 The June issue of  the Saturday Review added with evidently growing frustration:  
If, even in the days of  [Cardinal] Retz, the discussion of  public affairs by the uninformed was 
something more than ridiculous, it has become a serious danger to-day when the majority of  
mankind is, or easily can be, partially informed on most matters connected with foreign affairs. 
An active, and not always very scrupulous, press can now supply the fragmentary information 
and then play on the bad feeling which it has itself  aroused.126 
This point most of  all indicates that the newspaper reading public craved its ‘bogey’ – as a ‘“nip” to the 
habitual dram-drinker’. Sensation, popular scares and imperial intrigue were what sold newspapers; in this 
period fed by a general distaste and even hatred for Germany. Increasingly, ‘informed’ opinion, as this high-
minded writer would have it, was influencing state policy. As the German chancellor Bülow had exclaimed 
‘the days when national policy was conducted by Cabinets are past; popular passion is all-important in the 
modern world.’127 
The Changing Role of  Germany in Popular Literature  
During 1903 literary depictions of  the German Menace to Britain became increasingly commonplace. As 
argued in chapter three, literary narratives had increasingly been populated with insidious and covetous 
Germans. This literature experienced a step change during 1903; as anxieties about the German Menace 
received unprecedented levels of  popular and political acknowledgment, so authors and publishers sought 
to capitalize on this ubiquitous theme. Sold both in both cheaply available six shilling formats, and as serials 
in popular magazines such as Pearson’s Weekly, producers of  popular fiction appear to have responded to an 
increasing desire for information and stimulation involving Germany 
A variety of  authors and publishers sought to exploit anxiety about Germany in the period during and 
after the Anglo-German Crisis of  1902-03. There was further evidence in the publishing world for the 
changes that occurred over 1903 to the perception of  Germany in Britain. Allen Upward, a popular British 
                                                     
124 ‘Germany and British Trade Policy’, Saturday Review (July 1903), p. 68; Speaker, June 1903; Manchester Guardian, 11 May 1903; Manchester Guardian, 
29 April 1903; Manchester Guardian, 2 July 1903; ‘Canada and the German Tariff ’, Economist (5 September 1903); See Kennedy, P.M., Rise of  the 
Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 262. 
125 ‘Russian Realities And German Bogeys’, Saturday Review, 95:2481 (May 1903), pp. 608–9. 
126 ‘The Cult Of  National Antipathies’, Saturday Review, 95:2486 (June 1903), pp. 770–1. 
127 Ibid. 
 Chapter 4 117
  
 
novelist and self-imagined philosophe, published his account of  ‘Who Sent the Telegram That Made the Boer 
War’ in Pearson’s Magazine, January 1903.128 The collection from which it was extracted, The Secret History of  
Today: Being the Revelations of  a Diplomatic Spy, was advertised in the Daily Express as ‘The most absorbing, 
interesting series of  stories ever published.’ A reading of  what was essentially pulp-fiction of  the purest 
form will quickly undermine that claim. However, reaching a significant audience, the stories focussed upon 
and reflected the major events of  their day. Published in the midst of  the Venezuela Crisis of  1903, in which 
Germany was attacked heavily in the British press, Upward’s stories indicate some of  themes which were 
increasingly common in British expressions pertaining to Germany. Upward initially acquits the Kaiser in 
his first story, ‘The Telegram Which Began the Boer War’, and blames the effect of  the fateful telegram on 
a ‘Muscovite’ plot to worsen relations with Britain. This curious story indicates the ambiguity felt in Britain 
with regard to Germany and the Kaiser, but also somehow links the Kruger Telegram to the start of  the 
South African War – despite there being nearly three years between them. Depicted in this first story as 
impulsive though not anti-British, the Kaiser is an absolute monarch isolated from the rest of  his 
government. Though the plot turns out tellingly to be originated by a dubious Russian-Anarchist, doubts 
are cast upon the Chancellor and the Bismarck family. In a later chapter ‘The Policy of  Edward VII’ 
published in July 1904 the American super-agent protagonist sneaks into the Kaiser’s private quarters at the 
request of  a suspicious King Edward. British fears are confirmed when the ‘diplomatic spy’ uncovers first 
a suspicious map of  the British Empire marked out with red flags, before uncovering a vast plot to establish 
a European Zollverein and conspiracy to unite Europe against the British Empire.129 The twin themes of  
the Kruger Telegram as a vital event in world history and of  a German plot against Britain, are clearly 
visible. In just over a year, the themes of  the same author changed, from ambiguity towards the Kaiser with 
a negative portrayal of  Germany to a much clearer sense of  a pan-imperial threat from Germany. Even in 
January 1903 suspicions of  Germany were high and the Kruger Telegram was very fresh in the popular 
imagination, as argued in chapter three. A year later Upward felt his readership was even more receptive to 
the ‘truth’ of  a German Menace to the British Empire.  
However, in popular literature after Venezuela and Baghdad, the German Menace began to shift from 
the imperially focussed phenomenon it had been since 1896, into the more commonly recognised domestic 
danger that dominated part of  British culture in the decade before 1914. Though the Empire retained an 
important point of  focus, the German threat to Britain itself  grew inexorably to match and eventually 
overwhelm it. On May 27 1903 Smith, Elder & Co. published undoubtedly the most enduring and successful 
Edwardian invasion novel: The Riddle of  the Sands by Erskine Childers. In preparation through 1902 and early 
1903, the narrative depicted the discovery of  a dastardly German invasion plot by brave English amateur 
yachtsmen. In spite of  the glut of  information on the practicalities of  sailing boats, Childers’ novel was 
received with admiration in Britain and was highly popular. The timing of  this novel provides insight into 
the changing popular attitudes in Britain during 1902-03. Written during the period in which the German 
Menace was undergoing its full germination, The Riddle of  the Sands was published only a month after the 
end of  the anti-German outburst surrounding the Baghdad Railway. Childers picked up themes of  
conspiracy with his depiction of  secret German plans for a shock invasion, and of  German jealousy and a 
global challenge: 
We can’t talk about conquest and grabbing. We’ve collared a fine share of  the world, and they’ve 
every right to be jealous. 
His publisher advertised the novel sensationally as ‘An account of  the Cruise of  Yacht “Dulcibella,” being 
a page hitherto unwritten but of  vital interest to all Englishmen, in the recent history of  our relations with 
Germany.’ Such a tag-line suggests the marketability of  the idea of  a threat from Germany and the book 
was a great sales success both in the short term, and over the following decades.130 However, The Riddle of  
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the Sands, published shrewdly in the wake of  such widespread anti-German sentiment also indicated a change 
in the way Germany was imagined. The secret German plans for invasion inspired fear of  both a European 
war and a direct threat to the British way of  life. This was in marked contrast to previous fictional depictions 
of  Germany. Though Germany had featured in some traditional invasion narratives prior to the Riddle, the 
themes and success of  Childers’ novel indicate a growing association of  Germany with a domestic, as well 
as an imperial danger.  
 
Saturday Review, 23 May 1903 
In a sign that the topic of  the German Menace was becoming increasingly marketable, the shrewd 
editor-proprietor of  the Spectator, St Loe Strachey, commissioned a book composed of  a series of  articles 
written by William Arnold published under the title German Ambitions As They Affect Britain and the United 
States (25 May 1903). Arnold’s articles were written for the Spectator over the months before and during the 
Venezuela Blockade. The Speaker granted a glowing review but warned: 
Read by excitable persons, the book might be a stimulus to panic or to passion; to observers 
possessed of  composure and capable of  clear and masculine reasoning it is in no sense an 
invitation to hasty and vehement conclusions.131 
The issue of  the USA was central in Arnold’s mind. Arnold summarised his argument with a message to 
save both Britain and the United States from imminent peril: ‘the supreme moral of  these chapters’ was to 
ensure ‘friendship, and, if  need be, mutual aid, between the great twin brethren of  Anglo-Saxondom.’132 His 
sentiment may seem with hindsight to prove strangely augural in light of  the events of  the twentieth century. 
Another such example of  the popular mass-market anti-German narrative was The Boy Galloper by L. 
James.133 This archetypal invasion story described an invasion of  England by German forces and was 
targeted as a boys’ novel: 
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To say that this book will make every boy who reads it want to go out and enlist, is to tell the 
truth, as far as one may tell it by prophecy…every boy who reads it will be on tenter-hooks 
until he has organised, or become one of, a cadet corps, whether in his school or his town… 
In its review the Bookman warned that if  any books should be bought for British boys for the Christmas of  
1903, The Boy Galloper ‘must be one.’134 The reviewer evidently believed that the novel had struck a chord, 
and that the message of  volunteerism and military preparedness was increasingly important in this new era 
of  insecurity. William Le Queux, already a famous author for invasion novels and sickly love stories, later 
achieved his greatest success with a novel which depicted a German attack on Britain: The Invasion of  1910 
(1906). In October 1903 Le Queux, by then a hugely popular mass-market author, followed the latest trend 
for depicting the German enemy in ‘The Secret of  the Fox Hunter’, a chapter. In this story of  love and 
intrigue, Le Queux described a secret alliance between Germany and Russia ‘the effect of  which would be 
to break British power in the Far East’. The Russo-German conspiracy, though menacing in scale, was 
averted by the self-sacrifice of  Le Queux’s patriotic heroine.135  
During 1903 such popular novels played upon and reinforced the increasingly powerful image of  the 
German Menace. Childers and James brought the German imperial threat home to Britain in their invasion 
narratives, indicating the future development of  the German Menace into a more domestically focused 
anxiety. Nevertheless, the Empire in this period was still fundamental to anxieties about Germany. Drawing 
upon the themes of  British imperial anxieties which pervaded comment about Germany after 1896, in the 
epilogue Childers revealed his imperially-minded concerns:  
We have a small army, dispersed over the whole globe, and administered on a gravely defective 
system. We have no settled theory of  national defence, and no competent authority whose 
business it is to give us one.136 
Britain was imagined as overstretched and undefended, poor in comparison with their German adversaries. 
Le Queux more explicitly played upon the imperial fears of  a German conspiracy in China and Allen 
Upward indicated his own concerns about a global German Menace. William Arnold’s non-fictional account, 
warned of  the global ambitions of  Germany, and the threat to the British Empire. The simultaneous release 
of  Arnold and Childers’s works goes to show the increasing currency that fears of  Germany had gained, in 
whatever form.  
These diverse literary accounts show that by 1903 the German Menace was an established as a literary 
trope which sold in mass quantities, and piqued the imagination of  the British reading public. The imperial 
nature of  the German Menace, established during the Kruger Telegram Crisis and developed and intensified 
over the next seven years, was highly influential in 1903. However, due to the scale and importance of  
Germany as an imagined enemy, British anxieties gradually changed focus from the Empire to the 
metropole. If  Germany wanted to take Britain’s position as the great imperial power, a weakened and 
exposed Britain was viewed as weak and ready to be overwhelmed by Germany’s superior army. German 
efficiency, and aggression, combined with an impulsive autocrat and a scheming High Command, might 
bring about a swift victory by a shock invasion of  Britain. The end result remained the same – imperial 
destruction – but increasingly the threat moved from the periphery to the centre of  Empire. 
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The Times, 3 November, 1908 
The Kruger Telegram in Popular Memory,  
1896-1941 
After 1903 Germany increasingly took precedence as the bête noir of  the British popular imagination. 
Eminent historians have devoted numerous volumes to the development of  popular anti-German sentiment 
in the press, literature, theatre and in political circles.137 In brief, British concerns increasingly came to focus 
upon the race for naval supremacy and invasion and spy-fever.138 There remained some, especially in Liberal 
circles, whom Paul Kennedy has named ‘idealists’, that fought against a ‘flood-tide of  nationalism’; 
ultimately they were drowned out by a growing acceptance of  anti-German narratives.139  
In spite of  the increasing focus upon armaments and European War, the imperial German Menace – 
and thus British imperial anxieties - retained an important influence in British society, as a point of  reference 
and authenticity. The specific example of  the Kruger Telegram – the single most important event in the 
development of  the German Menace - reveals this most clearly. From 1903 to 1941 the Kruger Telegram 
and the crisis of  confidence it provoked in Britain was a regular point of  reference for understanding and 
deriding the Kaiser and Germany. This one incident, hugely important in the development of  anti-German 
sentiment in Britain, can indicate how, in spite of  the other major events of  this period, a fixed point of  
collective memory can act as a lens through which a society views threats and dangers, both real and 
imagined.  
* * * 
The durability of  the Kruger Telegram in the popular memory can be seen during the catalogue of  new 
scandals involving Germany which accumulated up to August 1914.140 During the First Morocco Crisis 
(1905), for example, British journalists drew from the Kruger Telegram tropes in the ideological archive to 
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reflect upon Germany’s latest action. The Kaiser and Germany’s attempt at another ‘imperial grab’ 
necessitated references to the Kruger Telegram once again: ‘It must be admitted that these German tests, 
like the Kruger telegram and the Imperial visit to Tangier, are very radical and thorough. They suggest the 
action of  a man who applies fire to the houses of  his neighbours in order to see whether they will burn.’141 
The Kruger Telegram commonly topped the lists of  grievances; regardless of  the on-going debates about 
the authorship of  the telegram, the Kaiser’s ‘impulsive acts’ were regularly and repeatedly associated with 
the Kruger Telegram and authoritarian rule were repeatedly emphasised in press and fiction.142 
In 1907 J.L. Garvin, writing under his pseudonym, “Calchas”, discussed ‘The Kaiser and the Future’ 
for the Fortnightly Review; he sought to discourage the popular scaremongering about Germany so rife in this 
period, and to promote better relations between Britain and Germany.143 Garvin’s article reveals much about 
the way events had already been catalogued and re-imagined with a decade of  retrospect; he provided a 
summary of  events since the accession of  the Kaiser, paramount among which was the Kruger Telegram 
which changed ‘everything in our political attitude…in an instant.’ Garvin referred to the alarm caused by 
‘the utterly unexpected and yet dangerous character…of  the act’; he evidently felt that 1896 had revealed 
the global threat of  Germany. Garvin saw the Kruger Telegram as a key turning point; if  Wilhelm’s plans 
had been left unhindered by the British then, ‘German policy would dominate the continent…and would 
soon be in a position to arbitrate upon the fate of  the British Empire.’ Garvin’s article indicates the longevity 
of  the imperial anxieties about Germany established in the British press and public sphere after 1896; he 
cited Kiao-Chau, the Baghdad Railway negotiations and other examples as evidence for the plotting, 
conspiratorial nature of  German foreign relations. Garvin called for calm amidst an atmosphere of  ‘blind, 
unreasoning, and hysterical Jingoism’ and ‘Teutophobia’ and although he avowedly stood against popular 
antagonism of  Germany, his article indicates the growing strength of  anti-German sentiment, which drew 
its legitimacy from specifically imperial and global concerns.144  
Other newsworthy events in foreign affairs in the pre-war period led to further reminders of  1896. In 
1908, the Kaiser’s famous Daily Telegraph Affair had caused a major storm of  indignation in German popular 
opinion for Wilhelm’s ‘impulsive declaration of  friendship’ to Britain. Responding to the interview, a 
member’s speech to the Manchester Reform Club referred to the ‘knife-edge’ which Britain walked along in 
its relationship with Britain. If  the Kaiser’s sudden U-turn in relations could generate such a fluctuations in 
British sentiment, what might be the result, ‘of  a harsh word, or a bitter criticism, or another Kruger 
telegram?’; as Lothar Reinermann has argued, though the event provided brief  respite for Wilhelm in the 
British press, it had only a short-lived impact on overall sentiment to Germany.145 Germany, and especially 
the Kaiser, would seemingly never escape the representation of  his impulsiveness, and its connection to the 
Kruger Telegram as the primary example. ‘Impulsive’ Wilhelm and Germany were portrayed again as a 
danger to peace of  ‘Africa, or Persia, or China, or…the Balkans’.146 Since 1896, each latest action by Wilhelm 
was seen in light of  his past endeavours. The importance of  the Kruger Telegram was that it placed each 
event into clearer perspective as British opinion drew on its past experiences to lend authority to ever 
growing fears about the possible results of  the Kaiser’s will and whims.  
In the wake of  the 1911 Morocco Crisis, where the Kaiser’s Germany had once again stirred the 
international anxiety with strong and sudden action, British journalists were once again led to remind 
themselves of  the Kaiser’s record. Sydney Brooks commented in the Fortnightly Review that any sense of  a 
‘philo-German’ tradition which had ‘undoubtedly obtained in Downing Street’ was washed away by the 
‘Kaiser’s telegram to President Kruger’. Brooks then suggested that in German eyes the years before 1896 
was an ‘epoch’ of  ‘latent ill-will’ changing to a period of  ‘open and deliberate policy of  hostility’ thereafter. 
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This rather simplified rendering suggests a willingness to forget any previous attempt to align with 
Germany.147 
In April 1914, just months before the outbreak of  the First World War, A.G. Gardiner, editor of  the 
Daily News, published the popular book, Prophets, Priests, and Kings (1914), in which he discussed the ‘great 
men’ of  the day. In his mini-biography of  the Kaiser, Gardiner expressed some of  the ambiguity popularly 
felt toward the Kaiser typical of  the time.148 The Kaiser, for Gardiner, was ‘the symbol of  medievalism’ for 
the modern world; emotional, impulsive and energetic, it is the autocratic rule of  the Kaiser which had 
engendered this depiction.149 Gardiner described the Kruger Telegram, the Kaiser’s most famous exploit, as 
‘perhaps the most momentous and disastrous incident in the history of  Europe in our time, for it was the 
seed of  all the bitterness of  after years.’ To grant such importance to an event almost two decades previous 
reveals the importance with which it was still perceived. Even before the outbreak of  the First World War 
the Kruger Telegram was produced as the prime example of  Wilhelm’s ‘artistic temperament’ and 
impulsiveness. It is important to recognise the context of  April 1914 in which Gardiner wrote. Gardiner 
described Wilhelm as ‘[i]mpulsive, imperious, dramatic, a militarist from his cradle, a statesman trained in 
“the indirect, crooked ways” of  Bismarck, governed by one passion, the passion to make his land great and 
powerful…’ The themes of  anti-German sentiment were attached implicitly to the Kaiser’s own personality. 
The Kaiser, and thus Germany, were unpredictable, plotting and desire a global dominion.’150 The Kaiser 
and Germany were perceived, from 1896 onwards, as seeking power and greatness; their plans were 
secretive, and their menace unknowable.  
The First World War and After 
After the outbreak of  the First World War, many in Britain sought to establish a turning point at which the 
calamity could have been averted; commentators regularly sought to provide insight into the ‘Psychology 
and Motives’ of  the Kaiser and Germany in their collective ‘war-madness’. The Kruger Telegram was 
regarded commonly as an early revelation of  the Kaiser’s lust for world domination, after which he ‘never 
looked back’.151 In October 1914 the English Review debated the greatest of  the ‘Kaiser’s Failures’; the Kruger 
Telegram ranked highest and was viewed as the point at which ‘the Kaiser gave formal expression to the 
new policy which has ever since been the corner-stone of  the Imperial design.’ The English Review made a 
drastic error, not only by placing the Kruger Telegram (4 Jan 1896) after the Kaiser’s ‘World Empire’ speech 
(19 January 1896), but in fact stating the Kruger Telegram as an event of  1897, as ‘the first political act of  
the Kaiser in assertion of  his views’.152 This glaring example of  the flexibility of  history in meeting the 
demands of  good copy also indicates the detachment of  events from popular memory; the threat of  a newly 
announced ‘World Empire’ was inseparable with the British popular outburst in January 1896.  
An inevitable desire arose to establish war-guilt. Inevitably, Germany and the Kaiser were viewed as the 
chief  culprits. Pseudo-historical accounts tended to place the Kruger Telegram at the beginning of  an 
unstoppable slide to war. According to the Saturday Review in October 1914, the Kaiser had grown to hate 
Britain ‘with a rancorous and envious malice’, indicated from telegram of  1896 onwards. The ‘sudden 
inspiration’ which epitomised the Kaiser’s international actions drew upon the trope of  ‘Kaiserly’ surprise 
and volatility going back to 1896.153 His impulsive behaviour was clearly blamed not only for such 
international blunders, but seemingly for the entire global conflict. The paradigm shift precipitated by the 
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Kruger Telegram Crisis in January 1896 influenced the British imagination in the opening months of  the 
First World War.  
In 1916 Winston Churchill, recently returned from active service on the Western Front, offered his 
views on the difficulty of  predicting the war before its outbreak for the Sunday Pictorial: ‘Very wise men with 
full knowledge of  all the facts, came to the wrong conclusion; and very foolish men, giving rein to their 
prejudices, came to the right conclusion, and are entitled to boast of  it for ever.’154 Churchill’s ‘foolish men’, 
the ‘scaremongers’ of  the pre-war era retorted quickly their various reflections;155 contributors highlighted 
a number of  events as the key indicator of  Germany’s intentions: the widening of  the Kiel Canal, the ‘Great 
Naval Bill’ (1907) or the Agadir Crisis (1911). Inevitably, the Kruger Telegram was employed as the key 
turning point. Shirley Benn, MP, for example, argued that ‘unprejudiced men who had visited Germany ever 
since the episode of  the Kruger telegram were well aware that war was inevitable’.156 Benn’s recollections 
were flagrantly imprecise, but the inclusion of  the telegram as the first and prime example of  this shift in 
policy is evidence of  the seminal importance of  that event as a shared cultural reference-point.  
Thus a trope developed in which the Kruger Telegram was envisioned as a missed opportunity for 
Britain; journalists expressed in ever-more doleful tones that the crisis should have ‘opened the eyes of  
British statesmen’.157 Thomas Seccombe that the ‘Kaiser’s telegram to Kruger roused us for a moment’ but 
nevertheless Britain ‘went on whistling, “splendid isolation,”’ and did nothing.158 The debate about the 
responsibility for the telegram itself  was linked directly to this vision of  1896 as a key turning point.  
Before 1914, debates had raged between those who attributed the telegram to the Kaiser’s turbulent 
moods, and those who proclaimed it as an act of  state.159 Many of  pre-war apologist accounts argued that 
the telegram was coordinated as an act of  state, rather than an outburst by Wilhelm. In May 1918 Valentine 
Chirol, a veteran journalist, debated the origin and meaning of  the Kaiser’s message in the Times. 160 Chirol 
first attacked the memoirs of  Otto Hammann, (former Director of  the German Foreign Office Press 
Bureau) as possessing questionable ‘historical value’ on the matter of  the telegram. That this debate went 
on into the 1920s indicates the longevity of  the Kruger Telegram in the popular imagination.161  
Even with the post-war rise of  the ‘Spirit of  Locarno’ and the welcoming of  a new Germany to the 
international community, the issue of  the old ‘Prussian’ Germany dogged journalists. Indeed, the issues of  
German brutality and ‘Prussianism’ continued to provoke soul-searching about Britain’s own imperial 
heritage. Through the 1920s many factual and critical accounts attacked German colonial methods, forming 
a justification for the Protectorates Britain established over Germany’s old enemies. A flurry of  publications 
from British authors, such as M.C. Cariston’s The Prussian Lash in Africa (1918), focussed on the destruction 
of  communities of  the Namaqua, Herero and others under German colonial rule.162 Many began to discuss 
the end of  the German colonial endeavour and its implications for the future of  Africa and the British 
Empire.163 Wartime atrocity propaganda soon transformed into debates over ‘Germany’s lost colonies’.164 
After the end of  hostilities, it was unclear whether Germany would have her previous colonies returned to 
her in the eventual peace settlement, but authors such as René Puaux and C.B. Fletcher were amongst many 
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who urged decisions makers against doing so.165 Fletcher spoke with strong condemnation of  ‘unimaginable 
cruelties’, ‘slavery for the men and concubinage for the women’ and of  the mass murder of  thousands of  
Hereros and other tribes.166 The unsettled nature of  the British Empire in the period after the First World 
War led to fears that the British themselves might be infected by German colonial methods. In reflecting 
upon the brutality of  Britain’s General Dyer in the aftermath of  the Amritsar Massacre in 1919, fears were 
expressed that imperial rule could precipitate ‘Prussianism’ in colonial policing.167 During this period, such 
evidence suggests that the German Menace deeply influenced Britain’s own self-imagine, even in the 
intervening spirit of  cooperation and rapprochement.168  
Throughout the 1920s an increasing number of  historical accounts began to appear which placed the 
Kruger Telegram at the heart of  the path to war. In 1924 H.E. Barnes claimed that the incident resulted in 
the alienation of  England, with ‘good feeling was not restored until June, 1914.’ “Augur”, writing in the 
same year for the Fortnightly claimed that ‘[t]he War did not come suddenly’ and that since the Kruger 
Telegram, ‘the coming conflict was a menace ever present in the minds of  those few British statesmen to 
whom we owe that in 1914 we were neither quite unprepared nor without friends.’ In an account simplifying 
an intensely complex and turbulent period into a steady slide to war from 1896 to 1914, we see the 
reproduction of  the German Menace and its close association with the telegram crisis.169  
Also writing in 1924, the journalist and popular historian, J.L. Garvin, wrote once more about the 
Kruger Telegram: ‘Irreparable damage was done…But the probe was portentous. Between Britain and 
Germany was opened a gulf  of  hostility never bridged.’ The telegram was invested with vital significance in 
a post-war generation seeking to grapple with history through the wreckage of  war. Garvin’s historical 
account is tinged with the spirit of  the post-war age; he wrote a melancholic, cataclysmic history filled with 
deep regret. Garvin granted the crisis primacy as the inspiration for the German 1897 Naval Law, and 
sparked the plans for world domination: ‘The Germans…waited and worked for a day of  power and 
reckoning as against England.’ Thus he invested the incident, a peripheral moment of  imperial antagonism, 
as having epochal significance. 170  
Garvin had tapped into the constant current of  opinion inspired by the Kruger Telegram. Though 
international relations ebbed and flowed, the British perception of  Germany was fundamentally altered by 
the crisis and the subsequent development of  fears of  a German Menace. The ‘Prussian’ rule of  the Kaiser, 
Germany’s secretive plans for world domination and the imposition of  its cruel methods upon Britain and 
its Empire scarred the popular imagination, and in the inter-war period, this scarring revealed itself  through 
debates about the Kruger Telegram, as a point at which Germany could have been stopped, and the fate of  
German colonial subjects, which might have befallen Britain’s own colonies had Germany acted as the 
British feared. 
Through the later 1920s and 1930s historians began to revise popular understandings of  the Kruger 
Telegram Crisis from the later 1920s. In 1925 Raymond Sontag argued that previous accounts had ‘hitherto 
felt their way more or less blindly’ sought to analyse events which appeared to have led ‘with the inevitability 
of  a Greek tragedy’ to the ‘debacle’ of  the Great War’. The recent opening of  the German archives allowed 
Sontag and others to explore with more accuracy the reality behind events which had been so commonly 
debated.171 Anthony Steel, in his contribution to The Cambridge History of  the British Empire (1929), agreed 
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that ‘the importance of  this incident is often over-rated’; furthermore he cited Garvin’s famous Life of  
Chamberlain as a major culprit for this exaggeration.172 Steel and Sontag would doubtless agree that the perils 
of  the retrospective in history, and of  the dangers of  personal accounts and reminiscences to cloud 
judgement, are particularly present in some such accounts.173 Even into the 1930s, the Kruger Telegram was 
still granted far greater prominence as a ‘turning point’ than it deserved in popular accounts. To the 
exasperation of  contemporary historians, accounts from the Pall Mall Gazette continued to draw upon the 
same tropes and up upon a popular trend for attributing added weight to individual ‘turning points’.174  
On 3 June 1941 Wilhelm II Hohenzollern died at Huis Doorn, in the Netherlands. An obituary was 
announced in a full-page Times spread: ‘The Last Great Kaiser’ referred to the Kruger Telegram Crisis as 
the first indication of  Germany’s intent to grasp “World Dominion”. In the British imagination the Kaiser, 
and his Reich, were never separated from his fateful telegram. The obituary depicted Wilhelm’s life, in sum, 
as a failed quest for world mastery.175 In the Contemporary Review George Gooch offered his own epitaph, 
reflecting that the ‘crazy Kruger telegram’ tore open a ‘wound’ that ‘never really healed’. Gooch made the 
same link between the crisis and the recognition that the event was crucial to the true beginning of  
Germany’s ‘risky game of  Weltpolitik’.  
Many similar accounts made the same links between the Kruger Telegram Crisis and the beginning of  
a serious German imperial challenge.176 The link symbolizes how many of  the tropes powerfully established 
or re-established during the outburst of  January 1896 were solidified in the British popular imagination to 
gain much greater importance in light of  later events. After 1896 Germany was increasingly seen as a 
‘menace’ to British interests, and this imperial insult had formed the foundations for a serious and sustained 
sense of  imperial anxiety, coloured by the depiction of  Germany as a plotting and unpredictable menace, 
much as Russia had been throughout the nineteenth century. Following this point the Kruger Telegram 
acted as a key point around which British writers and journalists based their arguments. Their readerships, 
we may suggest, were expected to instantly recognise the Kruger Telegram as evidence of  the German 
Menace. In terms of  the popular imagination and popular discourse, the crisis of  January 1896 was a seminal 
moment in developing perceptions of  a German Menace. Until 1903 this menace was imagined to be 
directed at the British Empire. Inevitably, as the threat grew it focussed in upon the British mainland, but 
despite this the Empire retained an important influence over the British popular imagination throughout 
this period. 
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Conclusion 
I write these articles because I believe that Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the 
British Empire; and because I know that we are not able or ready to defend ourselves against a 
sudden and formidable attack.  
The Empire is in danger, but the people do not believe it. They have been taught to regard the 
German menace as a wild scare of  invasion, and they believe the Navy can protect them while 
they make their money or take their ease…But the danger of  invasion is not the greatest or the 
only danger; and the strongest Navy in the world could not save us from disaster should the 
lowering war clouds break before we are prepared. 
Germany is preparing to attack us because we stand in the way of  her ambitions….For the 
Pan-Germanic ambition is the ambition for empire; the ambition to dominate and exploit the 
world. It is the old, old lust for power and glory, the old, old greed for trade and wealth…World-
domination, conquest! 
Robert Blatchford, Daily Mail, 13 September 1909 
 
In 1909 Robert Blatchford, famous ‘English Socialist’, wrote a series of  articles for the Daily Mail in which 
he warned of  a serious German threat to Britain. Blatchford was sent to research Germany by Lord 
Northcliffe, the most important and influential British press baron of  his era; the results seemed ominous 
and received great attention in the British press. Blatchford’s articles were written in the sensational, modern 
style which had helped the Daily Mail to achieve a daily circulation of  close to one million by the start of  
the First World War. He warned of  a great danger to the British Empire: Germany was preparing to 
annihilate the British Empire and Britain was frighteningly unprepared. Furthermore, he argued that the 
concerns which so exercised the British public in 1909 – the threat of  the German Navy and invasion – 
were secondary to the real danger: the German lust for world domination.  
Blatchford professed deep concern about the ambition of  Germany to steal away Britain’s Empire and 
to dominate the world. This popular attitude, expressed at the height of  Anglo-German naval antagonism, 
stemmed from a previous era of  imperial antagonism. The turbulent imperial relations between Britain and 
Germany during the period 1896-1903 profoundly influenced popular attitudes, to the extent that it was 
widely assumed in Britain that Germany was actively planning to undermine and overwhelm the Empire. 
The realities of  international diplomacy combined with the insecure British imperial mind-set to produce a 
consistently growing sense of  danger, which came to dominate popular discourse about Germany. In 1909 
Blatchford claimed to be the only one to know the secret and frightening truth about the imminent threat 
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to British imperial survival. In reality, he had seized upon a long-established popular attitude by invoking 
the long tradition of  the German Menace to the British Empire - the phenomenon which has been the 
primary focus of  this thesis. 
*** 
The British idea of  the German Menace had adopted all of  the themes of  the various other British imperial 
anxieties by the beginning of  the First World War. Typically, historians of  popular culture have focussed 
upon the German threat in connection with the naval race after 1904; in fact, it is possible to suggest that 
all of  the key elements of  the conception of  a German Menace to Britain were in place before that point. 
Many of  the features of  the German threat were drawn from imperial confrontations after 1896, but some 
of  key influences were in fact derived from past imperial anxieties (about France and Russia), and transposed 
upon the newly emergent Germany. The origins of  the German Menace lay in the Empire and in parts of  
the world under British imperial influence: South Africa, China, Venezuela and the Middle East. It was 
because of  imperial antagonism that Britons first learned to distrust Germany, and this imperial colouring 
remained present past the Armistice in 1918.  
The Kruger Telegram Crisis of  1896 was brief; the press storms and popular anger calmed within a 
month of  the event. However, though the crisis was relatively short-lived, the impact was substantial. The 
affront to British suzerainty in the Transvaal inspired deep jingoistic anger, displays of  patriotism, and 
aggressive threats. The fact that a nation, who had previously been viewed as friendly (at least in comparison 
to other potential enemies), had confronted Britain in such an overt and aggressive manner was a major 
reason offered for the outpouring of  anger. The entry of  a new contender into the matrix of  imperial 
anxieties had a strong impact on the British popular consciousness. Furthermore, it was the special position 
of  South Africa as a uniquely valuable imperial interest which played an important contributory role in 
inspiring such emotion in the popular outburst. Its intrinsic value allied to its strategic importance marked 
it out as a vital imperial asset.  
Increasingly the British viewed themselves as standing alone against the world, fitting with the ‘splendid 
isolation’ of  Lord Salisbury, but more importantly tied to the common themes of  imperial anxieties over 
the past decades. In the first weeks of  the crisis press and public called swiftly for a robust response, and 
even cries for war. The idea that Britain was overstretched, a key feature of  the theme of  imperial anxiety, 
played an instrumental role; politicians, the press and popular attention turned to the armaments debate 
with renewed vigour. Germany was represented as a jealous, covetous and insidious enemy. Themes of  
jealousy, of  their own imperial inadequacy and of  long-running schemes to undermine the British Empire 
began to grip the popular imagination. Conspiracy theories could be found amidst the daily reports on the 
Transvaal Crisis and thoughts soon turned to German-Boer intrigues and secret alliances. The Kaiser’s 
absolute rule was attacked; Wilhelm was perceived as the malevolent force behind this deliberate insult, and 
was abused with an astounding level of  vitriol. His ‘Kaiserly’ impulsiveness and his potential for secret 
conspiracies were feared and through these a collective German Menace was constructed in popular 
imagination.  
These themes of  imperial overstretch, German covetousness and the Kaiser’s war-mongering 
absolutism were crystallized into a set of  tropes – stored as a collective ideological cluster – to be reused 
and redeveloped. The Kruger Telegram was a vital point of  historical reference. In each future occurrence 
of  Anglo-German tension, the crisis was used as a vindication of  theories propounding the German 
Menace; over the following years, these tropes would be augmented to include the spectre of  German 
national efficiency, a factor which helped eventually to propel the German Menace into a position of  greater 
prominence than any other single threat. The imperial nature of  the German threat remained an important 
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factor even when debates shifted to the more imminent imagined threat of  invasion and to fears of  a 
German naval challenge. 
In the seven years after the outburst of  anger in January 1896 tropes about Germany as a threat to 
Britain developed and coalesced into a much clearer view of  what constituted the German Menace. These 
themes were first established during the Kruger Telegram Crisis as a disparate set of  accusations and 
rumours. The image of  Germany which crystallized during the January 1896 had a strong influence over 
the mood of  the following years; negative responses to German Weltpolitik were defined within the new 
paradigm which developed as a result of  the crisis. The shock to Britain caused by the South African War 
hardened those attitudes and encouraged the widespread acceptance of  both the perception that Germany 
was a threat and a clearer sense of  what constituted that threat. British debates about Germany were 
increasingly influenced by the German economic challenge, and its apparent jealousy, conspiracy and 
autocracy, themes which began to coalesce in January 1896.  
Debates about the lack of  efficiency and decadence in Britain were symbolic of  attitudes across this 
period. The South African War provided evidence to the pre-existing argument that Britain was failing 
against her main rivals. The popularity of  ideas of  national efficiency demonstrated both the lasting effect 
of  the shocks of  the South African War, and the continuity of  the imperial anxieties of  the 1880s and 1890s. 
Many in Britain perceived the Empire as overstretched and weakened; Britain was in need of  drastic action 
to secure its future as a world power. The spectre of  Germany lay at the heart of  this culture of  self-doubt; 
it represented both a model for efficiency and organisation, and also a rival which should be feared and 
countered. The increasingly aggressive German foreign policy and developing ideas of  German economic 
efficiency caused perceptions to evolve from an isolated argument in favour of  protection in 1896, into a 
more generalised conception of  a menace to the British Empire.  
Whilst debates about efficiency and the danger of  German commercial power raged on, the other 
themes of  the January 1896 crisis continued to be developed and re-imagined. Through the development 
of  the German colonial empire and the push for global influence evidence was repeatedly provided suggest 
that the fears expressed about Germany during the Kruger Telegram crisis were correct. Especially in 
respect of  Africa and China - the two imperial spheres where Britain and Germany came into closest and 
most regular contact - it was increasingly apparent that Germany was ruled by an impulsive and 
unpredictable autocrat, desirous of  world power. The brutality of  German military methods and the 
impulsiveness of  its High Command made it a power to be feared, and anathema to the British liberal self-
image. The British increasingly imagined this dangerous new world power; as covetous and jealous of  
Britain’s position as the primary power in the world. Furthermore, it was argued that Germany would seek 
in the future to undermine and attack Britain at every opportunity. Polemicists and authors repeatedly 
warned that Britain was Germany’s prime target; across the world its soft, overstretched underbelly was 
prime meat for the Imperial German war machine.  
Over time, and nourished by international events which seemed to provide vindication to such theories, 
these more complex arguments were more regularly and assertively voiced together, and often expressed as 
a summing-up of  Germany as a whole. Britain emerged from the South African War a nation which 
perceived itself  to have been shaken awake - rescued at the last minute from imperial collapse. Ideas of  
national reawakening were connected directly to this lustrous and virile German danger, and the lessons 
learned since the Kruger Telegram about German insidiousness, covetousness, brutality and autocracy 
combined to create a much more simplified and easily accessible cluster of  stereotypes.  
The major announcements and actions of  Imperial Germany during this period were ammunition for 
the development of  stereotypes about Germany. These tropes did not develop in a political vacuum, but 
rather were closely tied to developments across the world. Britain’s literary culture was founded upon a 
global and imperial consciousness, and these views filtered through to influence the popular imagination. 
Readers of  the daily, weekly and monthly newspapers in this period, of  whom there were millions, were 
exposed to a regular flow of  comment upon Germany’s conduct which was increasingly negative. Positive 
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views were also increasingly rare and Liberal newspapers, the minority in the market, were more likely to 
dismiss anti-German views as sensationalist, rather than defend Germany outright. Through the example 
of  Germany, it is possible to indicate how important international affairs in this period were in influencing 
national identity and popular perceptions of  national rivals. Furthermore, by tracing the development of  
these loosely connected stereotypes into a more coherent and simplified whole, it also possible to emphasise 
the profound impact of  national crises, and to understand how new discourses are formed out of  sudden 
shocks to popular consciousness.  
These markedly imperial concerns should be viewed as being linked to the later development of  naval 
race anxieties. Established scholarship has failed to emphasise that the German Menace to the British 
Empire was already a well-established popular phenomenon before the rise of  domestically focussed 
popular Anglo-German antagonism from 1904. This specifically imperial anxiety helps to explain much 
about British popular sentiment in this period, and was tied to wider processes of  national self-doubt, social 
change and economic decline.  
However, it is important to recognise that Germany was very much a focus for a more holistic imperial 
anxiety between the time of  the Kruger Telegram and that of  the Anglo-French Entente. Later invasion 
scares, and a change to focus solely upon the threat to the British metropole, can be traced back to the 
development of  imperial anxieties over this earlier period. Germany served as a focal point for British fears 
of  imperial decline; the German Menace provided a tangible and recognisable lens through which British 
inadequacies, doubts and anxieties could be explored. This fixation helps to explain how it was possible for 
Germany to be imagined as a pervasive threat to the British Empire while being fundamentally unable to 
pose a real threat to imperial stability in this period. The German Menace had persuaded many in Britain 
that Germany could not be trusted, that it was an unsavoury power and a direct threat to British global 
dominance; at the end of  1902 and beginning of  1903, the British public was primed to aggressively reject 
two government attempts to cooperate with Germany. 
The examples of  the Venezuela Crisis and the Baghdad Railway show how prominent the anti-German 
paranoia developed in the aftermath of  the Kruger Telegram had become by late 1902. The characterisation 
of  Germany as a malevolent threat to the British Empire was a major feature of  the cultural and political 
landscape in the imperial metropole by mid-1903. The imagery and themes inherent in the responses to the 
Venezuela Crisis and the Baghdad Railway negotiations indicate how perceptions of  a German imperial 
menace were directly connected to the Kruger Telegram Crisis in 1896. The nascent stereotypes burst into 
the limelight with the onset of  these two popular crises. German naval actions during the Venezuela 
blockade seemed to provide authentication for views of  Germany’s autocratic and brutal nature; the 
impulsivity of  the Kaiser and his aggressive militaristic methods were associated with thrusting and ruthless 
German military tactics. The bombardment of  Fort San Carlos consequently fitted within the narrative of  
German autocracy and aggression. Germany was repeatedly accused of  insidiousness and conspiracy; even 
a temporary alliance was viewed as dangerous - it was unpredictable with ambitions directly conflicting with 
Britain’s own.  
News that the British were participating in negotiations with Germany over the Baghdad Railway 
caused panic; Britain would supposedly be providing finance for Germany to dominate a project which 
could directly challenge Britain’s influence in the Near and Middle East, and threaten imperial security in 
India. Whatever the political persuasion of  the newspaper, Germany’s tactics and ambitions were cause for 
criticism and concern. British popular discourse had been so influenced by the development of  this menace 
- partly imagined, partly real - that it was a matter for discussion whenever the subject of  Germany was 
raised. That Germany potentially menaced Britain’s Empire became an accepted norm; those who did not 
accept the threat nonetheless actively acknowledged the dominance of  the idea itself. In the press, 
periodicals and popular literature, Germany was increasingly vilified after the withdrawal from the Berlin-
Baghdad Railway negotiations. Evidence suggests that popular mass-market fiction and non-fiction writers 
and publishers were desperate to capitalise on this newly radicalised anti-German atmosphere. This heralded 
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the initiation of  the characterisation of  the German bête noire in spy and invasion novels, with popular writers 
such as Childers and Le Queux in the vanguard.  
The importance of  the German Menace was also indicated by its influence upon political decision-
making. The realization of  the marketability and popularity of  this imagery gave it a degree of  its own 
momentum to the point that it tied government hands. The press, and popular sentiment, arguably provoked 
changes in Government policy during the Venezuela and Baghdad Railway episodes. The popular anger 
about cooperation with Germany delivered clear messages to the Balfour Government, which was for a 
time threatened by these foreign policy blunders. Any association with Germany in an imperial context 
would be electorally poisonous. In this era the British press increasingly acted as a democratising medium, 
which enabled popular sentiment to influence decision making. Whilst the press would subtly aim to 
persuade its audience, it was forced, in such a competitive mass-market, to feed the demands and desires of  
the general public. The outbursts over Venezuela and Baghdad stand as a clear example of  the increasingly 
complex relationship between the people, the media and the government.1 These political crises and the 
popular anger they fomented made clear that in Britain, Germany was politically poisonous; the safest policy 
for future Governments would be tacit avoidance, while the press and publishers soon recognised the 
increased potential of  the German Menace as a mass-market phenomenon. 
The popular outbursts during 1902-3 marked a new high for the imperial German Menace; henceforth 
anxieties about Germany were increasingly directed toward the imperial metropole. Until later in 1903 the 
German threat had little association with the British Isles. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the reason for 
this transfer to a domestically focussed phenomenon was in fact the very prevalence of  the imperial threat. 
The seriousness attributed to the German imperial threat facilitated its development into a more direct 
threat to Britain itself. Before Childers’ Riddle of  the Sands in mid-1903, narratives about Germany were much 
more commonly associated with imperial antagonism. As argued in chapter three, literary depictions of  war 
with Germany often revolved around imperial wars (e.g. The Mysterious Mr Sabin, the Yellow Danger) or secretive 
and clandestine tactics to undermine Britain’s imperial control (The Empire Makers). Childers’ novel marked 
the beginning of  the rise of  a craze for German invasion scares in popular fiction, spanning many genres 
and formats.2  
From this period onwards, British fears would inevitably focus upon the domestic sphere, out of  
perceived necessity. But the Empire, so central to the British popular identity and imagination in this period, 
was the focal point for the development of  Britain’s fear of  Germany, and it was here that the imperial 
menace laid the key foundations for all perceptions of  Germany in the pre-war armaments race, and the 
aggressive anti-German sentiment and activity during the First World War. The Kruger Telegram as an 
incident lingered long in the memory, as did the term ‘Hun’, the autocratic and aggressive image of  
Germany, and the view of  Germany as an insidious and nefarious danger to Britain. 
*** 
The findings of  this study suggest a need to reconsider a number of  interpretations and emphases in our 
understanding of  this period. By drawing links between abstract stereotypes, popular outbursts of  anger or 
anxiety and real domestic or international events, it is possible to augment approaches to popular culture. 
Too often in historiography the lure of  the Anglo-German Dreadnought Race (1906-1914) has led to an 
over-emphasis upon this later period. This thesis has aimed to present new insight to the scholarly 
understanding of  British attitudes towards Germany, and also to challenge assumptions about the pre-war 
                                                     
1 See Geppert, D., Pressekriege. 
2 As argued by Nicholas Hiley, these invasion scares were so influential as to inspire vast quantities of  supposed ‘spy spottings’ through the 1900s 
and 1910s, and contributed to the establishment of  Britain’s anti-espionage forces. Hiley, N., ‘The Failure of  British Espionage against Germany, 
1907-1914’, Historical Journal, 26:4 (1983), pp. 867–89; Hiley, N., ‘Decoding German Spies’, pp. 55–79; HO 317/44, Suspected German espionage 
in United Kingdom: letter of  introduction to Chief  Constables for Captain Kell from Home Secretary. 
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period. It has been commonplace to assume that Anglo-German antagonism – both popular and diplomatic 
– only began in the decade before the First World War. From a popular cultural perspective, the period 
between 1896 and 1903 is just as important for the birth and foundation of  the key stereotypes and modes 
of  expression which dominated the following decades.  
Too little has been made of  the prevalence of  negative imagery and stereotyping of  Germany during 
this earlier period, before the Dreadnought Age. Some authors have even used the Kaiser’s intermittent 
popularity to question the popularity of  anti-German sentiment. I would argue that though the British did 
express intermittent appreciation of  the Kaiser, Wilhelm II and the image of  an aggressive and militaristic 
Germany were interchangeable and flexible. Even when the Kaiser’s friendship was welcomed, this was 
expressed with hope rather than conviction, and the continuities in expressions of  opinion about the 
German Menace suggest that such fears were not allayed by these brief  occurrences. Furthermore, when 
the Kaiser was ‘in fashion’, British discourse changed focus to attack German anglophobia or military 
brutality. I would suggest that a constant undercurrent of  anti-German attitudes permeated the press and 
literature during this period.  
Historians such as Dominik Geppert and Frank Bösch have contributed greatly to our understanding 
of  the relationship between press and politics in this period; such accounts, however, have tended to focus 
more upon either the influence of  powerful individuals, or upon the wider structures or information 
networks. This study complements such histories by investigating how political events and decision-making 
interacted with wider popular culture. Such factors as international affairs, wars, state crises, or economic 
change play a profound role in the formation of  xenophobic or nationalistic stereotyping; this is an 
association which requires clear assertion when combining press and literary approaches. Case-studies such 
as the Kruger Telegram Crisis or the German Seizure of  Kiao Chau show how events involving British 
interests across the world could help form stereotypes or add layers to pre-existing ones. Furthermore, these 
crises were later used by journalists and authors as evidence for further plots or conspiracies; such popular 
panics or crises provided the basis of  lasting authenticity for proponents of  xenophobic and anxious 
sentiments. Stereotype-formation should be viewed as inspired and powerfully influenced by the processes 
of  political and societal change; but once initiated by such major developments, stereotypes and ideological 
constructs then attain their own unique essence – tied to elements of  reality but prone to extreme 
exaggeration and sensation.  
The negative image of  Germany steadily accrued authority and authenticity until 1902, at which point 
it burst onto the political scene. Popular anti-German outbursts over the Venezuela Blockade and the 
Baghdad Railway contributed to changes in Foreign Policy, making Germany a toxic partner for the Balfour 
Government. In an era where British and German officials were attempting to improve relations, the press 
and public stood strongly opposed, and made their opinion about Germany explicit. This adds to the 
scholarly view of  politics in Britain during this period; evidence suggests that politicians were increasingly 
prone to the sway of  popular debate and opinion. We should indeed view this as a society in the throes of  
political democratisation. Certain shock events appear to have caused paradigm shifts in popular attitudes; 
following these crises, such seminal events form points of  historical authenticity through which all future 
events could be viewed. Nevertheless, without reminders of  Germany’s Weltpolitik and unattractive 
diplomatic methods, the concept of  the German Menace would have found less fertile ground in British 
popular discourse.  
This thesis also contributes to the debate about British popular imperialism; the Empire lay at the heart 
of  the early development of  popular anti-German sentiment. I have found strong evidence to suggest that 
the British popular imagination and popular discourse were powerfully influenced by global and imperial 
events; they had a globalised popular consciousness which was defensive, jingoistic and often xenophobic 
in the purest sense of  the word. Public debate and popular discourse was regularly provoked by imperial 
crises and international antagonism. During the period from 1896 until the First World War, the people of  
Britain were aware of, and anxious about their empire. The growth of  nationalism, patriotism, and 
132 Conclusion  
 
 
xenophobia – aimed at targets both within Britain and without – typify this period. Imperial anxiety, as 
argued by Siddiqi, Wagner and others, influenced high-politics and mass culture; increasing literacy, the rise 
of  a mass newspaper press and huge rises in the popularity and accessibility of  popular fiction meant that 
the British increasingly participated in a genuinely popular culture which was repeatedly washed over by 
outbursts of  patriotism, concern, jubilation and aggression throughout this period. It is with this swelling 
mass of  opinion and anxiety that rising British popular imperialism clashed with an increasingly active 
German expansionism.  
My work has revealed more about the fractious and febrile atmosphere of  late-Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain; this was a society permeated by self-doubt and a growing defensive nationalism. The British were 
increasingly drawn to seek out potential enemies both in Britain and abroad; anti-German sentiments 
revealed here relate to the xenophobia which surrounded the Aliens Act of  1905. This indicates a much 
more general trend in popular attitudes: Britain was increasingly imagined as exposed and endangered 
throughout this period; fears of  Germany and other imperial enemies were part of  this wider development.  
In historical scholarship the popular press and literature have rarely been considered and examined 
together within the same context. We should view the different aspects of  modern popular word-culture as 
fundamentally entwined; serials in newspapers, popular novels, opinion pieces, editorials, journal articles and 
political polemics all shared one culture of  information. Authors, publishers and consumers were not 
isolated from one another, boxed off  into insular or singular genres; rather the mass market for literature 
and information meant that the many currents of  thinking, imagination and opinion were imbricated with 
one another to the extent that it was not always possible to isolate one from the other.  
Works of  literature should always be considered within the context of  their creation and consumption. 
Authors and publishers were extremely sensitive to popular trends and shifts in opinion; they were capable 
of  reacting quickly to seize upon the new sensational topics which excited their readership. Without situating 
oneself  firmly within the context and chronology of  one’s work, it is possible to miss the subtleties of  these 
developments. By incorporating a broad base of  primary sources from a variety of  archives, formats and 
genres it is suggested that historians of  popular culture can provide a more detailed and accurate account 
of  the development of  ideas and the networks of  information. This approach to popular cultural study can 
tell us much, not merely about the fin-de-siècle period, but also about a variety of  societies across 
chronologies and settings. 
Popular stereotypes and the dynamics of  paranoia have a profound importance in modern societies, 
and perhaps that has ever been the case. I have aimed to reveal more about the transfer and development 
of  such ideas, their interrelationship with unfolding events, and the interaction between the people, the 
media and the state. It is suggested that using these techniques we may trace networks of  information, the 
impact of  popular stereotypes and anxiety upon society, and the impact of  global events and developments 
upon popular culture. By conducting a deep analysis of  the development of  stereotypes during this period 
it has been possible to reveal more about how such stereotypes and ideas form and develop over time. 
Moments of  crisis precipitate paradigm shifts which can leave legacies in thought, expression and debate 
over considerable spans of  time. In the short term such paradigmatic change can release currents of  opinion 
which persist and develop, gathering momentum and historical authenticity, into powerful political and 
cultural issues. In the long term stereotypes created by sudden shocks can profoundly influence popular 
memory, and leave a lasting impression upon national and cultural identities. 
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